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Something Old, Something New:
Forecasting Willing Buyer/Willing
Seller’s Impact on Songwriter Royalties
Daniel Abowd*
Mechanical royalties payable to songwriters for digital reproductions of their works on services such as Spotify and Apple Music
are determined through a convoluted quasi-trial in front of an
administrative body called the Copyright Royalty Board (“CRB”).
The CRB is itself governed by statutory rate standards that constrain
the types of evidence and analyses it may consider when setting
royalty rates.
In 2018, Congress passed a much-heralded, consensus piece of
music legislation called the Music Modernization Act (“MMA”).
The MMA attacked a broad swath of issues across the music industry, including, most visibly, establishing a blanket license for digital
mechanical licenses, and a statutory entity to administer that license. But buried within the MMA was a less-celebrated wrinkle: a
provision that replaced the old 801(b) rate standard used by the
CRB for mechanical royalties with a new “willing buyer/willing
seller” rate standard. While the new standard was seen as a victory
for songwriters, its precise practical effects remain unsettled. Will
it really increase rates? If so, why? What evidence, arguments, and
analysis will it allow—and foreclose—relative to the old standard?
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reflect the opinions of The Royalty Network, Inc., its clients, or its affiliated songwriters.
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This Comment seeks to answer these questions through a comparative case study of two past CRB proceedings. First, it dissects
the analyses that shaped the CRB’s Phonorecords III decision—the
most recent mechanical royalty rate-setting proceeding, and the last
to use the old 801(b) rate standard. Second, it undertakes a similar
analysis of the CRB’s Web IV decision, the most recent instance in
which the CRB applied the willing buyer/willing seller standard to
a rate-setting proceeding for a different rights type (the digital performance of sound recordings). It then compares and contrasts
those two proceedings to predict how willing buyer/willing seller
will operate in the digital mechanical royalty context. From that
comparison it concludes that, while the change does skew songwriter-friendly, there is also a significant amount of uncertainty that
may render the change less significant than copyright owners
hope—and music licensees fear.
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INTRODUCTION

In 2018, Congress enacted the Music Modernization Act (the
“MMA”).1 The three-part omnibus bill accomplished quite a bit under a single banner. Title I addressed issues in music publishing, Title II addressed pre-1972 sound recordings, and Title III addressed
producer and engineer compensation.2
Title I, the “Musical Works Modernization Act,” covered the
most ground of the three sections. It established a new statutory
blanket license for the digital reproduction of musical works, in
place of the longstanding work-by-work or catalog-by-catalog licensing default.3 Going forward, digital interactive streaming services such as Spotify and Apple Music would be (1) able to avail
themselves of this license, and (2) assured that they would no longer
be liable for good faith (and otherwise) failures to secure mechanical
licenses for each of the millions upon millions of musical works embedded in sound recordings available on their platforms. 4 This
1

Orrin G. Hatch—Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 115–264, 132
Stat. 3676 (2018) [hereinafter “MMA”].
2
See id.
3
See MMA § 102.
4
See S. REP. NO. 115-339, at 14 (2018).
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blanket license would be administered by a newly formed Mechanical Licensing Collective, to be controlled and operated by music
publishers and songwriters while funded by the digital services. 5
Publishers and songwriters would, in theory, benefit from a more
efficient administrative system allowing them to more quickly and
effectively collect royalties accrued for streams of their works.6 The
digital service providers would benefit by no longer waking up to
nine-figure infringement suits.7
Buried deep within Title I were a few less-heralded provisions
that pertained not simply to the procedures designed to process payable royalties, but the substantive underlying royalties themselves.
Two of these changes related to the federal rate court system through
which music users and performing rights organizations (“PROs,” including BMI and ASCAP) litigate disputes over public performance
rates.8 Post-MMA, these disputes will now be heard by a rotating
series of SDNY judges—rather than one assigned judge9—and subject to fewer evidentiary restrictions.10
The last of the rate-affecting changes was a seemingly benign
update to an arcane portion of the Copyright Act: Section 115. Since
the early 1900s, mechanical reproduction of musical works—or
“compositions,” as distinguished from the sound recordings embodying those compositions—have been subject to a compulsory

5

See id. at 3.
See Jose Landivar, The Music Modernization Act: A Primer for Copyright Holders,
JD SUPRA (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-music-modernizationact-a-primer-61777/ [https://perma.cc/7TR2-2DRH].
7
See, e.g., Spotify Settles $1.6bn Lawsuit over Songwriters’ Rights, BBC NEWS (Dec.
21, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-46646918 [https://perma.cc/R22Z-932D].
8
For more on rate courts, see Brontë Lawson Turk, Note, “It’s Been A Hard Day’s
Night” for Songwriters: Why the ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees Must Undergo Reform,
26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 493, 512–14 (2016).
9
See MMA § 104.
10
Importantly, rate court litigants may now substantiate their proposed royalty rates for
the public performance of musical works by introducing as evidence royalty rates for the
public performance of the sound recording embodying those musical works. See id.
§ 103(a).
6
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license:11 with a few cursory restrictions, 12 anyone is entitled to a
license to reproduce any copyrighted musical work.13 Section 115
governs the terms of this compulsory license, including the statutory
royalty rates paid by licensees to licensors.14 Under Section 115,
these royalties are determined in rate-setting litigations presided
over by an administrative body known as the Copyright Royalty
Board (“CRB” or the “Board”). 15 The MMA did not disrupt this
basic structure. However, it did make one subtle adjustment: in place
of the old “public-interest”-oriented16 801(b) rate standard that
songwriters and publishers had long believed unduly depressed royalty rates by compelling the CRB to weigh a slew of non-marketbased factors, the MMA now instructed the CRB to set rates using a
new “willing buyer/willing seller” rate standard designed to model
the rates that would occur naturally in a hypothetical free market. 17

11

See Lydia Pallas Loren, The Dual Narratives in the Landscape of Music Copyright,
52 HOUS. L. REV. 537, 548 (2014) (contextualizing the origins of the compulsory license
as a safeguard against potential “abusive monopolistic practices” by rightsholders). Under
a Section 115 compulsory license, anyone who meets certain easily-satisfied criteria can
automatically obtain a license to make and distribute a record embodying any nondramatic
(i.e. “not created for use in a motion picture or dramatic work”) musical composition. See
Compulsory License for Making and Distributing Phonorecords, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE
(Jan. 2018), https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ73.pdf.
12
For example, recordings of the work must have “previously been distributed to the
public in the United States under the authority of the copyright owner of the work.” 17
U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(A)(i).
13
See id. § 115.
14
Id.
15
See MMA § 102. The CRB is an independent tribunal within the Copyright Office; its
three judges are appointed to serve six-year terms by the Librarian of Congress. 17 U.S.C.
§§ 801–803. Its rate determinations are subject to review for “legal error” by the Register
of Copyrights before being published in the Federal Register by the Librarian of Congress.
Id. Any “aggrieved” party who “who fully participated in the proceeding and who would
be bound by the determination” may then bring an appeal in the D.C. Circuit. Id. §
803(d)(1).
16
Mark H. Wittow, Katherine L. Staba, & Trevor M. Gates, A Modern Melody for the
Music Industry: The Music Modernization Act Is Now The Law of the Land, K&L GATES
HUB (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.klgates.com/A-Modern-Melody-for-the-MusicIndustry-The-Music-Modernization-Act-Is-Now-the-Law-of-the-Land-10-11-2018
[https://perma.cc/359E-ATVC].
17
Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, https://www.copyright.gov/
music-modernization/faq.html (last accessed Feb. 13, 2021) (“The new market-based
willing buyer / willing seller rate setting replaces the policy-oriented 801(b)(1) rate-setting
standard.”) (emphasis added).
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While the switch to willing buyer/willing seller has generally
been considered to be a victory for the copyright community that
advocated for it, its practical effects remain unsettled. Will it really
increase royalty rates when it is applied to mechanical royalty rates?
If so, why? What specific evidence, arguments, and analysis will
the new rate standard allow—and foreclose—relative to the old
standard?
This Comment seeks to answer these questions by comparing
and contrasting two prior CRB rate determinations in search of
clues indicating what may happen in the next CRB mechanical
royalty rate determination: Phonorecords IV. One past proceeding
(Phonorecords III) occurred in the same market and rights context
as Phonorecords IV (mechanical royalties for songwriters), but
applied a different rate standard. The other (Web IV) occurred in
a different market/rights context but applied the same rate standard
as Phonorecords IV (willing buyer/willing seller). This Comment
acknowledges that while neither of these precedents exactly
replicates the circumstances that will occur in Phonorecords IV,
each offers insight into how the CRB is likely to apply the willing
buyer/willing seller standard to mechanical royalties for the
first time.
From there, this Comment concludes that while the change
from 801(b) to willing buyer/willing seller does skew songwriterfriendly, as many expect, it also incorporates a significant amount
of uncertainty that widens the variance of possible outcomes in all
directions. This uncertainty is exacerbated by the reality that proceedings under either rate structure are decidedly more similar than
they are different, so any attempt to isolate and project their practical
distinctions quickly becomes an extraordinarily tangled exercise.
The Comment attempts to tiptoe through those tangles by proceeding in four parts. First, Part I explains the underlying structures
that govern mechanical royalties in the U.S. Second, in search of
clues as to how the post-MMA CRB will apply the willing
buyer/willing seller standard to mechanical royalties, Part II undertakes a comparative case study of two recent CRB rate-determinations: it first (A) unpacks the CRB’s 2018 Phonorecords III decision, the most recent digital mechanical royalty rate-setting proceeding and the last to use the pre-MMA rate standard; and (B) conducts
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a similar recounting of the CRB’s 2016 Web IV decision, the most
recent instance in which the CRB applied the willing buyer/willing
seller standard in a rate-setting proceeding in a different rights context—the digital performance of sound recordings. Part III then
compares and contrasts elements from each of the two dissected rate
determinations to forecast how the willing buyer/willing seller
standard will operate in the digital mechanical royalty context. Finally, Part IV argues that the practical differences between the old
801(b) standard and the new willing buyer/willing seller standard,
while broadly more friendly to songwriters than digital services,
may be less significant and less certain than licensors hope—and licensees fear.
I.

THE MMA AND THE CRB

A. Mechanical Royalties
1. 1909-2018
Under the Copyright Act, songwriters—or music publishers acting on their behalf—are due mechanical royalties any time their
composition is reproduced in some manner: either via physical sale,
digital download, or interactive (i.e. on-demand) digital stream. 18
The copyright owner’s exclusive reproduction right dates back to
the Copyright Act of 1909, when it was enacted in response to the
music publishing industry’s successful lobbying efforts to secure a
royalty for the mechanical reproduction of self-playing piano rolls.19
From the beginning, the reproduction right was subject to a compulsory license, granted in exchange for a mechanical royalty payable
18

To avoid confusion: mechanical royalties do not occur when a track is streamed via a
noninteractive streaming service such as Pandora’s primary internet radio service (as
distinguished by the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L.
No. 104–39 (1995)). 17 U.S.C § 114(j)(7) (defining an interactive service as “one that
enables a member of the public to receive a transmission of a program…on request”); see
also Henry Schoonmaker, The Two Types of Streaming & How You Can Collect Royalties
For Both, SONGTRUST (May 14, 2020), https://blog.songtrust.com/types-of-streamingroyalties [https://perma.cc/ASY8-7QZB]; Kevin Zimmerman, Understanding Mechanical
Royalties, BMI (Mar. 28, 2005), https://www.bmi.com/news/entry/Understanding_
Mechanical_Royalties [https://perma.cc/F9U6-DWAC].
19
See Zimmerman, supra note 18.

582

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:387

at the rate set either directly by statute or as determined by a statutory rate-setting body.20 The inaugural statutory rate of $0.02/copy
remained in place from 1909 until 1978, by which time the piano
roll had long since ceded center stage to a recorded music industry
dominated by physical music sales.21 At the industry’s pre-piracy
peak in the late 1990s, songwriters were due $0.07 per song per
sale.22 That rate for downloads and physical sales has plateaued at
$0.091 per song per download or physical sale since 2006. 23 Rates
for reproduction on digital streaming services are more complicated
and have naturally taken on greater importance as streaming has become the predominant music consumption format. 24
While mechanical royalties have historically comprised a significant portion of songwriters’ incomes, their role has diminished over
the past two decades. Mechanicals achieved peak prominence in the
1990s, at the height of the physical CD era. At that time, songwriters
typically earned mechanical royalties in roughly equal proportion to
performance royalties—fees earned from public performances of
their works on radio, television, public venues, and businesses.25
That ratio promptly plummeted in the post-Napster recorded music
industry collapse.26 Today, even in the midst of the streaming renaissance, songwriters barely generate $1 in mechanical royalties
for every $3 in performance income.27
20

See Jacob Victor, Reconceptualizing Compulsory Copyright Licenses, 72 STAN. L.
REV. 915, 940 (2020).
21
See How Much Do Songwriters Make from Mechanical Royalties?, ROYALTY
EXCHANGE BLOG (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.royaltyexchange.com/blog/how-much-dosongwriters-make-from-mechanical-royalties#sthash.O3tc1o9o.dpbs
[https://perma.cc/8MMP-C3TV].
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
See Streaming Overtakes U.S. Digital Music Sales for First Time: Nielsen, REUTERS
(Jan. 5, 2017, 11:23 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-music-streaming/streamingovertakes-u-s-digital-music-sales-for-first-time-nielsen-idUSKBN14P1YH
[perma.cc/3XTR-XKWA]. For a detailed explanation of how streaming rates are
determined, see infra Part II.
25
See Peter Alhadeff & Caz McChrystal, Inflation and US Music Mechanicals, 1976–
2010, 13 GLOBAL BUS. & ECON. REV. 1, 2 (2011).
26
Id.
27
Tim Ingham, US Publishers Pulled in $3.7BN during 2019—Just Over Half What
Record
Labels
Made,
MUSIC BUS. WORLDWIDE
(June
11,
2020),
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2. 2019 and Beyond: Phonorecords III, Phonorecords III-2,
and Phonorecords IV
The steady decay of mechanical royalties may finally have hit
an inflection point in the CRB’s Phonorecords III determination. In
Phonorecords III, the most recent in a recurring series of administrative rate-setting procedures undertaken every five years (and the
last to occur under the pre-MMA 801(b) rate standard), the CRB
imposed a 44% mechanical royalty rate increase, to be phased in
gradually over five years.28 As a result, between 2018 and 2019, the
share of overall music publishing revenue attributable to mechanical
royalties rose from 17.8% to 18.5%, as overall U.S. publishing revenue grew from $3.34 billion to $3.72 billion.29 This marked the
“first time since the bottoming out [of the publishing market]” that
mechanical income grew faster than performance income.30 Industry insiders credited this bump in the share of overall publishing income attributable to mechanical royalties directly to the first stage
of the gradual mechanical rate increase under Phonorecords III.31
Not unrelatedly, the Phonorecords III 44% rate increase was
seen as a “major victory” for songwriters—a substantial step forward on their long road to recovery from the post-Napster mechanical nadir.32 It also prompted several streaming providers to mount
and win—on procedural grounds only—a controversial appeal and
remand to the CRB to issue an adjusted rate determination.33 At the
time this Comment is being finalized, the post-remand adjusted

https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/us-publishers-pulled-in-3-7bn-during-2019just-over-half-what-record-labels-made/ [https://perma.cc/6KC4-E8Z2].
28
See Determination of Royalty Rates and Terms for Making and Distributing
Phonorecords (Phonorecords III), 84 Fed. Reg. 1918, 1919 (Feb. 5, 2019) (to be codified
at 37 C.F.R. pt. 385) [hereinafter “Phonorecords III”].
29
Ingham, supra note 27.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
See Major Victory for Songwriters as US Streaming Royalty Rates Rise 44%, MUSIC
BUS. WORLDWIDE (Jan. 27, 2018), https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/majorvictory-songwriters-us-mechanical-rates-will-rise-44-2018/ [https://perma.cc/JY7M-MX
V7].
33
See Dani Deahl, Here’s Why Apple Is Saying Spotify Is Suing Songwriters, THE
VERGE (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/15/18267288/apple-musicspotify-suing-songwriters-eu-antitrust [https://perma.cc/5YXC-YE7F].
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Phonorecords III (hereinafter “Phonorecords III-2”) determination
has yet to be issued.34
Meanwhile, alongside all of this, even as the Phonorecords III
appellate and remand process is still ongoing, under Section 115’s
five-year CRB timeline, the next five-year mechanical rate determination is already looming. With preliminary proceedings officially
underway as of early 2021,35 Phonorecords IV will be the first CRB
mechanical rate-setting proceeding to apply the MMA’s new willing
buyer/willing seller rate standard. 36 It will also occur at a time
when—due to the collision of the most impactful music legislation
in decades (the MMA), the high-profile 44% Phonorecords III rate
increase, and rightsholders’ lingering bad blood 37 over the services’

34

This has left the industry in temporary limbo. While stakeholders had initially pushed
the CRB to issue interim rates to apply until the appeal and remand are fully settled, it has
yet to do so, leaving services arguing that they are now free to revert to 2012 rates—which
has only further inflamed tensions between services and rightsholders. See Ed Christman,
Music Publishers Ask CRB to Set Interim Rates, Saying Further Delay May Lead to 'Freefor All', BILLBOARD (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/
9477565/music-publishers-royalty-board-set-interim-rates-crb-nmpa/
[https://perma.cc/87C3-5UGQ]; Stuart Dredge, Arguments over US Songwriter Streaming
Royalties Kick Off Again, MUSIC ALLY (Nov. 4, 2020), https://musically.com/2020/11/04/
arguments-over-us-songwriter-streaming-royalties-kick-off-again/ [https://perma.cc/2JJW
-A2JL] (quoting NMPA president David Israelite: “[T]hese multi-trillion dollar companies
are doubling down on their assault against creators….”). In January 2021, in consultation
with the Copyright Office, the newly operational, publisher- and writer-controlled
Mechanical Licensing Collective officially endorsed this approach. See Announcement
Concerning Interim Mechanical Royalty Rates Pending the Outcome of Copyright Royalty
Board Remand Proceedings in Phonorecords III, MECHANICAL LICENSING COLLECTIVE
(Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.themlc.com/press/announcement-concerning-interimmechanical-royalty-rates-pending-outcome-copyright-royalty (“The CRB is currently
presiding over [the Phonorecords III] remand proceedings, which are scheduled to run at
least into the second half of 2021.”).
35
See Determination of Rates and Terms for Making and Distributing Phonorecords
(Phonorecords IV), 86 Fed. Reg. 325 (Jan. 5, 2021).
36
Stuart Dredge, NMPA Boss Promises Big Fight over ‘CRB IV’ Streaming Rates,
MUSIC ALLY (June 16, 2020), https://musically.com/2020/06/16/nmpa-boss-promises-bigfight-over-crb-iv-streaming-rates/ [https://perma.cc/AY9R-R388].
37
See, e.g., David Israelite, Santa’s Guide to Tech Companies: Who’s Been Naughty
and Who’s Been Nice to Songwriters This Year, MUSIC BUS. WORLDWIDE (Dec. 14, 2020),
https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/santas-guide-to-tech-companies-whos-beennaughty-and-whos-been-nice-to-songwriters-this-year/
[https://perma.cc/7KEE-8X5C]
(listing Spotify and Apple music at the top of the “naughty”-to-songwriters list for their
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appeal—mechanical royalty rates have never been more at the forefront of the industry’s consciousness.38 In a Rolling Stone interview,
NMPA president David Israelite referred to Phonorecords IV (or
“CRB IV,” as publishers are calling it) as “the most important CRB
trial we’ve ever had.”39 Rolling Stone’s takeaway was somewhat
more colorful: “all-out war.”40
B. A New Rate Standard
Even as copyright owners and digital services were battling over
Phonorecords III, they were simultaneously cooperating to push the
cross-industry “consensus” MMA through Congress.41 Signed into
law in 2018, the primary focus of the MMA was the mechanism
through which digital services remit and allocate royalties to songwriters and publishers—rather than the royalty rates themselves. 42
However, buried among the structural reform was one change that
stands to substantively affect underlying mechanical royalty rates
beginning with Phonorecords IV: a new “willing buyer/willing

role in the Phonorecords III appeal); Lars Brandle, U.S. Songwriters Association Blasts
‘Shameless,’ ‘Brazen’ Spotify and Amazon as Royalties Hike Hits Hurdle, INDUS.
OBSERVER (Aug. 12, 2020), https://theindustryobserver.thebrag.com/nmpa-songwritersassociation-blasts-shameless-brazen-spotify-royalties/
[https://perma.cc/S4G9-J9SS];
David Israelite, NMPA CEO David Israelite to Songwriters: Court Case With Spotify,
Amazon Has ‘Seismic Implications’ (Guest Column), BILLBOARD (Mar. 9, 2020),
https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/9330522/nmpa-david-israelite-guest-opedspotify-amazon-court-royalties/ [https://perma.cc/EG7Y-EXMJ] [hereinafter “Seismic
Implications”]; Musicians Have Some Choice Words for Spotify CEO Daniel Ek, Who Says
They Should Work Harder, MKT. WATCH (Aug. 2, 2020, 8:39 PM)
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/musicians-have-some-choice-words-for-spotify-ceodanial-ek-who-says-they-should-work-harder-2020-08-02 [https://perma.cc/2G57EDTQ].
38
See Tim Ingham, Songwriters Are Already Fighting for Better Pay. But in 2021, They
Face an Even Bigger Battle, ROLLING STONE (June 15, 2020), https://www.rolling
stone.com/pro/features/songwriters-spotify-amazon-crb-royalties-war-1015116/
[https://perma.cc/39DK-TFZC].
39
See id.
40
See id.
41
See Craig Havighurst, The Music Modernization Act Is Law, Marking A Bipartisan,
Industry-Wide Consensus, WMOT (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.wmot.org/post/musicmodernization-act-law-marking-bipartisan-industry-wide-consensus#stream/0
[https://perma.cc/DA5Z-ANR5].
42
See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text.
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seller” rate standard for mechanical royalties payable starting in
2023.43
Under the old, pre-MMA 801(b) standard, the Board was directed to set “reasonable terms and rates” for mechanical reproduction to achieve the following objectives:
(A) To maximize the availability of creative works
to the public.
(B) To afford the copyright owner a fair return for his
or her creative work and the copyright user a fair income under existing economic conditions.
(C) To reflect the relative roles of the copyright
owner and the copyright user in the product made
available to the public with respect to relative creative contribution, technological contribution, capital
investment, cost, risk, and contribution to the opening of new markets for creative expression and media
for their communication.
(D) To minimize any disruptive impact on the structure of the industries involved and on generally prevailing industry practices.44
In addition to this guidance, the Board was permitted to “consider rates and terms under voluntary license agreements.”45 The origins of this standard remain somewhat hazy, but the factors “appear
to have been planted in Senate hearings in 1967 [during which]

43

While the Phonorecords III saga continues well after the passage of the MMA, the
Board must determine rates in accordance with the prevailing statutory rate standard at the
time of the proceeding. Thus, even on appeal and remand, the Phonorecords III
proceedings remain governed by section 801(b). Johnson v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 969
F.3d 363, 369 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2020). Meanwhile, at the time this Comment is being finalized,
preliminary proceedings for Phonorecords IV are already underway. See Determination of
Rates and Terms for Making and Distributing Phonorecords (Phonorecords IV), 86 Fed.
Reg. 325 (Jan. 5, 2021).
44
17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (prior to 2018 amendment).
45
17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(3)(D) (prior to 2018 amendment).
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Congress entertained the notion that music publishers should be regulated like public utilities.”46
Under the MMA’s new willing buyer/willing seller standard, the
Board is now directed to set “reasonable rates and terms…that most
clearly represent the rates and terms that would have been negotiated
in the marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing seller.”47
The Board must base its decision upon “economic, competitive, and
programming information presented by the parties, including…
(i) whether use of the compulsory licensee’s service
may substitute for or may promote the sales of
phonorecords or otherwise may interfere with or may
enhance the musical work copyright owner’s other
streams of revenue from its musical works; and
(ii) the relative roles of the copyright owner and the
compulsory licensee in the copyrighted work and the
service made available to the public with respect to
the relative creative contribution, technological contribution, capital investment, cost, and risk. 48
Although the first CRB mechanical royalty rate-setting proceeding applying this rate standard, Phonorecords IV, is set to begin in
2021, a nearly identical willing buyer/willing seller standard has
long governed Section 114 compulsory licenses for the digital public performance rights of sound recordings on noninteractive
streaming services, such as Pandora and iHeart. 49 The most recent
Section 114 CRB proceeding, Web IV, occurred in 2016.50 As of the
time of this writing, Web V is currently underway.51

46

Victor, supra note 20, at 944 (hunting for the factors’ “difficult to determine” origins
amid a “sparse” congressional record). The section 801(b) factors date back to the
Copyright Act of 1976, when Congress created the CRB’s predecessor, the Copyright
Royalty Tribunal, and for the first-time delegated rate-setting to this administrative entity
tasked with achieving these “policy-driven” objectives. Id.
47
17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(1)(F).
48
Id.
49
17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(1)(B).
50
See infra Section II.B.
51
Case Details for Web V, COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BD., https://app.crb.gov/case/detail/19CRB-0005-WR%20%282021-2025%29 [https://perma.cc/BT9H-CR35].
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C. Stakeholders’ Expectations
The legislative runway leading to the MMA primarily focused
on structural reform: a new blanket digital mechanical license, and
a much-ballyhooed organization created to administer that license.52
Relatively little attention—at least on the legislative record—was
allotted to the updated rate standard. 53
The discussion that does survive conforms to the ethos driving
most of Title I of the MMA (the “MWMA”): the notion that songwriters had long been undercompensated.54 This notion permeated
the MWMA’s administrative and licensing changes, and so too did
it inform the adoption of the willing buyer/willing seller standard.
Citing the “broad[ly]”55-held view that the 801(b) standard depressed royalty rates, the Copyright Office had long called for the
adoption of a standard “designed to achieve rates that would be negotiated in an unconstrained market.”56 This would also, the Copyright Office argued, carry the benefit of unifying what were, at the
52

See generally S. REP. NO. 115-339 (2018); H.R. REP. NO. 115-651 (2018); see also
Dani Deahl, The Music Modernization Act Has Been Signed into Law, THE VERGE (Oct.
11, 2018, 12:08 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/10/11/17963804/music-moderni
zation-act-mma-copyright-law-bill-labels-congres [https://perma.cc/8BG6-GSD8]; Jordan
Bromley, The Music Modernization Act: What Is It & Why Does It Matter? (Guest
Column), BILLBOARD (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/
8216857/music-modernization-act-what-is-it-why-does-it-matter-jordan-bromley [https://
perma.cc/N3U6-EMZW].
53
The legislative record for the Act is, to be sure, not particularly expansive. See Lydia
Pallas Loren, Copyright Jumps the Shark: The Music Modernization Act, 99 B.U. L. REV.
2519, 2550 (2019) (“The inside baseball that drove this massive amendment to the
Copyright Act did not even leave time for a formal conference committee report detailing
the reconciliation that occurred between the House- and Senate-passed bills.”).
54
See S. REP. NO. 115-339, at 1 (citing “inequitable compensation variances for music
creators”); Protecting and Promoting Music Creation for the 21st Century: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2018) (written testimony of David M.
Israelite, President and CEO, National Music Publishers’ Association) [hereinafter
“Israelite Testimony”] (testifying that songwriters’ “livelihood is threatened by a failure of
the law to keep pace with technology”).
55
See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE 105 (Feb.
2015), available at https://www.copyright.gov/policy/musiclicensingstudy/copyright-andthe-music-marketplace.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NMR-A26S]
(citing copyright owners’ frustration that the pre-MMA Section 115 “acts as a ceiling that
does not allow them to seek higher royalties through voluntary negotiations,” while
acknowledging that licensees disagree that the 801(b) standard depressed rates).
56
See id. at 3.
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time, several disparate rate standards governing different CRB ratesetting proceedings.57 The legislative record expressly echoed this
push for uniformity.58
Songwriters and publishers also pushed for the change—again,
as a part of a broader push for higher songwriter compensation. In
reality, they would have preferred 59 legislation abolishing the compulsory mechanical license60 entirely, allowing them to issue mechanical licenses on the open market.61 Given political realities,
however, they were willing to settle for a rate standard that would at
least endeavor to model an open market.62 In 2018, they got their
wish: a new rate standard that they believe will yield higher royalty
rates when tested for the first time in 2021–22. Of course, one
57

See id. (the Copyright Office’s official recommendation that Congress “[a]dopt a
uniform market-based rate-setting standard for all government rates”); id. at 81–82
(characterizing the pre-MMA rate standard disparities as “problematic”). Congress was
presented with the Copyright Office’s viewpoint in committee hearings. See Israelite
Testimony, supra note 54.
58
See H.R. REP. NO. 115-1551, at 22 (2018), https://republicansjudiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Music-Modernization-Act.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9L9E-JZNG] (touting the MMA’s creation of a “uniform willing buyer,
willing seller rate standard” across the various statutory licenses for music) (emphasis
added); S. REP. NO. 115-339, at 4 (explaining that the MMA “change[s] the current ratesetting standard [for Section 115 licenses] from that currently found at 801(b) to the
‘willing buyer/willing seller’ standard now applicable to setting rates for the public
performance of sound recordings by noninteractive webcasters under…Section 114”);
H.R. REP. NO. 115-651, at 4 (2018) (same exact language); see also Loren, supra note 53,
at 2541 (“One of the ways in which the MMA furthered equal treatment was by establishing
that the Copyright Royalty Judges are to use the same set of criteria for setting compulsory
royalties for musical works (mechanical copies under § 115) as for the statutory license for
sound recordings (digital public performances under § 114”).
59
Per NMPA EVP and General Counsel Danielle Aguirre: “Not everybody agrees with
the way that…rates are set under Section 115, or the fact that it’s a statutory, compulsory
license…. Ideally, we would have loved to have a law that got rid of the statutory license
and allowed everything in a free market. But we wouldn’t all be sitting here today having
passed a piece of consensus legislation, and we understood that.” MLC, Join Us in
Supporting The MLC, VIMEO (Oct. 26, 2020), https://vimeo.com/472309284
[https://perma.cc/8783-T9TA] (public industry panel discussing the MMA).
60
See supra Section I.A.
61
See Israelite Testimony, supra note 54, at n. 2 (“I must note here the irony of
addressing questions regarding whether proper due process protections have been included
in a 100-year-old statute that establishes a compulsory license and deprives songwriters
and music publishers of substantive due process protections and control over the licensing
and administration of their own intellectual property.”).
62
See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 56, at 12.
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question lingers: will the new rate standard actually increase mechanical royalty rates?
Unsurprisingly, most proponents of the new standard believe
that it will have this effect.63 Indeed, the rightsholder community has
already signaled that it now feels empowered to enter the
Phonorecords IV arena with guns ablaze—to seek “impossibly
high” rates under the new standard. 64 Furthermore, there is evidence
that many adversely affected stakeholders, 65 scholars,66 and legislators, have long believed the change in rate standards would yield
higher rates. But few have quite gotten around to explaining exactly
how that will happen. Most discussion tends to be somewhat conclusory: the old standard depressed rates below what would occur in
a free market,67 while the new standard strives for a free market rate,

63

See id. at 82–83; Israelite Testimony, supra note 54.
Ingham, supra note 38.
65
See Music Licensing Under Title 17: Hearing Before the H. Sub. Comm. on Courts,
Intell. Prop., and the Internet of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2014)
(testimony of Lee Knife, Executive Director, Digital Media Association [DiMa]) (“The
willing buyer-willing seller standard has led to higher rates than the § 801(b) standard has
led to.”); Protecting and Promoting Music Creation for the 21st Century: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/
meetings/protecting-and-promoting-music-creation-for-the-21st-century [https://perma.cc
/ST8G-BBV8] (written testimony of David J. Del Beccaro, President and CEO of Music
Choice) (“[C]hanging the Section 115 rate standard to ‘willing buyer / willing seller’ will
cause more unreasonable rate increases.”); Spotify Technology S.A., Annual Report (Form
20-F) (Dec. 31, 2019), available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1639920/
000156459020004357/ck0001639920-20f_20191231.htm [https://perma.cc/LVP2-H2PB]
(“The recently enacted MMA makes a number of significant changes to the legal regime
governing music licensing in the United States. This legislation could, when fully
implemented, increase the cost and/or difficulty of obtaining necessary music licenses.”).
There is also plenty of dissent and (at least publicly expressed) uncertainty among
adversely affected stakeholders, both as to whether the legislature made the right decision,
and whether it will actually yield a rate increase. See Protecting and Promoting Music
Creation for the 21st Century: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong.
(2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/protecting-and-promoting-music-creat
ion-for-the-21st-century [https://perma.cc/XEU9-X3DR]
(statement of Christopher
Harrison, Chief Executive Officer, DiMa) (“While it remains to be seen whether adoption
of the WS-WB standard will result in higher royalty rates, digital music providers agreed
to this change in the rate-setting standard as part of the overall reform of Section 115.”);
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 56, at 80–81, 107.
66
See Loren, supra note 53, at 2531.
67
See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 55, at 105.
64
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and therefore the new rates will be higher than the old rates. 68 At
best, there is a sense that by removing the discretion to supplant
market forces with public interest concerns such as public availability, arguably better served by lower rates, the new standard cannot
help but increase rates.69 The remaining sections of this Comment
attempt to be more specific—going straight to the source to examine
how the rate standards operate in practice, and thus what practical
effects may be prompted by applying willing buyer/willing seller in
the Section 115 context.

68

See, e.g., Joint Statement from NMPA President & CEO David Israelite, ASCAP CEO
Elizabeth Matthews, BMI President & CEO Mike O’Neill, NSAI President Steve Bogard
and SONA Executive Directors Michelle Lewis and Kay Hanley, ASCAP (Dec. 21, 2017),
https://www.ascap.com/news-events/articles/2017/12/joint-statement-from-nmpa-ascapbmi-nsai-sona [https://perma.cc/SVU4-9NM5] (joint statement from songwriter and
publisher organizations claiming that the willing buyer/willing seller rate “improves how
mechanical royalty rates are calculated”); Amy Goldsmith, Musically Inclined: The Music
Modernization
Act
of
2018,
IP
WATCHDOG
(Nov.
9,
2018),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/11/09/music-modernization-act-2018/id=102954/
[https://perma.cc/62UW-4FXM] (“In a stark change from prior practice, royalty rates will
be negotiated using the fair market value concept of the ‘willing buyer, willing seller;’ the
goal is to increase compensation to the music creators….”); Steve Englund, Alison Stein
& Ava McAlpin, Sweeping Music Modernization Act Transforms Music Licensing for the
Digital Age, MEDIA L. RESOURCE CTR., at 14 (Oct. 2018), available at
https://jenner.com/system/assets/publications/18448/original/Englund%20Stein%20McA
plin%20MLRC%20Oct%202018.pdf?1541780643
[https://perma.cc/8GTQ-LHAH]
(noting that the new rate standard replaces an “older standard that had been interpreted to
allow below-market rates”); Jem Aswad, Lawmakers Introduce Music Modernization Act,
Which Simplifies Digital Licensing and Increases Rates, VARIETY (Dec. 21, 2017),
https://variety.com/2017/biz/news/lawmakers-introduce-music-modernization-act-whichsimplifies-digital-licensing-and-increases-rates-1202647412/
[https://perma.cc/7352N424] (listing the new rate standard as among a few other factors aimed at “increase[ing]
digital rates”); Kathryn O’Leary, Understanding the Music Modernization Act: 5 Things
You Should Know, ONES TO WATCH (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.onestowatch.com/
blog/understanding-the-music-modernization-act-5,
[https://perma.cc/9RNH-Q2E3]
(“This [801(b)] standard has ensured that rates do not reflect market value, but the MMA
would…get better rates for songs.”); Kaitlin Chandler, The Times They Are A Changin’:
The Music Modernization Act and the Future of Music Copyright Law, 21 TUL. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 53, 65 (2019) (“[T]he willing buyer/willing seller standard provides a higher
royalty rate for owners….”).
69
See supra notes 44, 63–68 and accompanying text.
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II. OUT WITH THE OLD/IN WITH THE NEW

Part II of this Comment conducts two parallel rate structure case
studies. Part A dissects the Phonorecords III CRB rate determination under Section 115 of the Copyright Act 70—the most recent mechanical royalty determination for interactive streaming and the last
to apply the old 801(b) standard. 71 Part B then similarly examines
the Web IV rate determination for the public performance of sound
recordings through noninteractive streaming under Section 114 of
the Copyright Act72—the most recent CRB proceeding to apply the
willing buyer/willing seller standard which, although only recently
inserted into Section 115 by the MMA, has long governed Section
114.73
Together, these two rate determinations comprise the closest
thing to relevant precedent for Phonorecords IV. The first,
Phonorecords III, applied a different rate standard (the old 801(b)
standard) to the same market and rights type as Phonorecords IV
(mechanical royalties for the interactive streaming of musical compositions). The second, Web IV, applied the same rate standard as
Phonorecords IV (willing buyer/willing seller) to a different market
and rights type (public performance royalties for the noninteractive
streaming of sound recordings).
A. A Section 801(b) Case Study (Phonorecords III)
Section 115 rate-setting proceedings determine the statutory
rates governing the reproduction of musical works.74 Prior to the
MMA, these Phonorecords proceedings were subject to the old
801(b) rate standard. However, because the rates determined in
Phonorecords I and Phonorecords II were both primarily the product of settlements between copyright owners and—as the rates pertained to digital streaming—streaming services, Phonorecords III
represented the first fully litigated rate-setting proceeding governing
70

17 U.S.C. § 115.
See Johnson v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 969 F.3d 363, 369 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
72
17 U.S.C. § 114.
73
See, e.g., Determination of Royalty Rates and Terms for Ephemeral Recording and
Webcasting Digital Performance of Sound Recordings (Web IV), 81 Fed. Reg. 26316 (May
2, 2016) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380) [hereinafter “Web IV”].
74
See Johnson, 969 F.3d at 367–68.
71
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interactive digital streaming.75 Accordingly, it is the only directly
relevant data point for those interested in observing how the Board
approaches mechanical rate-setting in the digital streaming context.
For context: to operate lawfully under the Copyright Act, interactive streaming services must obtain licenses for four separate
rights: the (1) reproduction and (2) public performance of the sound
recordings distributed through their platforms, as well as the (3) reproduction and (4) public performance of the underlying musical
works (“compositions”) embodied in those sound recordings. 76 Section 115 rate-setting proceedings like Phonorecords III deal only
with the reproduction (i.e. mechanical) license for underlying musical compositions.77
Importantly, while the Services have subsequently succeeded in
petitioning the D.C. Circuit to vacate and remand the Phonorecords
III determination, and as of this writing the Board has yet to publish
its revised Phonorecords III-2 rates, the initial Phonorecords III
opinion still stands as an important insight into the Board’s processes, logic, and interpretations of its governing rate standards. The
D.C. Circuit grounded its decision to vacate firmly in procedural defects.78 Further, it expressly disclaimed that because it was reaching
its decision on procedural grounds, it “need not at this juncture address whether the Board adequately considered [the § 801(b) standard].”79 Thus, even post-appeal, the initial Phonorecords III opinion
continues to provide a window into the Board’s fundamental

75

See generally Phonorecords III, supra note 27.
See Michelle Castillo, Spotify IPO Filing Reveals How Insanely Complicated It Is to
License Music Rights, CNBC (Feb. 28, 2018, 5:44 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2018/02/28/how-spotify-licenses-and-pays-for-music-rights.html [https://perma.cc/ZV2
L-DA7Z].
77
They also indirectly touch on composition public performance rates by virtue of the
prevailing all-in structure the Phonorecords III Board opted to renew. See infra notes 96–
99 and accompanying text.
78
Johnson, 969 F.3d at 375–76 (vacating in relevant part because the Board “failed to
provide adequate notice” for its decision to adopt an uncapped TCC prong and “failed to
reasonably explain” why it rejected the Phonorecords II settlement as a benchmark). In an
unrelated, minor substantive quibble, the court also noted that the Board had “failed to
identify under what authority it substantively redefined” a statutory term relevant to
royalties for bundled services. Id.
79
Id. at 389.
76
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conceptions of its own authority, discretion, preferences, and interpretation of its statutory mandates.
Of particular import: because the D.C. Circuit explicitly declined to opine on this portion of the initial determination,
Phonorecords III continues to represent the clearest indication of the
ways in which the Board does, and does not, believe itself constrained by its governing Section 115 rate standard.
1. The Previous Mechanical Royalty Rate Scheme
Prior to Phonorecords III, the industry operated under the 2012
“flexible,” and incredibly convoluted, rate structure. This rate
scheme combined various all-in, “greater-of” a percentage total service revenue (i.e. the amount of earnings a service generates
through, among other things, subscriptions and advertising revenue), and Total Content Cost (“TCC,” i.e. the amount that each service spends on sound recording and composition rights, total, for
interactive streaming)80 prongs, broken out by a litany of different
service types, and subject to per-subscriber rate minimums.81 It was,
in a word, complicated.
The scheme for “subscription services accessible through portable devices such as mobile phones” (e.g. Spotify) looked like this: 82

80

See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1923 n. 38.
Id. at 1975 (Strickler, J., dissenting). Overall, streaming services were obligated to
pay a “maximum of 10.5% of service revenue,” and a minimum royalty rate that varied by
service type (e.g., categories such as: the “lesser of 22% of service payments for sound
recording rights and $0.50 per subscriber per month” for “standalone non-portable
subscription, streaming only” services). Id. The basic categories of services included:
“‘standalone non-portable subscription—streaming only’ services (i.e., tethered to a
computer); (b) ‘standalone non-portable subscription—mixed’ (i.e., both streaming and
limited download) services; (c) ‘standalone portable’ subscription streaming and limited
download services (i.e., accessible on mobile or other Internet-enabled devices); (d)
‘bundled subscription services’ which are streaming and limited download services
bundled with another product or service; and (e) ‘free [to the end user] non-subscription/
ad-supported services.’” Id. After deducting the performance portion from this “all-in” rate,
the resulting putative rate would then be subject to a mechanical-only per-subscriber floor
that also varied by service type (e.g., “$0.50 per subscriber per month” for “standalone
portable subscription, mixed use” services). Id.
82
Standalone Portable Subscriptions, Mixed Use, HARRY FOX AGENCY,
https://www.harryfox.com/#/rate-charts [https://perma.cc/DXM7-PEKF].
81
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Effectively, services were obligated to pay a headline rate of
10.5% of service revenue to songwriters, subject to a parade of caveats and complications. This rate was an “all-in” rate, meaning it
covered both the mechanical right and performance right implicated
by every interactive stream; services could deduct performance royalties paid out to the PROs (which are negotiated and licensed separately, and beholden to an entirely distinct judicial process in the
SDNY) from the mechanical royalties they account directly to copyright owners under this rate calculation.83
When the Phonorecords III scheme is referred to as a “44%”
increase over these rates, that figure is referring to the new headline
rate of 15.1% of service revenue that streaming services will now
have to pay, which is a 43.81% bump from the old 10.5% headline
rate.84 Under Phonorecords III, the increase will take place

83

See id.
Tim Ingham, Spotify vs. Songwriters: Publishers Remain Confident that Streaming
Platforms Will Be Forced to Increase Royalties in the US, MUSIC BUS. WORLDWIDE (Aug.
12, 2020), https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/spotify-vs-songwriters-publishersremain-confident-that-streaming-platforms-will-be-forced-to-increase-royalties-in-theus/ [https://perma.cc/5NG6-XRVH].
84
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incrementally, rising “by around 1% annually” until it reaches
15.1% in 2023.85
2. Procedural History and Overall Structure
In 2017, after copyright owners and licensees such as record labels had reached a settlement pertaining to rates for physical reproduction, digital downloads, and ringtones, the Board presided over
litigation surrounding the one major context in which stakeholders
had not managed to settle: interactive streaming.86 The Board’s
eventual Phonorecords III opinion was split 2-1, with Chief Judge
Barnett and Judge Feder in the majority, and Judge Strickler offering
a lengthy dissent and alternative rate structure. 87 The dispute effectively split the litigants into two basic groups of parties—the “Copyright Owners” (songwriters, music publishers, and their trade organizations) and the “Services” (digital streaming services and their
trade organizations).88
The Phonorecords III majority opinion proceeded under the following general structure: first, it evaluated the various parties’ rate
structure proposals, and the general foundational rate structures underpinning each specific proposal, and undertook to choose one of
these structures—or rather to harvest individual traits from several
different proposals.89 Second, once it had selected a structure, the
Board then considered marketplace rate benchmarks and expert

85

Id.
Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1920.
87
See id. at 1963. Notably, post-appeal, former Chief Judge Barnett’s term has ended,
former Judge Feder is now Chief Judge Feder, and the Librarian of Congress has appointed
Judge Steve Ruwe to the Board. See About Us, U.S. COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BD.,
https://www.crb.gov [https://perma.cc/P9HM-LRCC]; Librarian of Congress Names New
Copyright Royalty Judge, LIBR. OF CONG. (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.loc.gov/item/prn19-101/librarian-of-congress-names-new-copyright-royalty-judge/2019-10-18/
[https://perma.cc/5QBA-Y83D].
88
While CRB rate-setting proceedings, which are technically administrative
proceedings, in some ways resemble traditional Article III litigation, this is one major point
of divergence: the “parties” who argue before the CRB are interested stakeholders, not
specific entities directly bound to act by the tribunals’ decision. The Board’s decision does
not directly pertain to the parties. Rather, the Board simply promulgates the terms of a
statutory scheme, and the parties then become subject to, and constrained by, that new
statutory scheme along with everybody else.
89
See infra Section II.A.3.
86
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analysis using those benchmarks, before ultimately relying upon
theoretical Shapley economic modeling to determine the numerical
rates to plug into this structure.90 From three separate Shapley proposals, it derived a “zone of reasonableness” for rates fitting within
its chosen rate structure, and then chose rates from within that
range.91 Finally, it verified that these rates were consistent with the
801(b) factors.92
3. Rate Structure
Each of the participating parties in the rate-setting proceeding
submitted proposed rates and rate structures. The Board distilled
from each proposal specific features and structural configurations
that were evaluated separately from the numerical rates each party
advocated.
The Board Rejects a Per-Play Rate. Two adversaries, the Copyright
Owners93 and Apple, each incorporated a per-play prong into their
rate proposals. Apple’s proposal was comprised entirely of a simple
flat rate of $0.00091 per (nonfraudulent) stream, while the Copyright owners incorporated their $0.0015 per-play proposal into a

90

See infra Section II.A.4.b. Empirical Shapley analysis uses game theory to attempt to
attribute the relative marginal value contributed by each market participant. See Johnson
v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 969 F.3d 363, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
91
See infra Section II.A.4.
92
See infra Section II.A.5.
93
Here, “Copyright Owners” excluded George Johnson, dba GEO Music Group, a selfpublished songwriter and musician who appeared pro se. Phonorecords III, supra note 27,
at 1924–25. The Board respectfully declined to incorporate his proposals. Id. The
Copyright Owners incorporated their “per-play” rate in the context of a proposed “greaterof” structure, wherein the Services would play the “greater of” (1) a “per-play” fee of
$0.0015 per stream, or (2) a “per-end user fee” of $1.06 per streaming end user. Id. The
per-user rate was met with additional criticism from the Services, who argued that a peruser rate would activate for any services who users clocked, on average, fewer than 707
streams per month (and that, historically, Spotify has averaged fewer than 707 streams per
month per user)—effectively raising the per-play fee well above $0.0015 per stream. Id. at
1931. While the Board did not articulate its reasoning specifically for rejecting a per-user
component, beyond its general assertion that the revenue-based structure was the “most
efficient” of all the proposals, it appeared to credit this argument from the Services. Id. at
1931–34.
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more intricate “greater-of” structure.94 The Board flatly rejected
both parties’ bid for a per-play rate structure, citing downstream
competitive (i.e. competition for streaming consumers) concerns:
the Board maintained that a per-play rate would limit services’ flexibility to cater to wide variance in end user willingness to pay
(“WTP”) for digital streaming.95
The Board Adopts an “All-In” Rate. While the Services may have
split over the per-play issue, all five participating Services unanimously advocated continuing the 2012 settlement’s “All-In” feature.96 Under this structure, the Board is tasked with determining an
“all-in” rate, inclusive of both the mechanical and performance licenses inherent to every interactive stream. Any time a user streams
a song on a service like Spotify, that stream generates both a mechanical and performance royalty. Because only the mechanical portion is subject to Section 115 compulsory licensing, while the performance portion is negotiated with PROs such as ASCAP and BMI,
the two components could theoretically exist entirely independently
of each other. However, the 2012 settlement provided an “all-in”
rate inclusive of both.97 Under this structure, after calculating their
total “all-in” payable royalty pool, statutory services deduct performance fees privately negotiated and paid out to the PROs, and then
account the remainder directly to rightsholders as mechanical royalties.98 The Board, in electing to renew this “all-in” approach,

94

Id. at 1924 (“[E]ach month the licensee would pay the greater of (a) a per-play fee
($0.0015) multiplied by the number of interactive streams or limited downloads during the
month and (b) a per-end user fee ($1.06) multiplied by the number of end users during the
month.”).
95
Id. at 1925. The Board agreed with the (non-Apple) Services’ view that a fixed
upstream per-play rate “would not align” with downstream demand for interactive
streaming from consumers with wildly divergent willingness to pay (“WTP”) for those
services. Id. It declined to indulge the Copyright Owner’s argument that a per-play rate
would vindicate the “inherent value” of a musical work. Id. at 1934 n. 64, 1936, 1946 n.
110; see also infra Section III.B.2.
96
Phonorecords III, supra note 27, at 1928.
97
Id.
98
Id.
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emphasized the “perfect complementarity” of mechanical and performance rights.99
The Board Imposes a Mechanical Floor. The Copyright Owners
stressed the importance of preserving some kind of mechanical
floor—“a rate below which the calculated mechanical license rate
[can] not fall” regardless of what the headline rate calculation would
yield.100 They argued that this feature, particularly under a percentage-of-revenue structure, protects against songwriter compensation
becoming artificially depressed relative to songwriters’ actual value
as a result of streaming service business models, long-term planning, and creative accounting.101 The Board agreed.102 It adopted a
per-user mechanical floor in its rate structure, 103 justifying it as a
balancing of the Services’ interest in all-in predictability with the
Copyright Owners’ “need for a failsafe to ensure that mechanical
royalties will not vanish either through the actions of the Services”
or external forces.104

99

Id. at 1934. The Services argued that, because the mechanical and performance
portions of a stream are “complementary rights—[t]hat is, each right is worthless without
the other”—the Board must group them together “to prevent exorbitant costs.” Id. at 1928–
29, 1997 (internal quotations omitted). The Services underscored the “recent fragmentation
and uncertainty in performance rights licensing.” Id. at 1928–29. They also noted the
prevalence of this feature in direct licenses in the marketplace, as well as in the incumbent
statutory regime. Id. at 1929. For their part, the Copyright Owners objected, to little avail,
on jurisdictional and “practical” grounds—that the “upshot” of this structure is to erode
mechanical royalties, which allows songwriters to access and recoup advances vital to their
livelihoods. Id.
100
Id. at 1930.
101
Id. The Copyright Owners expressed particular concern that when royalties are
calculated as a percentage of service revenue, they may be artificially driven down by
services deliberately foregoing revenue in pursuit of other goals: for example, by lowering
retail subscription prices in order to grow market share in the long-term, or by using
streaming as a loss-leader to attract users for other services, or by offering streaming as a
part of a bundle with other goods and then attributing revenue to the non-royalty-generating
portions of the bundle. See infra Section III.B.5.
102
Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1930 (discounting the Services’ concerns that this
could lead to a “windfall” for licensors).
103
This varies by service offering type. For example, for “standalone portable
subscription offerings,” if the calculated effective royalties would otherwise fall below “50
cents per subscriber per month” then the service must nonetheless pay total royalties equal
to 50 cents/subscriber/month. Id. at 2036.
104
Id. at 1935.
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2012 Settlement as Benchmark: Flexible Rate Structure. The parties disagreed on what (if any) role the 2012 (Phonorecords II) settlement should play in the Phonorecords III proceedings. On one
side, three Services—Amazon, Pandora, and Spotify—submitted
proposals to renew the uber-complicated 2012 “flexible” rate structure with some minor adjustments.105 Fundamentally, each of their
proposals contemplated an “all-in” rate of 10.5 percent of service
revenue with no mechanical floor.106 On the other side, the Copyright Owners, along with one lone service (Apple), advocated jettisoning the 2012 structure entirely, in favor of a predominantly “perplay” rate structure.107
The parties in favor of continuing the pre-existing rate structure
argued that the 2012 settlement supplied a helpful benchmark for
future rates because, they argued, it had been reached in the context
of the same rights, the same uses, and the same types of market participants as still exist now, and that, as a relatively recent negotiated
agreement, it was reflective of current market forces and consensus.108 The Copyright Owners, naturally, disagreed. 109
Ultimately, the Board sided with the Services in concluding that
it should adopt a “flexible, revenue-based rate structure” wherein
streaming companies’ royalty obligations would remain directly tied
to their overall revenue derived from subscription sales, advertising,
etc.110 In other words, unlike the fixed rate mechanical royalty

105

Id. at 1923. The 2012 structure distinguished rates based on a number of varied service
offering types. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 1931–34.
108
Id. at 1926. They also maintained that, contrary to the Copyright Owners’ contention,
licensors “ha[d] actually benefitted” from a flexible rate structure that yielded an increase
in mechanical and performance revenue offsetting the decrease in publisher revenue from
traditional record sales. Id. at 1927; id. at 1986 (Strickler, J., dissenting).
109
They argued that the 2012 settlement was not a free-market negotiation reflective of
market forces, but merely an articulation of the parties’ predictions of litigation outcomes;
that it had been an “experimental” agreement reached in interactive streaming’s infancy;
and that in any event it was skewed by the “shadow” of the statutory license. Id. at 1931;
see also infra Section III.D.3.a. As to the practical effects of the current system, they again
invoked the business models and incentives that streaming services employ that decrease
the amount of royalty-generating revenue available to trickle back to songwriters.
Phonorecords III, supra note 27, at 1931; see supra note 101.
110
Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1934.
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generated by, say, an iTunes sale (9.1 cents per song downloaded),
the royalty generated by a Spotify stream would continue to vary as
a function of Spotify’s total revenue spread across the total of number streams in any given accounting period.111 The Board reasoned
that such a structure would be “the most efficient means of facilitating beneficial price discrimination” in a downstream market where
streaming services were competing over consumers with hugely variant willingness to pay (“WTP”) for interactive streaming.112
However, even as it acknowledged that some kind of “flexible”
approach was called for, the Board declined to rely upon the 2012
settlement as a foundational benchmark for the Phonorecords III
rate structure.113 In doing so, the Board eschewed the complex, granular, service-type-specific flexibility of the 2012 structure. 114 Instead, it seized upon a middle ground structural approach proposed
by Google.
The Board Adopts Google’s Proposed Structure. After considering
a number of other structural pitches, the Board adopted Google’s
proposed structure. Google’s (amended) proposal called for consolidating all the individual product types falling under the broad banner of revenue-generating interactive streaming, and for mechanical
royalties for all revenue-generating interactive streaming product
types to be subject to a single rate calculus.115 In other words, where
the 2012 rates distinguished between streaming medium (e.g. desktop vs. mobile), and revenue mechanism (e.g. ad-supported or

111

Id. at 2035.
Id. at 1934.
113
The Board’s failure to precisely explain this decision was another procedural point
that the D.C. Circuit relied upon in its decision to vacate the initial Phonorecords III
determination. Johnson v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 969 F.3d 363, 387 (D.C. Cir. 2020)
(“Because we cannot discern the basis on which the Board rejected the Phonorecords II
rates as a benchmark in its analysis, that issue is remanded to the Board for a reasoned
analysis.”). The court held that, while the Board had critiqued certain Service arguments
centering around the Phonorecords II structure, it did not explain the wholesale rejection
of the benchmark. Id. (insisting that arguments included for the first time in the Board’s
appellate brief defending its own actions, along with “post hoc” justifications offered by
the Copyright Owners on appeal, “cannot make up for the Board’s failure to adequately
explain itself in [Phonorecords III]”).
114
Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1934; see supra Section II.A.1.
115
Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1923.
112
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subscription), among other variables, under Google’s proposal, any
revenue-generating product116 would be subject to the same rates.117
The Board enthusiastically adopted this basic structure. 118 It
noted that a number of voluntary marketplace agreements included
a structure built around the “greater-of” (1) percentage of total service revenue, and (2) TCC.119 The fact that these agreements occurred “outside the context of litigation” afforded them additional
credibility to the Board.120 Additionally, the Board was drawn to the
(relative) simplicity of Google’s proposal compared to the sprawling maze of categories in the 2012 settlement.121

116

This includes free-to-the-user, ad-supported streaming wherein the service generates
revenue from third parties, but not, for example, temporary free trials. See id. at 2036 (“For
Free Trial Offerings for which the Service receives no monetary consideration, the royalty
rate is zero.”) (emphasis added).
117
Id. In Google’s specific proposal, that rate would be the greater of a 10.5% of service
revenue (subject to certain adjustments) and 15%—with no cap—of TCC.
118
Id. at 1935.
119
Id. Individual streaming services and rightsholders are always at liberty to enter into
voluntary agreements instead of relying upon the statutory license, and in fact often do so.
See Kristelia A. García, Penalty Default Licenses: A Case for Uncertainty, 89 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1117, 1149 (2014) (arguing that this kind of “private ordering” benefits market
participants by permitting parties to “tailor[] terms to fit the contemplated content and use,
thereby alleviating concerns presented by the one-size-fits-all nature of a statutory
licensing regime”). Parties typically do this in order to allow for a grant of rights that is
broader than the statutory grant (e.g., additional non-US territories, non-mechanical rights)
or to provide the rightsholder with additional benefits (e.g., access to proprietary data). See,
e.g., Anne Steele, Spotify Strikes New Licensing Deal With Universal Music Group, WALL
ST. J. (July 22, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/spotify-strikes-new-licensing-dealwith-universal-music-group-11595415603 [https://perma.cc/4VEA-4LKY]. However, the
underlying rates available under these voluntary licenses are heavily influenced by the rates
available under the statutory license. See Loren, supra note 11, at 549 (even as “almost no
one uses the statutory compulsory license to obtain the necessary license to record a
musical work” the terms and rates available under the statutory license “significantly affect
the behavior in market transactions”). This statutory “shadow” becomes a major point of
contention when these agreements, influenced by one set of statutory rates, are then offered
as “benchmarks” during CRB proceedings determining the next set of statutory rates. See
infra Section III.D.3.a.
120
Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1936. The Board noted that agreements that occur
in the context of the litigation (i.e. settlements) can be skewed by the parties’ desire to
avoid the cost of litigation, rather than their pure assessment of the pure market value at
play. Id.
121
Id. at 1936.

2021]

SOMETHING OLD/SOMETHING NEW

603

Crucially, the Board left the TCC prong uncapped.122 In doing
so, it allowed the effective all-in rate to increase, without limitation,
any time the TCC prong exceeds the percentage-of-revenue prong.
Because TCC is a direct product of fees payable to record labels for
the right to stream sound recordings (for which there is no compulsory license or statutory rate to limit services’ risk), this meant that
any time a service’s record label royalty obligations increase above
a certain threshold, its royalty obligations to songwriters could similarly increase—with no upper bound. 123
As discussed earlier, interactive streaming services are required
to obtain licenses spanning public performance and reproduction
rights from both sound recording owners and composition owners.124 Unlike composition rights, the two sound recording rights—
which are typically bundled into a single license with individual record labels, or with entities representing multiple record labels—are
negotiated in an open market free from the kinds of regulatory forces
that constrain songwriter compensation.125
122

Id. at 1934.
See Henry Schoonmaker, How Spotify Streams Turn into Royalties, SONGTRUST (July
20,
2020),
https://blog.songtrust.com/how-spotify-streams-turn-into-royalties
[https://perma.cc/933N-TMZP].
124
See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.
125
For interactive streaming services (unlike noninteractive streaming services, as
distinguished by the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L.
104–39 (1995), these (1) reproduction and (2) public performance sound recording rights
are not subject to any compulsory license or statutory rate-setting. 17 U.S.C § 114(j)(7)
(defining an interactive service as “one that enables a member of the public to receive a
transmission of a program…on request”). By contrast, interactive streaming services must
obtain their (3) public performance and (4) reproduction (i.e. mechanical) licenses of the
underlying compositions from two separate types of entities, neither of which operate in a
purely free market. Mechanical Royalties vs. Performance Royalties: What’s the
Difference?, ROYALTY EXCHANGE (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.royaltyexchange.com/
blog/mechanical-and-performance-royalties-whats-the-difference#sthash.aKUVcTlo.dpbs
[https://perma.cc/5YCM-6W2T]. Services typically license public performance rights for
compositions from PROs such as ASCAP and BMI. Id. These rights are not subject to any
compulsory license, although they are more constrained than sound recording rights by
virtue of rate court jurisdiction, as well as ASCAP and BMI’s individual consent decrees
with the Department of Justice. See Nate Hertweck, What Songwriters Need to Know About
the DOJ's Review Of Consent Decrees, RECORDING ACAD. (Aug. 15, 2019),
https://www.grammy.com/advocacy/news/what-songwriters-need-know-about-dojsreview-consent-decrees [https://perma.cc/Y67A-C7Q5]. Of the four rights interactive
123
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The Board’s justification for tying statutory composition rates to
these free-market sound recording rates was simple: “The ratio of
sound recording royalties to musical works royalties should be
lower than it is….”126 An uncapped TCC prong, it explained, allowed the Board to “influence that ratio directly” by tethering (and
presumably increasing) songwriter rates to sound recording royalty
rates.127 This decision was among the most controversial aspects of
Phonorecords III and figured prominently in the D.C. Circuit’s decision to vacate.128 The D.C. Circuit ultimately overturned this point
streaming services must license, only the reproduction license for the composition is
subject to a compulsory license: the Section 115 compulsory license and statutory
mechanical rate-setting scheme that is the focus of this Comment. See Loren, supra note
53, at 2526.
126
Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1934.
127
Id. The Board added that this feature also permitted publishers and songwriters to
benefit from the protections against revenue deferral that record companies have been able
to negotiate for sound recording rights. While the Services would take umbrage with this
decision, later in the actual rate-setting portion of the decision, the Board reduced the actual
TCC percentage value beyond where models suggested it should otherwise be, to protect
the Services from suffering the effects of the record companies’ oligopoly on both the
recording and composition side of the equation. Id. at 1953.
128
The D.C. Circuit struck down the uncapped TCC prong on procedural grounds.
Johnson v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 969 F.3d 363, 383 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“[B]ecause the
Copyright Royalty Board failed to provide fair notice of the [uncapped TCC] rate structure
it adopted, that aspect of its decision must be vacated and remanded for further
proceedings.”). Importantly, because Google first proffered the uncapped TCC prong in a
“post-hearing proposal” (and because no other party proposed an uncapped TCC prong),
the notion of an uncapped TCC prong was not an issue directly litigated during the trial
stage of Phonorecords III. See id. The Board’s decision to embrace a structure that was
proposed post-hearing figured prominently in Judge Strickler’s dissent and into the
Services’ arguments on appeal. See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1963–64 (Strickler,
J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority erred by plucking two rates from the record, combining
them post-hearing, and then wrongly declaring that this ‘mash-up’ was actually based on
the record.”); Public Initial Brief for Appellants/Intervenors Pandora Media, LLC, Google
LLC, Spotify USA Inc. and Amazon Digital Services LLC at 24, Johnson v. Copyright
Royalty Bd., 969 F.3d 363 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (No. 19–1028) [hereinafter “Service Brief”]
(“[T]he uncapped TCC structure was not proposed before or during the hearing, and the
parties had no opportunity to present evidence demonstrating the flaws in that approach.”).
Judge Strickler also raised substantive issues with the uncapped TCC prong. First, his
dissent (and the Services, on appeal) argued that the uncapped TCC prong recklessly
imports the record companies’ oligopoly market power—which inflates rates on the sound
recording side—into the rates for musical works, thus surrounding the Services with market
power. See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1964 (Strickler, J., dissenting) (“[H]ow can
it be reasonable to ask the Judges to set a rate that does not itself provide for a fair
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on procedural grounds—because the Board had not given the Services sufficient opportunity to litigate the uncapped TCC prong, it
could not include it in its final determination. 129
4. Royalty Rates
After devoting significant time to piecing together a rate structure, the Board then turned its attention to the numerical rates themselves. First, the Board evaluated the benchmarks proposed by each
party and the expert analysis built upon those benchmarks. While it
ultimately determined each benchmark to be inadequate, it found
“certain aspects of each” to be instructive.130 Second, it used several
Shapley economic analyses to establish a “zone of reasonableness”
from which it plucked its final rates. As a final step, it tested these
final rates against the 801(b) factors.

return…but simply puts the Copyright Owners’ fair return in the hands of the labels to
negotiate terms that will adequately protect the publishers and songwriters as well?”);
Service Brief at 24 (“Setting an uncapped rate tethered to a non-competitive market and
relying solely on those market forces to evaluate rates is plainly inconsistent with
Congress’s purpose of lessening the impact of anticompetitive forces.”) (internal quotation
marks removed). Relatedly, the dissent also characterized as “heroic” and “complacent”
the assumption that record companies, knowing that musical work royalty rates are now
subject to uncapped TCC prong, “will recognize that they have no choice but to decrease
their royalty rates” in order to allow the streaming services “to retain enough revenue to
survive.” Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1964 (Strickler, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is
no factual evidence in the record to sustain the Majority’s hypothesis that record labels
would voluntarily lower their rates.”). Second, per the dissent, the majority failed to
consider the potential harms to the Copyright Owners under any TCC prong, such as (1)
the record companies acquiring streaming services and offering them “sweetheart” deals,
depressing songwriter royalties based on those deals, and (2) for that matter, relying on the
product of self-interested record company negotiations for protection in the first place. Id.
(criticizing as naïve the majority’s downplaying the risks associated with an uncapped TCC
through “trust in the rational self-interest of the market participants”). Id. at 1967. Finally,
the dissent argued that the majority’s decision to, in effect, “delegate” songwriter royalty
rates to record companies through an uncapped TCC prong violated the “private
nondelegation doctrine” proscribing “the delegation of statutory duties to private entities.”
Id. at 1967. Judge Strickler ultimately advocated continuing the 2012 structure and rates.
Id. at 1968. Crucially, the D.C. Circuit declined to opine on any of these substantive
critiques of the uncapped TCC prong. Johnson, 969 F.3d at 383 (“Because we have vacated
the rate structure devised by the Board for lack of notice, we need not address these
arguments.”).
129
Id.
130
See Public Initial Brief for Appellees at 17–18, Johnson v. Copyright Royalty Bd.,
969 F.3d 363 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (No. 19-1028).
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a) Proposed Benchmarks
To provide benchmarks for the “inherent” value of a musical
work—the premise underlying its (rejected) per-play proposal—the
Copyright Owners advocated looking to license terms for interactive
sound recording rights.131 As discussed in Part II.A.3, these sound
recording rates, unlike the mechanical rates at issue in Phonorecords
III, are not subject to a compulsory license. Nonetheless, the Copyright Owners’ expert justified this benchmark by noting that interactive sound recording licenses (1) covered the same “composite
good” as the rates being determined in Phonorecords III, meaning
the sound recordings embodying the musical works at issue here;
and (2) involved the same licensees, the streaming services. 132 Because, however, the actual rights governed by the sound recording
licenses native to the benchmark were different from the underlying
musical work licenses at issue in this proceeding, he conceded that
certain adjustments would have to be made. 133
In service of these adjustments, the Copyright Owners’ expert
sought to quantify a general marketplace value ratio between sound
recording royalty rates and musical work royalty rates.134 To do this,
he looked to various interfaces in which licensees must license both
sound recordings and underlying musical works and calculated the
ratio between payments for each right.135 He derived his range of
ratios from the following settings: (A) the 2012 settlement statutory
rates;136 (B) voluntary licenses for interactive streaming, which he
discounted because, he argued, their rates were depressed by the
“shadow” of the compulsory license;137 (C) synchronization licenses, or licenses for film and television audio-visual placements,
131

See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1936.
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
He calculated that the TCC prongs under the 2012 rates suggested a sound
recording/musical work ratio of between 4.55:1 and 4.76:1, which he argued was an “upper
bound.” Id. For an elaboration on what the 2012 structure entailed, see supra Section
II.A.1.
137
Based on real marketplace agreements, he calculated a sound recording/musical work
ratio of between 4.2:1 and 4.76:1, “closely tracking the regulatory ratios implicit in the
section 115 TCC.” Id. at 1937.
132
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which are typically negotiated in a free market for equivalent
rates on the sound recording and composition side;138 (D) marketplace YouTube agreements; and (E) marketplace Pandora “opt-out”
deals. 139 From these ratios, making certain economic assumptions,
he calculated a (redacted) range with a (redacted) midpoint.140 Presumably, the Copyright Owners’ final proposed rates fell within
this range.
While it ultimately rejected the Copyright Owners’ proposals,
the Board found the approach of evaluating benchmark ratios between sound recording and musical work rates to be “a reasonable
first step.”141 However, it took issue with some of the expert’s data
and methodology—that his “wide range” of ratios was the result of
data points that “do not relate to the same products and same uses of
the two rights,”142 including some that incorporated “inefficiently
high rates” arising in the “unregulated [for interactive streaming] . . .
oligopoly” that is the sound recording industry. 143
138

Here, he found a sound recording/musical work ratio of 1:1, noting that this was an
“important” benchmark because it showed that, in an open market, the two rights are often
“equally valued.” Id.
139
For these two deal types, the terms, and resultant calculated ratios, have been redacted
in the public Phonorecords III decision: YouTube’s agreements with publishers and labels,
as well as Pandora’s agreements for digital performance rights with labels and with certain
music publishers who had partially withdrawn from the PROS between 2012 and 2016.
The Board characterized these ratios as falling “in the middle of his range. Id. at 1938.
Partial withdrawal was disallowed in 2015. See Pandora Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y
Composers, 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d, 785 F.3d 73, 77–78 (2d Cir.
2015).
140
Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1940. Typically, the Board redacts from its public
opinions proprietary data that it relies upon for its rate determinations.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id. The Board alluded to its reliance in Web IV on noninteractive services’ ability to
counteract these oligopolistic forces by steering listeners to lower-cost repertoire, and its
conclusion in that case that no similar function exists in interactive streaming—where, by
definition, the service must be prepared to serve the listener whichever song the listener
wishes to hear. See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26343. As a result, the Board expressed
skepticism that interactive sound recording evidence rates could reliably be used to inform
an “effectively competitive rate,” as it deemed to be required under section 801(b). Id.
(citing Web IV for the proposition that a benchmark derived from royalty rates negotiated
between streaming services and the record label “oligopoly…compromises the value of
rates set therein as useful benchmarks for an ‘effectively competitive’ market…as required
by the ‘reasonable rate’ language in section 801(b)(1)”). Nonetheless, the Board still
entertained sound recording/musical work ratios based on these rates. Id. at 1940–41.
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Specifically, the Board (A) accepted the ratio derived from the
2012 settlement rates as a probative benchmark of “a rate the parties
are willing to accept.”144 It also (B) enthusiastically accepted as probative the ratio derived from voluntary interactive streaming licenses, reiterating that a statutory “shadow” is not disqualifying,
even as it might affect how the Board ultimately weighs that benchmark.145 However, it (C) rejected the 1:1 synchronization ratio as a
benchmark for interactive streaming rates “because of the large degree of incomparability” between synchronization and mechanical
licensing.146 It also (D) rejected the sound recording/musical work
ratio derived from YouTube agreements as a useful benchmark because of differences between the two service types, and the fact that
sound recording YouTube rates are depressed by DMCA “safe harbor” provisions—while also dismissing as “conclusory” the Copyright Owners’ suggestion that “safe harbor” also drives YouTube
composition rates downward.147 Finally, the Board (E) partially
144

Id.
Id. at 1941. For further background surrounding the statutory “shadow,” see sources
cited supra note 119. While the Board acknowledged that the notion of a statutory
“shadow” that constrains marketplace agreements is perfectly valid, it also suggested that
this it may have procompetitive effects: it may help to “offset or mitigate the bargaining
power of licensors who otherwise have the ability to threaten to ‘walk away’ from
negotiations and thus decimate the licensees’ businesses.” Phonorecords III, supra note
28, at 1932–33.
146
Id. at 1941 (quoting Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate
Determination Proceeding, 74 Fed. Reg. 4510, 4519 (Jan. 26, 2009) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 385) [hereinafter “Phonorecords I”]). Per the Board, several factors contribute
to this “incomparability.” First, synchronization licenses arise in situations where film and
television producers may enter a transaction with “a certain musical work in mind,” and
the option to re-record that work (which is why “cover songs are quite common in films”),
deflating the value of any single sound recording of a musical work relative to the work
itself. Id. Second, the Board concluded that the market for synchronization placements is
more competitive than other music licensing markets: in the interactive streaming context,
where the services’ core product is a comprehensive catalog of many songs, each sound
recording is effectively a “must have” complement for every other sound recording. Id.
Not so in synchronization—there, the Board noted, sound recordings are substitutes for
each other, competing for scarce placement opportunities. Id.
147
Id. at 1942. The Board acknowledged that YouTube does compete directly with the
audio-only interactive streaming services governed by Section 115, but that, as a video
service, it is not itself subject to Section 115 (nor its “shadow”); it was swayed by the
differences between the two service types. Id. Nonetheless, in addition to the perceived
differences in how “safe harbor” operates for the two copyrights, it emphasized that the
145
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accepted the benchmark derived from Pandora’s marketplace deals
with publishers who had partially withdrawn digital performance
rights from the PROs prior to 2016.148
For their part, the Services who advocated renewing the 2012
structure did not “examine in detail” the rates within their general
benchmark proposal: the 2012 settlement itself. 149 Rather, they argued that the rates within the 2012 structure were generally reflective of the relevant market, had “baked in” the relevant economic
variables, and triggered a reliance interest from various stakeholders
and new entrants.150
The Board dismissed both the overall “broad” tack taken by the
Services, as well as their specific reliance arguments.151 It “categorically rejected” any reliance argument based on the plain language
of the statute providing that each rate determination is de novo.152
The Services also introduced the newly extended (by settlement
between the Copyright Owners and, among others, record labels)
mechanical rates for physical sales, digital sales, and ringtones as a
benchmark to substantiate their proposed interactive streaming mechanical rates.153 In support of this benchmark, it argued that
addition of video offerings “creates a bundling of value distinguishable from the value of
interactive streaming alone.” Id.
148
The Board quibbled with some of the Copyright Owners’ expert’s assumptions, and
disregarded a purported downward trend in the sound recording/musical work ratio that he
claimed the agreements supported. Id. (“His change in the ratio…was driven by
expectations regarding the likelihood of an uncertain change in the legal landscape
regarding publisher withdrawals from performing rights organizations. Such uncertain
potential changes are not well-captured by mapping them over a time horizon.”). The Board
elected to proceed with the ratio derived from just one of his (redacted) data points as a
useable benchmark. Id.
149
Id. at 1944.
150
Id. The Services argued that they had relied upon the 2012 rates continuing in
“developing their business models,” including choosing to enter the market at all. Id.
Additionally, they took issue with the Copyright Owners’ construction of “the Services”
as a monolith, reminding the Board that “not all Digital Services use the same business
model.” Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id. at 1945. Musical works are reproduced within the meaning of the Copyright Act
in a number of contexts, including physical sales, digital sales, ringtones, and digital
streaming. Johnson v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 969 F.3d 363, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2020). All of
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because the total revenue created by physical and digital sales was,
at that point, roughly equal to the revenues created through interactive streaming, the two avenues were of “equivalent financial importance to publishers” when negotiating.154 Thus, it provided useful guidance on the “industry’s sense of the market rate” as well as
the “industry’s sense of how the judges would apply [section 801(b)].”155
The Board accepted this rate as “somewhat useful,” noting that
it was a recent, voluntary settlement pertaining to the same licensed
rights, by the same licensors.156 However, it also recognized that the
“access value” of owning a specific song or album is dwarfed by the
value of access to the comprehensive repertoires offered by interactive streaming services.157 As a result, the Board concluded that this
rate was “at best” a useful guidepost for mechanical floors. 158 Nonetheless, it also accepted portions of the Services’ economic analysis
using this benchmark and allowed the resulting figure to inform its
final rate determination for streaming mechanical rates. 159
those reproductions are subject to compulsory licensing and statutory rate-setting. Id. at
368. In the lead-up to Phonorecords III, stakeholders settled regarding the statutory rates
for physical sales, digital sales, and ringtones. Id. at 371. The Phonorecords III proceedings
arose only after a similar settlement was not reached for digital streaming. Id.
154
Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1945.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 1946.
157
Id. at 1945. The Board acknowledged that the formal distinction between ownership
and access was insignificant, because “[o]wnership is in essence a more comprehensive
and unconditional form of access.” Id. The important difference here was the scale of music
available via access/ownership, not the “access” or “ownership” label itself. Id.
158
Id. at 1946.
159
The Services’ experts attempted two economic analyses. Id. First, they applied the
RIAA’s streams-downloads “equivalence” factor (150 to 1), and an academic study’s
attempt at the same metric (137 to 1), against Spotify’s streaming data, and the effective
2012 percentage-of-revenue rate, to calculate an appropriate per-stream benchmark rate,
which was significantly lower than the per-play rates proposed by both the Copyright
Owners and by Apple (the latter was derived using a similar methodology). Id. at 1946.
The Board rejected the first approach out of hand: The Services had neither defined what
“equivalence” means, nor why this specific construction of “equivalence” would be
significant in this context. Id. at 1944. However, the Board accepted the Services’ experts’
second economic analysis, in which they divided the songwriter royalty rate for downloads
and CDs from the average retail price for each format, respectively, and applied those
quotients against streaming service revenues, to find that an equivalent percentage-of-
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b) Shapley Economic Modeling
Having found the benchmarks derived from real-world agreements each to be inadequate—if occasionally helpful—the Board
next evaluated several competing, complex Shapley economic models.160 The Board quoted expert testimony explaining that the Shapley analysis endeavors to model bargaining in a free and “fair” market by assigning costs to each party “according to its average contribution to cost” and to assign benefit “according to its average contribution to value.”161
The extent to which the modeled market should be “fair” or
“free”—and the extent to which there is an economic difference between those terms—varied by model.162 In designing her model, the
Services’ expert, explicitly invoking 801(b) Factor B (requiring a
fair income for both licensor and licensee) and Factor C (consideration of the parties’ relative roles), chose to “intentionally deviate
from the market-based distribution of profits” in favor of the ideals
espoused in those two 801(b) factors. 163 By contrast, the Copyright
revenue rate would be between 10.2% and 11.3%—right around the 10.5% percent-ofrevenue figure in the 2012 rates. Id.
160
“The Shapley methodology is a game theory model that seeks to assign to each market
player the average marginal value that the player contributes to the market.” Johnson v.
Copyright Royalty Bd., 969 F.3d 363, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2020). For more on Shapley analyses,
see Richard Watt, Fair Remuneration for Copyright Holders and the Shapley Value, in
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT 118, 120 (Richard Watt ed., 2014) (“The
Shapley model of allocation has long been accepted by economists as providing a fair and
equitable sharing rule.”); Anne Layne-Farrar, A. Jorge Padilla, & Richard Schmalensee,
Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations: Making Sense of Frand
Commitments, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 693 (2007) (discussing Shapley modeling in the
patent licensing context); David Crump, Game Theory, Legislation, and the Multiple
Meanings of Equality, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 331, 349–52 (2001) (discussing Shapley
values more broadly, beyond the intellectual property context).
161
Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1947–48.
162
Id. While the Copyright Owners’ primary Shapley expert characterized this analysis
as modeling “bargaining processes in a free market,” the Services’ Shapley expert stressed
that the analysis “embodies a notion of fairness.” Id. The Copyright Owners’ rebuttal
Shapley expert’s characterizations fell in between, describing Shapley analysis as
modeling “the outcome in a hypothetical ‘fair’ market environment…when all bargainers
are on an equal footing.” Id.
163
The Services’ expert, unlike the Copyright Owners’ experts, also designed her model
to “eliminate a separate factor— market power—that she asserts renders a market-based
Shapley Analysis incompatible with the objectives of Factors B and C of section
801(b)(1).” Id. at 1950.
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Owner’s expert attempted to predict the sound recording/musical
works ratio that would occur “in an unconstrainted market.” 164 Unsurprisingly, the Copyright Owners’ model produced higher royalty
rates than the Services’ model. Indeed, the Services’ expert concluded that not only should rates be lower than the Copyright Owners’ model suggested, but “the fairness component of § 801(b) factors suggests that interactive streaming’s mechanical rates should be
reduced from their current level.”165
Though they differed in their results, all three Shapley analyses
concluded that “the ratio of sound recording to musical works royalty rates should decline” from the 2012 ratio of 5.71:1, which was
based on the 10.5% percentage-of-revenue rate versus approximately 60% for sound recordings.166 In other words, all analyses rejected the reality under the 2012 rates in which sound recording
owners were paid nearly six times more for streaming activity than
the creators of the underlying compositions. While they disagreed
on how much, all three experts agreed that the gap between artist/label compensation and songwriter/publisher compensation should
decrease.
c) Zone of Reasonableness
Having evaluated each of the parties’ numerical rate proposals,
the Board proceeded to its next task: assembling a “zone of reasonableness,” or a range of valid potential rates from which to select
final rates. First, the Board converted the three (redacted) ratios derived via Shapley analyses into percentage-of-revenue and TCC figures in order to fit within the rate structure the Board had previously
adopted from Google’s structural proposal. 167 Then, the Board positioned two of those three putative rates168 to establish a (redacted)

164

Id.
Id. at 1949 (emphasis added).
166
Id. at 1952.
167
See id. at 1948–54; supra notes 115–123 and accompanying text.
168
One of the Copyright Owners’ experts presented his figures in rebuttal testimony;
because the Services’ expert did not have a chance to rebut these figures, they were not
included in the zone of reasonableness. See id. at 1954. No benchmark values were
included because the Board had already rejected each of the proffered benchmarks. See
supra Section II.A.4.a.
165
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“zone of reasonableness” for each of the two prongs.169 Finally,
“[t]aking into consideration the totality of the evidence presented in
this proceeding”—without further elaboration170—the Board selected a (redacted) final figure from the zone of reasonableness for
each prong.171
5. Applying the 801(b)(1) Factors
Armed at long last with both a structure and potential numerical
rates to populate that structure, the Board now engaged directly with
the guiding 801(b)(1) factors. It noted that these four factors compel
the Board to use “legislative discretion”172 in determining “reasonable rates” because the factors “pull in opposing directions,” and the
Board must therefore choose one rate from a range of reasonable
rates that may each “serve all these objectives adequately but to differing degrees.”173
In the end, the Board found that the rates and structure it had
already selected passed 801(b) muster and did not warrant further
adjustment upon express application of the 801(b) factors.
As a prelude to its discussion of each factor, the Board discussed
the relationship between the 801(b) standard and market-based rates
set under the willing buyer/willing seller standard.174 The key difference: unlike the willing buyer/willing seller standard, “section
801(b)(1) does not focus on unregulated marketplace rates.”175
169

Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1948–54.
Id. at 1954. The Services seized upon this point in their appeal. See Service Brief,
supra note 128, at 43 (“[O]nce the Majority established its ‘zone of reasonableness, it set
the rate by simply choosing the midpoint of the zone. The Final Determination contains no
explanation whatsoever for that choice or even an acknowledgment that it made such a
facile split….”). The D.C. Circuit did not rely upon this point in its decision to vacate and
remand. See generally Johnson v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 969 F.3d 363 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
171
Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1954.
172
Id. at 1955 (citing SoundExchange, Inc. v. Librarian of Cong., 571 F.3d 1220, 1224
(D.C. Cir. 2009)).
173
Id. (citing Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 662 F.2d 1,
9 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
174
Id. at 1955. Of course, while the pre-MMA Board was still not governed by willing
buyer/willing seller in the context of mechanical rate-setting under Section 115, it had
plenty of experience applying willing buyer/willing seller in the Section 114 context. See,
e.g., infra Section II.B.
175
Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1955 (emphasis in original).
170
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However, the Board clarified, market-based rates are acceptable,
without adjustment, provided that their underlying market forces
also satisfy the four itemized factors.176 If they do not, then the
Board “may adjust the reasonable, market-based rate appropriately.”177
Factor A. The Board first had to resolve a stark, philosophical difference in how the two sides interpreted Factor A: “maximiz[ing]
the availability of creative works to the public.” 178 The Services
urged the Board to view this factor through the demand-focused lens
of maximizing consumer access to streaming services and therefore
to the works contained therein. 179 The Copyright Owners advocated
a supply-focused lens: that chronically depressed rates stifle incentives for creators to continue to generate a supply of creative works
that can then be made available to the public.180
While it expressed sympathy for the evidence the Copyright
Owners presented to demonstrate the very real financial difficulties
faced by the songwriter labor force—and expressly stated that these
conditions warranted a significant rate increase—the Board opted
for the Services’ demand-focused interpretation of “availability.”181
It then concluded that the flexible rate standard it had provisionally
adopted did, in fact, satisfy the “availability” factor by allowing
streaming services to more flexibly and comprehensively cater to
varying willingness to pay (“WTP”) among downstream consumers.182 Therefore, it reasoned, no adjustments to its proposed rate
structure and numerical rates were warranted under Factor A. 183
Factors B and C. Next, the Board tackled Factors B and C in tandem. Per these factors, the Board was tasked, respectively, with affording a “fair” return to copyright owners and users , while weighing “the relative roles of the copyright owner and copyright user in

176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1956.
Id. at 1957.
Id.
Id. at 1958.
Id.
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the product made available to the public.”184 It remarked that Congress included these factors to allow the Board to move “[b]eyond a
strictly market-based analysis,” and that the two could be grouped
together because, as all parties’ experts agreed, the Shapley value
“operationaliz[ing] the concept of fair return based on relative contributions” would speak to both.185 Because its proposed rates were
themselves derived from Shapley analyses, which purported to provide a “fair allocation of revenue between copyright owners and services,” the Board summarily deemed these two factors satisfied
without any further adjustment.186
Factor D. The Board opened its discussion of Factor D—avoidance
of industry disruption—by citing its own test from Phonorecords
I.187 There, it had held that a rate would need adjustment if it caused
any “adverse impact that is substantial, immediate and irreversible
in the short-run.”188 It then noted that it had declined to adopt a perstream rate for precisely this reason. 189 It added that, while it had not
granted the Services’ wish to maintain the exact 2012 rate structure,
it had adopted many of that structure’s attributes in service of this
same goal.190
The Board disavowed any responsibility under Factor D to account for speculative, long-run hypothetical consequences. It reiterated that “it is not the Judges’ role to protect the current players in
the industry.”191 It acknowledged that, even under the existing rates,
184

Id. at 1958–59.
Id. at 1959.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id. (emphasis added). This limited construction of “disruption” was a major point of
contention on appeal. See Service Brief, supra note 128, at 49 (“These rates could cause a
significant disruption to the market, including that record labels could adapt by “mov[ing]
the streaming service in-house.”). The D.C. Circuit did not rule on this point. See Johnson
v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 969 F.3d 363, 389 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (vacating on procedural
grounds, and declining to opine on the Board’s interpretation of 801(b) factors B, C,
and D).
189
See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1959.
190
Id.
191
Id. at 1953 n.137. The majority shrugged off the dissent’s suggestion that if
mechanical royalty rate increases forced record companies to reduce their own rates, they
might one day contemplate the radical step of forming their own streaming services, and
185
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interactive streaming services were not profitable, and stated bluntly
that “nothing the Judges do in this proceeding will change the Services’ business models to change that circumstance.” 192 Furthermore, the Board continued, while mechanical royalty rates certainly
have some effect on the bottom-line, even the Services themselves
acknowledge that the lack of profitability was primarily “a function
of a lack of scale [because] market share is divided among too many
competing interactive streaming services.” 193 However, the Board
conceded, while the Services had certainly demonstrated that they
could absorb short-term losses, there could still be an immediate inflection point “beyond which services will be unable to attract capital and survive until the long run market dénouement.”194
Thus, while the lack of profitability did nothing to convince the
Board that it needed to adjust its rate increase in the long run to satisfy Factor D, this last point did prompt one temporal adjustment.195
In order to avoid the “short-run” disruption that Factor D protects

shutting out third-party services, rather than “docilely accept such a revenue loss.” Id. at
1953; see also id. at 2028 (Strickler, J., dissenting). The majority contended that the risk
of the “must-have supplier” record companies walking away from negotiations, effectively
shuttering the services, would exist under any rate governance, and the fact that they had
not done so “demonstrates that it is not in their economic interest to do so.” Id. at 1953.
This was another matter of contention on appeal. See Service Brief, supra note 128, at 49
(“Eliminating all existing providers of interactive streaming services, and their substitution
with vertically-integrated providers, would ‘disrupt’ the market under a plain reading of
that statutory term. Because the Majority wrongly believed that it was required to ignore
whether its decision may force all existing streaming services from the market, its decision
should be vacated.”) (emphasis in original). Vacating Phonorecords III on procedural
grounds, the D.C. Circuit did not rule on this point. Johnson, 969 F.3d at 389
(acknowledging the Services’ contention that “the Board failed to account for the
possibility that the new rate structure and heightened rate would eventually result in the
elimination of all existing providers of interactive streaming services” but that insisting
that the court “need not at this juncture address whether the Board adequately considered”
this, and other, 801(b)-based substantive arguments) (internal quotation marks omitted).
192
Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1959. In any event, it predicted, perennial “chronic
accounting losses,” had not and would not preclude streaming services from being in
business, nor new services from entering the market. Id. at 1959–60. The Board had
previously mused that Spotify’s market value of over $8 billion at the time “suggest[ed]
perhaps, investors’ expectations regarding future profits.” Id. at 1922.
193
Id. at 1960.
194
Id.
195
See id.
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against, the Board elected to roll out the 44% rate increase it was
about to introduce over a five-year period, rather than overnight. 196
6. Final Rates
In the end, the Board landed on the following “Subpart C”197
mechanical royalty rates: a nearly 44% increase over the 2012
)rates.198 The baseline rate is the greater of the following: 199

These “all-in” rates are then subject to a deduction of performance royalties, typically paid to performing rights organizations,
and then divided by stream count to generate a per-stream rate. 200 If
that rate falls below the mechanical floor (typically a fixed rate per
user per month, such as 50 cents per subscriber per month for
“standalone portable subscription offerings”) then the mechanical
floor rate will apply instead.201
B. A Willing Buyer/Willing Seller Case Study (Web IV)
While the willing buyer/willing seller standard has only governed mechanical royalties for musical compositions under Section
196

Id.
Beginning after Phonorecords III, “Subpart C” now refers to all streaming services
“that are revenue bearing,” including ad-supported, subscription, family plans, student
plans, annual plans, etc. It does not govern mechanical royalties for physical sales, digital
sales, ringtones, or bundles thereof (“Subpart B”). “Subpart D” governs promotional
streaming and free trials—streams that are free to the user (including promotional stream,
free trials, but not ad-supported streams, which fall under “Subpart C”). “Subpart A”
provides general definitions and terms governing the statutory license. Id. at 1961, 2031–
36. Prior to Phonorecords III, these subparts were organized differently.
198
Id. at 1958. The 44% increase figure refers to the new 15.1% percent-of-revenue
prong that is scheduled to arrive in 2022, which is a 43.81% increase from the old 10.5%
headline percent-of-revenue prong under the 2012 rates, which remained operative through
2017. Id. at 1960, 2024.
199
Id. at 2035.
200
Id. at 2035–36.
201
Id.
197
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115 since the passage of the MMA, Section 114 rate-setting proceedings, which determine the statutory rates for the public performance of sound recordings via noninteractive streaming, have long
been governed by a willing buyer/willing seller rate standard. 202
Interactive services differ from noninteractive services in two
important respects. First, although not all services of each type are
identical, the core distinction between the two categories is that interactive streaming users have full agency in selecting the song they
wish to listen to, while noninteractive users cannot select specific
songs (and are also subject to other constraints, such as limited
skips, song restarts, etc.).203 Second, the compulsory public performance license for sound recordings under Section 114 applies only
to noninteractive streaming services. 204 It does not apply to interactive streaming services.205 In this sense, it is the exact mirror image
of the Section 115 compulsory license, which governs interactive,
but not noninteractive, streaming.206
In the Section 114 context, the Board is tasked with establishing
“rates and terms that most clearly represent the rates and terms that
would have been negotiated in the marketplace between a willing

202

Web IV, supra note 73, at 26316.
See Wittow et al., supra note 16; see also, e.g., Skips and Replays, PANDORA,
https://help.pandora.com/s/article/Skips-1519949305278?language=en_US
[https://perma.cc/MP6S-4DTJ]. Perhaps the most prominent examples of each are, on the
interactive side, Spotify and Apple Music’s basic interactive services, whose users can
browse and select among vast libraries of individual songs and albums, as distinguished
from Pandora’s prominent noninteractive internet radio service, whose users can supply
artist and genre inputs in order to prompt the service to create a general radio station that
is responsive to the supplied preferences without ceding actual control over the specific
songs played. See Schoonmaker, supra note 18. While noninteractive streaming services
like Pandora rose to prominence in the US before their interactive counterparts, interactive
services like Spotify and Apple Music have come to dominate the streaming market in
recent years. See Ashley King, Pandora Is Losing Subscribers—88,000 Left the Service
Last Quarter, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Feb. 4, 2020), https://www.digitalmusicnews
.com/2020/02/04/pandora-losing-subscribers-q4-2019
[https://perma.cc/6FJT-G6P8];
Stuart Dredge, How Many Users Do Spotify, Apple Music and Other Big Music Streaming
Services Have?, MUSIC ALLY (Feb. 19, 2020), https://musically.com/2020/02/19/
spotify-apple-how-many-users-big-music-streaming-services/
[https://perma.cc/SJY348ZA].
204
See 17 U.S.C. §114(d)(2).
205
17 U.S.C. §114(d)(2)(A)(i).
206
See supra note 18.
203
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buyer and a willing seller.”207 To do so, it must sift through “economic, competitive[,] and programming information presented by
the parties” in order to ascertain the rate structure that they believe
would occur in a “hypothetical marketplace, free of the influence of
compulsory, statutory licenses.”208 The statutory language of Section 114 explicitly permits the Board to “consider rates and terms of
comparable services and comparable circumstances under voluntary, negotiated license agreements.” 209
1. Overall Structure
The Board’s 2016210 Web IV decision proceeded by way of a
relatively simple structure, particularly compared to Phonorecords
III. First, the Board engaged in a very brief rate structure discussion.
Second, it evaluated the parties’ submissions for prospective benchmarks in the rate-setting process and weighed potential adjustments
to those benchmarks. In this case, the relevant parties were: on the
licensor side, SoundExchange, the sole performing rights organization designated by the Copyright Office to collect and distribute
public performance royalties for sound recordings; and on the licensee side, companies who offer noninteractive internet radio services,
including Pandora and iHeart, as well as trade organizations like the
National Association of Broadcasters (the “NAB”).211
Third, the Board synthesized these adjusted benchmarks to establish a zone of reasonableness. Finally, it picked a rate from within
that zone of reasonableness. The decision was unanimous. Notably,
it was reached by the same three judges who would later split over
Phonorecords III.

207

Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B)).
Id.
209
Id.
210
Like Section 115 proceedings, Section 114 rate determinations also occur in five-year
intervals. 17 U.S.C. § 112(e)(3). And like Section 115, the parties to Section 114
proceedings are stakeholders whose interest in the litigation is that they will become subject
to the new statutory regime. See supra note 88.
211
The Board also briefly disposed of proposals from Sirius XM, the NAB, and pro se
songwriter/musician George Johnson. Web IV, supra note 73, at 26355.
208
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2. Rate Structure
In contrast to Phonorecords III, the Web IV Board made quick
work of its primary rate structure decision: it elected to renew the
basic pre-existing per-play rate structure. It swiftly and summarily
rejected SoundExchange and Pandora’s separate “greater-of” rate
structure proposals, whereby a statutory service would pay SoundExchange the “greater-of” a per-play rate or a percentage of service
income.212
Before proceeding to evaluate the parties’ proposed benchmarks, the Board then dispensed with some other ancillary structural
matters. First, it declined to adopt differentiated rates depending on
whether or not a streamed recording was being simulcast from a terrestrial radio broadcast.213 Next, the Board briefly addressed the
212

Id. at 26326 (discounting the relevance of the marketplace agreements that had been
proffered in support of that proposal, and rejecting the notion that record companies should
be entitled to share in service upside beyond the royalty generated by a properly calibrated
per-play rate). The Board also referred to past rate determinations that had opted for a
purely pure-play structure, and cited stare decisis-like directives from the Copyright Act
that the Board should act in accordance with its own prior decisions. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C.
§ 803).
213
Many terrestrial broadcast radio stations offer digital simulcasts of their over-the-air
programming. See, e.g., Listen to Live Radio, IHEARTRADIO, https://www.iheart.com/
live/country/US/city/new-york-ny-159/5 [https://perma.cc/JXX6-X2SC]. In support of
the differentiated rates proposal, the testifying expert for the NAB derived the lower
bound of the NAB’s proposed “zone of reasonableness” for royalty rates from terrestrial
radio, where broadcasters are not required to pay royalties for broadcasting sound recordings (they do pay for the underlying compositions), and whose promotional effect, in a
hypothetical market, “would drive down royalty rates, possibly even resulting in negative
royalty rates if the law permitted record companies to pay broadcasters to play their music (i.e. payola).” Web IV, supra note 73, at 26390. The Board was unmoved by the comparison to terrestrial radio because, simply, “there is no market for licensing of sound recordings for transmission by terrestrial radio stations, since there is no general public performance right for sound recordings.” Id. at 26391. The Board also dismissed the upper
bound of the NAB’s “zone of reasonableness” because it was derived from the SDARS II
CRB rates (governing the public performance of sound recordings via satellite radio),
which had been promulgated under the § 801(b) standard, not willing buyer/willing
seller. Id. at 26391. Finally, the Board deemed the NAB’s other arguments irrelevant to
whether a record company operating in the hypothetical marketplace would be willing to
accept lower rates: (1) that FCC regulations require terrestrial broadcasters to act “in the
public interest,” (2) that terrestrial broadcasters tend to have a local and communitydriven focus, and (3) empirical evidence that a significant percentage of (12.2%) simulcast listening is attributable not to music, but rather to “hosts, DJs, and other on-air personalities.” Id. at 26321. The Board did, however, briefly entertain arguments
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“novel question” of whether it is permitted to establish divergent
rates for major and indie record companies. 214 It noted that while the
evidence suggested that services entering into voluntary agreements
in the actual marketplace do tend to pay higher rates to majors than
indies, no party had proposed such a differentiated rate structure. 215
It elected to refer the matter to the Register of Copyrights, who relied on this lack of relevant proposals by actual parties in determining that the question “did not meet the statutory criteria for referral.”216 Without guidance from the Copyright Office, the Board both
declined to opine on the legal question and elected not to differentiate rates by category of licensor for purposes of the Web IV rate
structure.217
Finally, the Board declined to independently value substitution
(the extent to which revenue and activity from one source crowds
out revenue and activity from other sources) and promotion (the extent to which activity and revenue from one source enhances activity
and revenue from other sources) effects when reviewing putative
benchmark agreements.218 Instead it proceeded under the presumption that any benchmark agreements already “factor in” any substitution effects and promotion effects.219
surrounding the potential substitution of other sources of record company revenue by
simulcasts, as well as the promotional benefits of terrestrial radio, and the effect these dynamics could have on record labels in a hypothetical marketplace. See id. at 26322 (declining to credit these arguments because of evidentiary deficiencies, rather than relevancy issues). Ultimately the Board relied upon evidence suggesting a “strong indication
that simulcasters and other commercial webcasters operate in the same, not separate submarkets.” Id. at 26323.
214
Id. at 26319.
215
Id.
216
Id. (quoting Memorandum Opinion on Novel Question of Law at 7, Determination of
Royalty Rates and Terms for Ephemeral Recording and Webcasting Digital Performance
of Sound Recordings (Web IV), 81 Fed. Reg. 26316 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380)
(Nov. 24, 2015) (No. 14-CRB-0001-WR) [hereinafter “Register’s Opinion”]).
217
Id.
218
Id. at 26321–22.
219
Id. The Board dismissed SoundExchange’s attempts to offer subjective evidence of
agreement participants not considering these effects when entering to agreements, as well
as its claims that the Services’ proffered benchmarks were “too new and untested” for the
Board to conclude that these effects are “baked” into them. Id. at 26236. It did add,
however, that for benchmark agreements imported into these noninteractive proceedings
from other markets (e.g., SoundExchange’s noninteractive benchmark, discussed infra
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3. Benchmark Proposals
The Board devoted the bulk of its Web IV opinion to evaluating
prospective benchmarks. It gave most serious consideration to sophisticated rate proposals, anchored in quantitative benchmarks,
from SoundExchange, Pandora, and iHeart.220 As a non-dispositive
guide, the Board generally evaluated putative benchmarks using a
“Four-Part Test” that it stated had been “implicit in the Judges’ prior
[Web CRB] determinations.”221 First, the Willing Buyer and Seller
Test: that the benchmark rates are those “that would have been negotiated in a hypothetical marketplace between a willing buyer and
a willing seller.”222 Second, the Same Parties Test: that the benchmark rates pertained to the same categories of parties that are appearing in front of the CRB.223 Third, the Statutory License Test:
that the “hypothetical marketplace” that the benchmark rates purport
to actualize “is one in which there is no statutory license.” 224 And
fourth, the Same Rights Test: that the benchmark rates apply to the
same rights that the Board is now presiding over. 225
The Board also held that it is “required by law to set a rate that
reflects a market that is effectively competitive.”226 In reaching this
conclusion, it relied upon the statutory language in Section 114
(which is replicated in the new Section 115) providing that the “Copyright Royalty Judges…shall base their decision on economic, competitive, and programming information presented by the parties,”227
as well as federal caselaw reinforcing this directive.228 Importantly,
the Board construed this requirement as permitting it to infer that
Section II.B.3), that the Board would have to “identify and consider any difference in the
promotional/substitutional effects between these markets” in order to translate them into
the noninteractive market. Web IV, supra note 73, at 26327.
220
The Board also swiftly disposed of proposals from Sirius XM, the NAB, and pro se
songwriter/musician George Johnson.
221
Web IV, supra note 73, at 26383.
222
Id.
223
Id.
224
Id.
225
Id. In this case: “a blanket license for digital transmission of the record companies’
complete repertoire of sound recordings.” Id.
226
See id. at 26382 (emphasis added).
227
17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(B)(i) (emphasis added); 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(1)(F).
228
See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26332 (citing Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
Copyright Royalty Bd., 574 F.3d 748, 753 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
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“an excess of market power can preclude a finding that a buyer or
seller was a ‘willing’ participant.”229 In such a scenario, the Board
has determined that this requirement allows it to reject a benchmark,
or adjust it so that it becomes effectively competitive. 230
The Board Partially Adjusts, Partially Limits, and Partially Rejects SoundExchange’s Benchmark. SoundExchange’s proposal
contemplated a rate that would be the “greater-of” (1) 55% of service revenue attributable to noninteractive streaming; or (2) an escalating per-play rate starting at $0.0025 per play in 2016 and increasing annually up to $0.0029 per play in 2020.231 Its expert derived both figures from a benchmark calculated from “80 agreements between interactive streaming services and record companies.”232
As discussed earlier, interactive and noninteractive services offer significantly divergent functionality to their respective users. 233
In spite of these differences, SoundExchange argued that its interactive-based benchmark satisfied the Board’s traditional Four-Part
Test. 234 In particular, addressing the Statutory License Test, its expert stressed that of all possible benchmarks, these voluntary marketplace agreements were least likely to be corrupted by the statutory “shadow”—the notion that the presence of the compulsory license gives licensees no incentive to offer higher rates than the statutory rates.235 His reasoning: unlike the noninteractive services in
Web IV, “interactive services cannot default to the statutory license.”236 However, addressing the Same Rights Test, he conceded
that because there are important differences between interactive
streaming and noninteractive streaming, his proffered benchmarks
would need to be adjusted to fit into the Section 114 framework. 237
229

Id. at 26333.
Id. at 26331–32.
231
Id. at 26335.
232
Id. (emphasis added).
233
See supra notes 203–206 and accompanying text.
234
Web IV, supra note 73.
235
See id. at 26330, 26337.
236
Id. at 26337 (emphasis added).
237
Id. Addressing the Willing Buyer and Seller Test, SoundExchange’s expert noted that
unlike noninteractive agreements, these agreements were “were entered into voluntarily
230
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Without explicitly responding to SoundExchange’s invocation
of the Four-Part Test, the Board partially adjusted, partially limited,
and partially rejected SoundExchange’s proposal based on an interactive streaming benchmark. First, it emphasized the need to adjust
the benchmark in response to its finding that interactive streaming
is not an “effectively competitive” market. 238 Because the business
model for interactive streaming services is to offer users the ability
to select from essentially comprehensive music libraries, it explained, these services “must have” every major label’s repertoire to
be “commercially viable.”239 The major labels’ repertoires are thus
economic “complements”—unable to be substituted for one another—and the resulting dearth of “buyer choice” precludes the market from being “effectively competitive.”240 As a result, in order for
this benchmark to be used in any capacity, the Board would have to
apply a “steering” adjustment to it.241

between parties who did not have the option of electing the statutory license.” Id. at 26337.
Finally, addressing the Same Parties Test, he contended that the parties entering into
interactive streaming agreements (record companies and interactive streaming services)
were “similar” to the parties in the Web IV proceedings—SoundExchange appearing on
behalf of record companies, and noninteractive streaming services. Id.
238
Id. at 26341. The Board rejected SoundExchange’s contention that the mere presence
of active negotiations between record companies and services indicated that the market
was “effectively competitive.” Id. at 26344 (“[N]egotiations over price can occur between
a monopolist and its customers in order to facilitate price discrimination and increase
monopoly profits.”).
239
Id. at 26341.
240
Id. at 26340, 26342.
241
“Steering” is the process by which noninteractive services direct more listening traffic
to certain licensors’ catalogs in exchange for those licensors agreeing to accept lower
royalty rates. See id. at 26341. The Board credited the noninteractive Services’ contention
that the “must-have,” on-demand nature of interactive streaming makes it impossible for
the interactive streaming services—unlike the noninteractive streaming services—to foster
competition through steering. Id. Thus, in order for interactive streaming rates to be helpful
in the noninteractive streaming context, they must be adjusted to reflect the pro-competitive
benefits of steering. Id. In imposing this 12% adjustment, the Board cited “hard and
persuasive evidence” from Pandora and iHeart’s own benchmark agreements that steering
“has reduced royalty rates in the [actual] noninteractive market and would do so in the
hypothetical [noninteractive] market as well.” Id. at 26334, 26343–44. The Judges applied
economic analysis based on these Pandora and iHeart benchmark offerings to reduce the
SoundExchange benchmark by 12% “to reflect an effectively competitive rate.” Id. at
26341. This approach featured prominently in SoundExchange’s appeal of the Board’s
decision; the Circuit Court deferred to the Board’s discretion. See SoundExchange, Inc. v.
Copyright Royalty Bd., 904 F.3d 41, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
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Second, the Board limited the applicability of the
SoundExchange benchmark to only noninteractive subscription
rates (and not the more prominent ad-supported, or “free-to-theuser” noninteractive rates). While the Board agreed with
SoundExchange that there was “significant evidence of functional
convergence”242 between interactive and noninteractive services
and that interactive and noninteractive services do in fact compete
with one another for downstream listeners, it relied upon “overwhelming” evidence that in both interactive and noninteractive settings, the subscription and ad-supported models service entirely different classes of consumers—those who have some “willingness to
pay” (“WTP”) for a streaming service, and those with a WTP of zero
(and who are therefore relegated to ad-supported services). 243
The Board Accepts Pandora’s Benchmark. Although similar in
some respects, Pandora’s benchmark met a different fate. Pandora
also proposed a “greater-of” structure244 spread across a range of
possible royalty rates. The low end of the range it argued the Board
should use to select rates: the greater-of (1) 25% of eligible Service
revenue, or (2) a per-play royalty that would start at $0.00110 per
play in 2016 and increase to $0.00118 by 2020.245 The high end: the
greater-of (1) 25% of eligible Service revenue, or (2) a per-play
242

Web IV, supra note 73, at 26347. SoundExchange had offered evidence detailing the
many ways in which both types of services increasingly offer features catering to both “lean
forward” and “lean back” listeners—and that within both types of services, the same user
often alternates between the two capacities, depending on “the situation and the time of
day” and “the mood they’re in.” Id. at 26335–36. Notably, the Board took no issue with
SoundExchange grounding its economic analyses in service revenues, rather than profits.
It dismissed—“as it pertains to the narrow segment of the market to which the Judges apply
the interactive benchmark”—the Services’ objections that a noninteractive service buyer
would base its willingness to enter into a voluntary agreement based on profits, not
revenues. Id. at 26348. To that end, it reiterated its holding from Web II that it is “not
obliged to set the statutory rate at a level that permits a noninteractive service to realize
any particular profit in the market.” Id.
243
Id. at 26345. The Board also rejected SoundExchange’s attempts to corroborate its
benchmark with certain noninteractive agreements between record companies and largely
interactive streaming services. It held that SoundExchange’s expert had “failed to account
for extra-statutory functionality,” and to properly contextualize these agreements within
the specific relationships that birthed them. Id. at 26353.
244
The Board had already rejected this portion of the proposal earlier in its opinion. See
supra note 93.
245
Web IV, supra note 73, at 26355.
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royalty that would start at $0.00120 per play in 2016 and increase to
$0.00129 by 2020.246 In support of this proposal, Pandora relied
upon a benchmark derived solely from its 2014 agreement with
Merlin, a rights agency representing independent record labels. 247
The Board accepted Pandora’s benchmark as probative of the
rates that a noninteractive service would pay to indie labels in the
hypothetical markets for both subscription-based and ad-supported
(“free-to-the-listener”) streaming. 248 First, while it did not expressly
say so, the Board appeared to credit Pandora’s argument that the
proffered Pandora/Merlin benchmark satisfied a variant of the
traditional Four-Part Test.249
Second, unlike the SoundExchange benchmark, the Pandora/Merlin agreement was native to the noninteractive streaming
context. Relatedly, unlike the SoundExchange benchmark, the parties to the Pandora/Merlin agreement had voluntarily provided for
pro-competitive “steering,” allowing Pandora to disproportionately
favor or disfavor certain songs, catalogs, or individual licensors in
their selection of content to present to users. 250 The Board emphatically agreed with Pandora that the threat of steering—which “is synonymous with price competition in this market”—drives rates down,
mitigating the “effect of complementary oligopoly” that would, if
left unchecked, tend to inflate rates. 251 Thus, because it already

246

Id.
Id.
248
Id. at 26365–66.
249
Pandora’s argument: it (1) “constitute[d] a competitive and arms-length direct
license” between a noninteractive service and individual label members of a collective who
were each at liberty to either opt into the agreement, or remain subject to the statutory rates;
and concerned (2) the same rights; (3) the same products (public performance of sound
recordings via noninteractive streaming); and (4) the same parties as those covered by the
statutory license. Id. at 26358.
250
Id. at 26336.
251
Id. at 26366 (adding that “[t]he nature of price competition is to cause prices to be
lower than in the absence of competition, through the ever-present ‘threat’ that competing
sellers [i.e., record labels] will undercut each other in order to sell more goods or services”
by giving the contracting service a financial incentive to “steer” users towards lower-priced
songs and catalogs). The Board gave little credence to SoundExchange’s primary criticism:
that even if steering may have this effect upon specific deals, it could not—“as a matter of
simple arithmetic”—have the same effect upon the market as a whole. Id. at 26363–66
247

2021]

SOMETHING OLD/SOMETHING NEW

627

incorporated “steering,” this benchmark satisfied the “effectively
competitive” requirement.252
The Board did allow for one caveat: it split the difference between the parties’ positions on the extent to which the Pandora/Merlin agreement was representative of the entire record industry. Over
SoundExchange’s objections, the Board held that the agreement was
sufficiently representative of indie record companies.253 However,
it credited SoundExchange’s criticism that the Pandora/Merlin was
not representative of the rates that majors would command in the
hypothetical marketplace.254 As a result, the Board stated, it would
consider this benchmark to be “only one guidepost” among others
in establishing a statutory rate that would apply market-wide, including to majors.255
(“[A] webcaster cannot commit to steer to every record company or label because there is
only a total of 100% subject to steering.”). While it acknowledged this mathematical
reality, the Board maintained that accounting for steering was necessary to counterbalance
the many anti-competitive factors tending to inflate rates, including: (1) the “stand-alone
monopoly value of any one sound recording;” (2) the “firm-specific monopoly value of
each Major’s repertoire taken as a whole;” and (3) the omnipresent possibility that the
Majors could “utilize their combined market power to prevent price competition among
them by virtue of their complementary oligopoly power.” Id. at 26368.
252
Id. at 26366, 26372.
253
In support of this position, the Board cited to “compelling” (redacted) statistics
indicating the percentage of Merlin members who had opted into the agreement as well as
the lack of evidence showing either coercion or of dissatisfaction among those who had
opted in, and dismissed as a “classic principal-agency problem” SoundExchange’s
contention that Merlin—as a collective (the agent)—had prohibitively divergent incentives
from its member labels (the principals). Id. at 26371.
254
Id. at 26372.
255
Id. at 26373. The Board closed its discussion of the Pandora/Merlin benchmark by
dispensing with a triumvirate of additional SoundExchange critiques. First, it rejected the
notion that the “mere presence of other items of potential value” beyond what would be
included in a statutory license constituted grounds to disqualify the Pandora/Merlin
benchmark. Id. at 26369 (while benchmarks “may be imperfect,” to reject a proposed
benchmark merely because it includes some extra-statutory features would be “throwing
out the baby with the bathwater”). These other items included access to Pandora’s
proprietary data, its concert promotion apparatus, certain marketing opportunities for new
releases, etc. Id. at 26359–60. Second, the Board dismissed the notion that Pandora’s
market power was too outsized to allow one of its voluntary agreements to serve as a
reliable benchmark for statutory rates. Id. at 26371 (the “key variable” for monopsony
power was the share of Merlin members’ revenue derived from Pandora—a mere 5%
insufficient to constitute market power—not Pandora’s high listener-share among

628

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:387

The Board Accepts Portions of iHeart’s Proposed Benchmarks.
Noninteractive service iHeart proposed a per-play rate of $0.0005,
relying on economic analysis centered around a benchmark consisting of an agreement between iHeart and Warner Music, a major label.256 While the iHeart/Warner agreement featured a “greater-of”
structure, incorporating a (redacted) per-play rate and a (redacted)
percentage of iHeart revenue, its formal proposal simply contemplated a per-play rate, adjusted using what it called an “incremental”
approach.257 In addition to the load-bearing iHeart/Warner agreement, iHeart also proffered twenty-seven separate agreements with
indie labels that it argued supported its rate proposal. 258
While it rejected iHeart’s “incremental” analysis, as well as any
reliance on the twenty-seven iHeart/indie benchmarks, the Board accepted the per-play rate actually stated in the iHeart/Warner agreement as probative of the rates that a willing noninteractive service

noninteractive streamers). Finally, it discarded SoundExchange’s contention that the
Pandora/Merlin agreement was “experimental,” and therefore unfit to guide the Board. Id.
at 26371–72 (remarking that any agreement is experimental to some degree, insofar as the
parties are “free to vary the terms of their economic relationship” afterwards).
256
Id. at 26375.
257
Id. Its expert explained that the percentage-of-revenue component was not relevant
because the parties did not believe that the “greater-of” threshold would be met: “So they
have a number that both parties looked at and said that number would never actually be
used in the real world, so who cares what the number is….” Id. at 26377. iHeart’s
“incremental” rate was derived from, but also differing from, the effective rates under the
iHeart/Warner agreement. Its expert explained that the average rate under the
iHeart/Warner agreement “does not necessarily reflect the rate…that a willing buyer and
willing seller would have reached in a marketplace” because the agreement actually
covered two bundles of plays: (1) the number of Warner repertoire plays that would occur
absent the agreement (i.e. if Warner’s repertoire were subject to the statutory license and
rate); and (2) the number of additional Warner repertoire plays that would not occur if the
iHeart/Warner agreement did not exist. Id. at 26376. Under the (redacted) terms of the
iHeart/Warner agreement iHeart apparently had the opportunity to steer additional plays to
Warner repertoire, and an incentive to do so under the (redacted, but apparently) substatutory rates provided therein. Id. Thus, iHeart argued that projections based on the
effective rate provided in the iHeart/Warner agreement, which of course applied to both
bundles, were “tainted by the upward influence of the statutory rate.” Id. at 26376–77.
iHeart’s expert applied the same approach to the 27 iHeart/indie agreements, and used these
results to justify its $0.0005 proposed per-play rate. Id.
258
Id. at 26377. Although these agreements applied to a “relatively small percentage of
plays” relative to the iHeart/Warner agreement, iHeart argued that they were probative of
what willing buyers and willing sellers would agree to. Id.
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would pay to a willing major label. 259 It agreed with iHeart that the
benchmark—when used correctly—satisfied its traditional FourPart Test.260 Notably, the Board dismissed SoundExchange’s objections that this agreement’s rates were too skewed by the statutory
“shadow” to satisfy the Statutory License Test.261 It reasoned that
the iHeart/Warner benchmark was a voluntary agreement that its
signatories had executed at a time when iHeart was already obligated to pay statutory rates, and that Warner had nonetheless agreed
to an effective rate that was less than the statutory rate. 262
Additionally, the Board held that the benchmark satisfied the
Same Rights Test because, like the statutory license, it covered the
noninteractive digital transmission of a record company’s full repertoire of sound recordings.263 To that end, while acknowledging
259

Id. at 26389. The Board agreed with SoundExchange’s criticism that iHeart’s
“incremental” approach based on the two separate “bundles” of streams under the
agreement effectively and erroneously treated the price of half of a “buy one, get one free”
transaction as zero, it “intentionally attribute[ing] no market value to the rate and revenue
paid for” one of its conceptual bundles. Id. at 26379–82 (“If a vendor offered an ice cream
cone…for $1.00, but offered two ice cream cones for $1.06, it would be absurd to conclude
that the true market price of an ice cream cone is the incremental six cents. Rather, this
offer indicates a market price of $0.53, the average price for the two ice cream cones.”).
Accordingly, in accepting the iHeart/Warner deal as a valid benchmark, the Board insisted
upon using the “effective average rate contained in that agreement.” Id. at 26384 (emphasis
in original).
260
Id. at 26389. The Board further noted the role that steering had played in satisfying
another statutory test: the “effective competitive” requirement—here, price competition
leading to an agreement in which a licensor accepted “an increase in quantity (more
performances) in exchange for a lower price (a lower rate).” Id. at 26383.
261
Id. at 26330.
262
Id. at 26331. This issue featured prominently in SoundExchange’s ill-fated appeal of
the Board’s decision. SoundExchange unsuccessfully contended that the Board “arbitrarily
failed to account for the impact of the statutory license on the rates negotiated in the
Pandora and iHeart benchmark agreements,” each of which were negotiated with the
Service comfortably knowing “that they can simply fall back on the statutory rate if they
fail to strike a bargain.” SoundExchange, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 904 F.3d 41, 50
(D.C. Cir. 2018) (affirming the Board’s decision in its entirety, under the deferential
“arbitrary and capricious” standard). SoundExchange went on to argue—also
unsuccessfully—that the Board “arbitrarily ignored how the statutory license generally
prevents parties from negotiating rates above the statutory royalty.” Id. at 51.
263
Web IV, supra note 73, at 26383–84. Addressing the other two parts of the test, the
Board held that the agreement satisfied (1) the Willing Buyer and Seller Test, because each
party was sophisticated and “under to compulsion to enter into [it];” and (2) the Same
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that the iHeart/Warner agreement contained extra-statutory terms—
terms present in the marketplace agreement that would not be replicated in the statutory license—it declined to adjust the benchmark
rate to reflect these elements.264 In discussing “whether and how, if
at all, to value these non-statutory items,” it noted that the parties
each had an obvious interest, as litigants, in establishing values to
assign to the items that would support their position, and in substantiating those values with data and internal analyses. 265 For that reason, it ruled that it is the burden of the party claiming monetary value
for a non-monetary term to prove up that value. Because it deemed
that neither party had done so here, it elected to “disregard these
unvalued items: not because [as iHeart’s experts asserted] they
should be presumed to have a net value of zero” but rather due to a
“failure of proof of value by sophisticated parties.”266
4. Zone of Reasonableness and Rate Selection
Thus, the Board emerged from its benchmark assessment and
adjustment steps with three “usable” benchmarks that it could use to
establish “zones of reasonableness” for commercial subscription
and commercial ad-supported rates. For commercial subscription
rates, it synthesized (1) the steering-adjusted SoundExchange
benchmark ($0.0021 per performance) and (2) the subscription rate
from the Pandora/Merlin agreement ($0.0022 per performance,
“which already incorporates a steering adjustment”) into an “extremely tight” zone of reasonableness spanning from $0.0021 to
$0.0022 per performance.267 From that range, without offering any
Parties Test because, as in the hypothetical marketplace, the buyer was a noninteractive
streaming service and the seller was a record company. Id. at 26383.
264
Id. at 26384–87. These “non-statutory items” included promotional opportunities
“allow[ing] Warner’s artists to benefit from particular advertising on iHeart’s [platforms],”
other (redacted) promotional opportunities, guaranteed payments, etc. Id.
265
Id. at 26384 (“[T]he Judges would anticipate that the record companies and
SoundExchange would present specific evidence of the monetary value for the nonstatutory consideration they received under the contract that must be added to the stated
(‘headline’) rate on a per-play basis…. Reciprocally, the Judges would also expect to
receive evidence from the webcasters/licensees with regard to their contemporaneous
calculation of the monetary value of contractual consideration they allege to have received
in addition to the basic right to play sound recordings.”).
266
Id. at 26387.
267
Id. at 26405.
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additional explanation, it selected a commercial subscription rate of
$0.0022 per performance for the year 2016, adjusted only for inflation over the subsequent four years. 268
For commercial ad-supported rates, it derived its zone of reasonableness from two (redacted) benchmark rates: (1) the ad-supported
portion of the Pandora/Merlin benchmark, and (2) the “adjusted, effective average” rate from the iHeart/Warner benchmark. 269 From
this (redacted) zone of reasonableness, it selected a commercial adsupported rate of $0.0017 per performance. 270
III. NEW BOSS: SAME AS THE OLD BOSS? APPLYING WILLING BUYER/WILLING
SELLER TO SECTION 115

Part III of this Comment compares and contrasts the
Phonorecords III and Web IV decisions explored in Part II. It then
uses this comparison to predict how the willing buyer/willing seller
rate standard, which has long governed Section 114 proceedings for
the noninteractive streaming performance of sound recordings, will
now operate under Section 115 proceedings dictating mechanical
rates for the interactive streaming of musical compositions.
Phonorecords IV will be the first mechanical rate-setting proceeding
to occur after the MMA, and therefore will be the first to apply the
new standard. It is set to begin in 2021 and conclude in 2022 with a
new rate schedule for the five-year period beginning in 2023. 271
In particular, Part III seeks to analyze various aspects of the two
rate determinations explored in Part II in order to distill discrete indicators for how the Phonorecords IV Board is likely to approach a
number of impactful issues. Part III.A begins by comparing the statutory language and implications of the switch from the old 801(b)
268

Id.
Id.
270
Id.
271
See Mary Ellen Egan, Pryor Cashman Partners Take on Streaming Music Providers,
BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 25, 2020, 1:05 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-lawweek/pryor-cashman-partners-take-on-streaming-music-providers
[https://perma.cc/ZWT4-XXMF]. It is worth noting that at least one of the Judges who
presided over Web IV and Phonorecords—former Chief Judge Barnett—has been replaced
in the tribunal by Judge Steve Ruwe; now-Chief Judge Feder’s term is set to expire in 2020,
while Judge Strickler’s term expires in 2022. See Phonorecords III, supra note 28.
269
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standard to the new willing buyer/willing seller standard, as well as
the subtle but conspicuous differences between the Section 114 and
Section 115 willing buyer/willing seller statutory texts. Next, Part
III.B compares and contrasts the Phonorecords III and Web IV
Boards’ discussion surrounding several core value and principles.
Part III.C then compares the structures and procedural emphases
employed in each rate determination. Finally, Part III.D contrasts
the role of benchmarks in Phonorecords III and Web IV, as well as
several key arguments raised by the parties in the benchmark context.
A. Comparing the Statutory Rate Standards
1. 801(b) vs. Willing Buyer/Willing Seller (Section 115)
The MMA struck Section 115’s 801(b) rate standard in its entirety. Under the pre-MMA statute, the Board was directed to use
the four 801(b)(1) factors—(A) maximize the public availability of
copyrighted works; (B) afford a fair return for the copyright owner
and user; (C) reflect the relative roles of the copyright owner and
user; and (D) minimize industry disruption—to determine “reasonable” rates.272 The Board was also permitted to “consider rates and
terms under voluntary license agreements” in determining its own
rates and terms.273
Post-MMA, the Board must now “establish rates and terms that
most clearly represent the rates and terms that would have been negotiated in the marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing
seller.”274 In doing so, it is to consider “economic, competitive, and
programming information presented by the parties,” including two
specific elements.275 First, it must consider the extent to which the
compulsory use may “substitute for or may promote” recorded music sales or otherwise boost or depress revenue the copyright owner
may earn from other uses of its musical works.276 Second—the lone
holdover from 801(b)—the Board must look to “the relative roles of
272
273
274
275
276

See 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (prior to 2018 amendment).
17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(3)(D) (prior to 2018 amendment).
17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(1)(F).
Id.
Id.

2021]

SOMETHING OLD/SOMETHING NEW

633

the copyright owner and the compulsory licensee in the copyrighted
work and the service made available to the public with respect to the
relative creative contribution, technological contribution, capital investment, cost, and risk.”277
Almost of all of the other pre-MMA rate guidance is gone. The
other three 801(b) factors have disappeared. So too—conspicuously—has the language permitting the Board to “consider rates and
terms under voluntary license agreements.” 278
2. Willing Buyer/Willing Seller (Section 114) vs. Willing
Buyer/Willing Seller (Section 115)
The statutory text articulating the willing buyer/willing seller
standards in Sections 114 and 115 governing, respectively, statutory
rates for digital performances of sound recordings (Web IV), and
mechanical royalty rates for musical works (Phonorecords III)
are nearly identical. In fact, they track each other essentially wordfor-word except for the clause in Section 114 permitting the
Board to “consider rates and terms under voluntary license agreements.”279 This clause—again, conspicuously—is not mirrored in
Section 115.280
3. 801(b) vs. Willing Buyer/Willing Seller (Section 114)
In Phonorecords III, the Board devoted some effort to broadly
contrasting the 801(b) standard from the willing buyer/willing seller
standard that was, at that time, employed only in Section 114 proceedings. The key difference, it explained, was that unlike willing
buyer/willing seller, 801(b)(1) “does not focus on unregulated marketplace rates.”281 However, the Board was quick to make clear that
801(b) rates could be market-based, provided that those marketbased rates also satisfied the 801(b) factors. 282 Only if the Board
were to produce putative market-based rates, and then discover that

277
278
279
280
281
282

Id.
See id; compare id. with § 115(c)(3)(D) (prior to 2018 amendment).
See 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(1)(B)(ii).
See 17 U.S.C. § 115.
See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1955 (emphasis removed).
See id.
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these rates failed to satisfy any of the 801(b) factors, would further
adjustments be necessary.283
Furthermore, the Board emphasized, it was entirely possible that
divergent rate proposals could each satisfy all of the 801(b) factors
“adequately but to differing degrees,” in which case the “legislative
discretion” to choose among differing qualifying rates lay with
the Board itself.284 In short, the Board’s view was that, while not
all rates set under the Board’s broad “legislative discretion” in an
801(b) setting would satisfy the willing buyer/willing seller standard, any market rate set under willing buyer/willing seller could
pass 801(b) muster as long as it satisfied each of the factors to
some degree.285
4. The Board’s Discretion under Each Standard
The Phonorecords III and Web IV Boards operated under differing statutory guidance. Although both were tasked with determining
“reasonable”286 and “effective[ly] compete[tive]”287 rates, they were
ultimately subject to divergent rate standards. 288
While the 801(b) factors colored the entire proceeding, the
Phonorecords III majority’s written opinion explicitly invoked them
quite sparingly, at least until after it had already derived prospective
rates from the parties’ submitted Shapley analyses.289 Only as a final
step did the Board test its provisional rates and structure against
801(b) to ensure they did indeed satisfy each of the factors. 290 The
Board then applied its own “legislative discretion” in support of its
declaration that it was permitted to choose among any number of
divergent rates, provided that each potential rate satisfied the 801(b)
factors to some degree.291

283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291

See id.
Id.
See id.
See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 143, 226–230 and accompanying text.
See generally supra Section II.
See supra Section II.A.4–5.
See supra Section II.A.5.
See supra notes 284–285 and accompanying text.
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The Web IV Board claimed no such legislative role. It interpreted
its mandate, under willing buyer/willing seller, as determining
the rates that would actually have been negotiated in a “hypothetical marketplace, free of the influence of compulsory, statutory
licenses.”292
This view will likely guide the Phonorecords IV Board as well,
as it applies willing buyer/willing seller to Section 115
proceedings for the first time. The Phonorecords III Board’s discussion of “legislative discretion” was strictly confined to the balancing
of the various 801(b) factors. Outside of the presence of those factors, as the Web IV Board demonstrated, the Phonorecords IV Board
will not—at least expressly—construe its role as involving public
interest, public policy, or “legislative” judgments, beyond whatever
judgments are embedded in the Board’s analysis of what a willing
buyer would pay, and what a willing seller would accept, in a hypothetical competitive market.
Importantly, there is good reason to suspect that the
Phonorecords IV Board will do its best to conform to the Web IV
Board’s construction of the willing buyer/willing seller standard.
Past Boards have consistently emphasized their stare decisis-esque
mandate under the Copyright Act. Although the Board is an administrative body, not an Article III court formally bound by stare decisis, Section 803 provides that it “shall act in accordance with…prior
determinations and interpretations of…the Copyright Royalty
Judges.”293 The Board is well aware of this provision: it expressly
relied on it in electing to continue the existing per-play structure in
Web IV.294 And just two years later, Judge Strickler (whose term
continues until 2022) cited it in his Phonorecords III dissent.295

292

See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26316 (citing Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 72 Fed. Reg. 24084, 24087 (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 380) (May 1, 2007) [hereinafter “Web II”]).
293
17 U.S.C. § 803.
294
See Web IV, supra note 73 at 26326 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 803).
295
See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1980 (Stricker, J., dissenting) (citing 17
U.S.C. § 803).
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5. Statutory Implications for Phonorecords IV
Together, Web IV and Phonorecords III establish that the move
from 801(b) to willing buyer/willing seller is—formally, at least—a
restrictive change. It removes certain discretion from the Board
without, at least expressly, adding any discretion. Under 801(b), the
Board was already permitted to establish free-market-analogous
rates, provided that those rates also satisfied the 801(b) factors.
However, it was also free to establish rates that were not intended to
mimic a free market, again provided that those rates also satisfied
the 801(b) factors.
Under willing buyer/willing seller, the Board perceives its role
to be more constrained: it must simply approximate the rates that
would occur in a free market, unconstrained by statutory licenses.
Thus, it is now required to do something that before it was merely
permitted—subject to the 801(b) factors—to do. It may wield no
“legislative discretion” and consider no factors that do not expressly
fall within the purview of this narrow task.
The precise implications of this change remain uncertain. They
depend, of course, on whether the 801(b) factors, which did not necessarily preclude free-market rates, tended to nonetheless compel
the Board to arrive at below-market or above-market rates. There is
a general consensus, particularly among the rightsholder community, that the net effect of the 801(b) factors was to depress rates
below what would have been achieved in an open market. 296 And
while there is certainly evidence to support this view scattered
throughout the Web IV and Phonorecords III determinations, those
cases also highlight ways in which the elimination of the 801(b) factors may foreclose certain protections for copyright owners. 297
B. Values and Principles
The Phonorecords III and Web IV Boards confronted many
overlapping concepts. The similarities, and differences, in their dispositions may presage the Phonorecords IV Board’s approach.

296
297

See supra notes 57–68 and accompanying text.
For further discussion, see infra Section III.B.4.c.
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1. The Board’s Own Authority and Discretion
The Phonorecords III Board wielded broad authority and discretion in its rate-setting role. First, it exercised the a la carte freedom
to build its own rate structure using ingredients distilled from several
different party proposals—an approach the D.C. Circuit broadly
condoned on appeal, even as it relied on related procedural defects
in its decision to vacate the Board’s results.298 Second, the Board
emphatically denied that it was at all beholden to stakeholders’ reliance interests in continuity from one rate-setting period to the next:
“The statute is plain in its requirement that the rates be established
de novo each rate period.”299
Third, the Phonorecords III Board expressly asserted the authority to condition rates on forces outside of its jurisdiction. It adopted
a TCC prong that expressly tied mechanical rates to the rates independently negotiated by streaming services and third-party record
labels for sound recording rights.300 It also rejected the Copyright
Owners’ “jurisdictional argument” opposing the all-in rate configuration.301 Because, the Copyright Owners had argued, performance
rates are ultimately the province of rate court proceedings in the
Southern District of New York, and because the Copyright Act takes
great pains to establish separate mechanical and performance rights,
an administrative tribunal charged only with establishing rates for
mechanical licenses does not have the authority to make decisions
encompassing performance rights.302 The Phonorecords III Board
was unmoved by this logic. It was unequivocal in its authority to
impose an “all-in” rate structure, and elected to do so, crediting the

298

See Johnson v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 969 F.3d 363, 381–82 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (while
“some degree of deviation and combination [among parties’ proposals] is permissible,” in
this case the Services were crucially “deprived of the opportunity to voice their objections”
to the uncapped TCC prong because it was first raised in a post-hearing proposal).
299
Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1944.
300
See supra notes 118–129 and accompanying text.
301
See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text. While the D.C. Circuit struck down
the uncapped TCC prong on procedural grounds, nothing in its decision foreclosed future
Boards from allowing these kinds of external forces to influence rates, provided that they
provide the parties adequate notice and explanation. See supra note 128.
302
Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1929.
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Services’ emphasis on the “perfect complementarity” of mechanical
and performance rights.303
While the Web IV Board’s statement of its own authority was
not quite so ambitious, this difference was likely more a product of
context than of restraint. It gave no indication that its rationales for
adopting a per-play rate—a structure plucked directly from party
proposals, in continuation of the existing rate structure—had anything to do with limited authority to adopt other structures. 304 Likewise, while it elected to adopt a pure per-play rate, rather than any
structure expressly contingent on third-party forces, the Board did
not suggest that this was the product of a lack of authority to do
otherwise.305 Nor did it give any indication that its earnest reliance
on third-party benchmarks—which included SoundExchange’s
benchmark derived from the unregulated interactive streaming
sound recording market—was informed by a need for caution regarding the effect of extra-jurisdictional forces on statutory royalty
rates.306
Looking forward, neither Web IV, nor the statutory changes, are
likely to foreclose the Phonorecords IV Board from echoing the authority and discretion it flexed in Phonorecords III. As a result, it is
likely to continue the all-in rate configuration, leaving mechanical
rates tethered to third-party rate court jurisdiction. And while the
D.C. Circuit’s procedural rebuke may give the Board pause as it
considers whether to reprise some version of the controversial TCC
prong, there continues to be no substantive authority precluding the
Board from tying songwriter earnings to the unregulated negotiations between interactive streaming services and record companies.

303

Id. at 1934. The Board stressed that nothing in its decision actively regulated
performance rates. Id. Rather, an “all-in” deduction was just that: a deduction. Id. In his
dissent, Judge Strickler agreed with the majority, and stated further that, contrary to the
Copyright Owner’s view, it would be a dereliction of duty not to establish an “all-in” rate
—“the perfect complementarity of the two licenses would be ignored, and the interactive
streaming services would pay two times for the same economic right…to stream the
musical work embodied in the sound recording.” Id. at 1997 (Strickler, J., dissenting).
304
Rather, the Board rejected the proposed “per-play” alternatives for substantive
reasons. See supra Section II.B.2.
305
See generally id.
306
See generally supra Section II.B.3.
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2. Downstream Competitive Effects
Both the Phonorecords III and Web IV Boards placed significant
emphasis on competitive forces. In addition to inferring an “effective competition” requirement from the statutory language governing both rate standards,307 both Boards considered downstream competitive effects (i.e. competition among individual services for end
users) to be relevant to the upstream royalty rates each Board was
tasked with determining.
Phonorecords III: Per-Play Rate Structure? In Phonorecords III,
the effects on downstream competition played a central role in the
Board’s choice of upstream rate structure. Two adversaries (the
Copyright Owners308 and Apple) each incorporated a fixed per-play
prong into their rate proposals and justified that proposed structure
by way of its downstream competitive effects. Although their proposals differed greatly in execution, the two parties agreed that a
uniform per-play rate of some kind would level the downstream
competitive playing field.309 By aligning the Services’ content costs
with “actual demand for and consumption of their content,” they argued, a per-play structure would forge a baseline “level of equality”
among all streaming services competing for end users “without regard to business models” (i.e. free/ad-supported services, paid subscription services, bundled services, etc.).310 Conversely, they

307

See Phonorecords III, supra note 28 at 1940; Web IV, supra note 73, at 26332.
Here, “Copyright Owners” excluded George Johnson, dba GEO Music Group, a selfpublished songwriter and musician who appeared pro se. Phonorecords III, supra note 28,
at 1924–25. The Board respectfully declined to incorporate his proposals. Id.
309
Id.
310
Id. Interactive music streaming configurations continue to proliferate. Some music
streaming services are offered in bundles alongside video streaming services. See, e.g.,
Premium with Hulu, SPOTIFY, https://support.spotify.com/us/article/premium-and-hulu/
[https://perma.cc/4E2C-6M4D]. Others are bundled with cellular data or broadband plans.
See, e.g., AT&T and Spotify Bring Customers More Options, AT&T (Aug. 05, 2019),
https://about.att.com/story/2019/att_spotify_more_options.html. [https://perma.cc/GQR5X4R6]. Still others are bundled with other offerings from the same company. See, e.g.,
YouTube Premium, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/premium/ [https://perma.cc/
T6YS-KMSJ]. Even among standalone, non-bundled offerings, there is an ever-increasing
variety of offering types, spanning from “free” ad-supported services where the consumer
pays no monetary fee, to “premium” subscriptions where the consumer pays a recurring
subscription fee in exchange for increased functionality, flexibility, repertoire, audio
308
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argued, the current scheme of upstream rate complexities311 was
not necessary to facilitate any particular downstream streaming
model.312
The Board agreed that downstream competitive effects were of
vital importance, but disagreed that a nominally level “per-play”
playing field was the right way to manifest these concerns. Instead,
it prioritized maximizing service flexibility to meet diverse downstream consumer willingness to pay (“WTP”) for interactive streaming.313 Because downstream users vary greatly in their willingness
and ability to pay for interactive streaming, the Board reasoned, a
fixed per-play rate could limit the Services’ ability to effectively
compete for low-WTP (and especially no-WTP) users, who may not
generate sufficient revenue to cover fixed content costs.314 By contrast, it reasoned, a flexible, percentage-of-revenue structure would
enable the price discrimination necessary to allow both existing services and potential new entrants to compete for as many of those
downstream users as possible, while also deriving (and passing
along to songwriters) greater value from high-WTP consumers. 315
quality, and other benefits. See, e.g., What are the Differences Between the Amazon Music
Subscriptions?, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?node
Id=GW3PHAUCZM8L7W9L
[https://perma.cc/C24E-YNQW]
(disaggregating
Amazon’s three different standalone streaming tiers—a free-to-the-user, ad-supported tier;
a paid subscription tier; and a more expensive, high definition, paid subscription tier—as
well as its Amazon Prime bundled service). Many services also offer multiple pricing tiers
within certain offering types, such as student discounts, family plans, and other promotional
discounts. See, e.g., Matthew Lynley, Spotify Plays the Long Game with Family and
Student Plans Even as Revenue Per User Drops, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 28, 2018),
https://techcrunch.com/2018/02/28/spotifys-family-and-student-plans-are-reducing-somerevenue-per-user-but-they-are-sticking-around-longer/./ [https://perma.cc/7337-9DKN].
311
See supra Section II.A.1.
312
Id.
313
See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1934. The Board appeared to credit the nonApple Services’ arguments that rate flexibility was essential to accommodate the broad
spectrum of downstream WTP, as evidenced by an increase in interactive streaming
consumers, interactive streams, interactive streaming services, and “companies providing
those services” that had occurred under the 2012 rate structure. See id. at 1926. The nonApple Services had emphasized that “an upstream per-play rate would not align with the
downstream demand for ‘all-you-can-eat’ streaming services.” Id. at 1925. Despite
appearing to credit these views, the Board still declined to extend the full, granular, servicetype-specific flexibility of the 2012 structure. Id. at 1934.
314
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
315
See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1934.
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Notably, the Board first articulated this decision without reference to the 801(b) factors.316 However, much of this material resurfaced when it tested its proposed rates and rate structure against
801(b)(1) Factor A—maximizing the availability of works to the
public.317 The Services had contended that the 2012 settlement rates
best satisfied Factor A because, once again, increased rate flexibility
would ensure more downstream price discrimination, which in turn
would allow more members of the public to access interactive
streaming services (and, therefore, the creative works offered
therein).318 For their part, the Copyright Owners urged the Board to
view Factor A through the lens of maximizing the supply of future
works—by spurring creation through higher rates for songwriters
who “would see low rates as a disincentive.” 319
The Board embraced the Services’ interpretation of Factor A.320
It acknowledged that the term “availability” could plausibly take on
multiple meanings: (1) incentivizing songwriters (upstream) to create more through higher rates, or (2) maximizing options for consumers (downstream) and therefore, presumably, consumption.321 In
opting for this second construction, the Board contended that not
only does price discrimination facilitate consumption by low-WTP
end users, but that this in turn actually benefits copyright owners by
maximizing service revenue.322 Thus, the Board construed Factor A
as requiring it to favor an upstream rate structure that facilitated
downstream price discrimination—which supported its choice to
adopt a flexible revenue-based rate structure.323
Web IV: Evaluating Benchmarks. In Web IV, the Board considered
similar dynamics, in the same market, in a different procedural context: evaluating parties’ proposed benchmarks. SoundExchange justified its proposed per-play royalty rate for the noninteractive, adsupported (i.e. free-to-the-user) streaming performance of its sound

316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323

Id.
See supra Section II.A.5.
See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1956.
Id. at 1958.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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recordings using a benchmark derived from 80 interactive, subscription (i.e. not free-to-the-user) marketplace agreements between record companies and interactive streaming services. 324
While it allowed this benchmark to be considered for certain
limited purposes,325 the Web IV Board rejected its validity as a
benchmark for noninteractive ad-supported rates—the most consequential rates on the Web IV docket. It did so not because of the
differences in the upstream rights licensed, but rather because the
divergence in WTP between the downstream consumers of each service type.326 It cited “overwhelming” evidence in the record of a
“sharp dichotomy” between listeners with a positive WTP for
streaming, and those with a WTP of zero. 327 In other words: because
people who are willing to pay for streaming subscriptions comprise
such a distinct class of consumers from those who are unwilling
to pay for streaming subscriptions, it would not be “reasonable”
to use subscription-derived benchmarks to determine ad-supported
rates.328
Notably, the Web IV Board concluded that—in one context, at
least—downstream competitive considerations took a backseat to
other competitive forces. The Web IV Board did provisionally accept
interactive subscription benchmarks (to be considered when setting
statutory noninteractive subscription rates only, but not ad-supported rates), but it took care to apply adjustments to the rates in
order to render them “effectively competitive.” 329 In doing so, the
Board credited the testimony of the Services’ experts that, because
of the major record labels’ outsized market power, the upstream interactive streaming market is not “effectively competitive.”330 Accordingly, rates negotiated in that market tend to skew higher than
324

Web IV, supra note 73, at 26337. For an overview of the various streaming
configurations available to consumers, see supra note 310.
325
The Board did accept interactive streaming benchmark subscription rates as a
benchmark for noninteractive subscription rates, in part because functional convergence of
the two service types had led to competition for the same downstream listeners between
interactive and noninteractive services, see Web IV, supra note 73, at 26347.
326
See supra notes 242–243 and accompanying text.
327
See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26345.
328
See id. at 26346.
329
See supra notes 238–241241 and accompanying text.
330
See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26341.
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would occur in a hypothetical “effectively competitive” market. 331
Thus, those rates would have to be adjusted downwards in order to
serve as a fair benchmark in this market.332 In reaching this conclusion, the Board acknowledged that interactive streaming services
compete for downstream listeners, 333 but nonetheless disregarded
SoundExchange’s argument that downstream competition for
streaming consumers—between interactive streaming services and
the threat of piracy, and as well as free-to-the-user services like
YouTube—could offset the effects of the upstream record company
oligopoly.334
Projecting Phonorecords IV: Per-Play Rate Structure? While the
Phonorecords IV will no longer have access to 801(b) Factor A, the
Web IV Board’s discussion of downstream competition in a willing
buyer/willing seller context demonstrates that the absence of Factor
A is unlikely to stop the future Boards from weighing downstream
competitive effects in general—even as it may sometimes deem
other competitive forces to be more powerful. Under both rate standards, the Board clearly considers downstream consumer WTP relevant to determining upstream rates.
However, without 801(b) Factor A in the mix, the Phonorecords
IV Board may be more likely to adopt a per-play rate structure. Without Factor A, the Board cannot prioritize the “availability” of copyrighted works simply for “availability’s” sake. Had the
Phonorecords III Board been swayed by the Copyright Owners’
supply-side interpretation of “availability,” this change could have
been detrimental to songwriters. But the Board was not so swayed.
Instead, it sided with the Services on this point, construing the
“availability” factor as consistent with its decision to proceed with
a revenue-based rate structure to encourage more varied, flexible
service offerings that would be accessible to a broader range of consumers.335 The Phonorecords IV Board will no longer be permitted
to factor in “availability” in this way, which may prompt it to prioritize other forces above downstream competitive forces—as it did in
331
332
333
334
335

See id.
See id.
Id. at 26347.
See id. at 26343–47.
See supra Section III.B.2.
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Web IV—and, thus, look more favorably on the per-play rate structure that the Copyright Owners have long sought.
3. Simplicity: Per-Play Rate Structure?
The Board may also have given per-play advocates fresh ammunition for Phonorecords IV in the text of the Phonorecords III decision itself. The Board justified its decision to do away with the tencategory 2012 settlement structure in favor of a uniform, twopronged approach by contending that for rate structures, absent authority or arguments to the contrary, “simpler is better.” 336 It remarked that, compared to the “Rube-Goldberg-esque complexity
and impenetrability” of the 2012 settlement, a single two-pronged
rate calculus for all revenue-generating streaming activity would
help avoid “confusion and conflict,” particularly for new entrants
that might not fit into any of the 2012 settlement’s ten separate rate
categories.337 Admittedly, the Board did not find the “simpler is better” adage quite compelling enough to embrace the simplest proposal it heard: the per-play rate structure that its proponents professed would promote simplicity and transparency by transforming
royalty accounting into a simple multiplication problem. 338
Conversely, while the Web IV Board did not make statements
suggesting express reliance on simplicity for simplicity’s sake, it did
opt for a straight-ahead per-play structure—which also happened to
be the simplest structure proposed by any of the parties in that proceeding.339
336

Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1935.
Id. The dissent took issue with this. See id. at 1967 (Strickler, J., dissenting) (arguing
that because “the issue of regulatory complexity is not a factor or objective in the ratesetting process under section 801(b)(1),” the majority erred in favoring simplicity for
simplicity’s sake). The D.C. Circuit did not invoke this point in its decision to vacate. See
generally Johnson v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 969 F.3d 363 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
338
Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1925. This would have been a far cry from the
current rate complexities that continue to make it onerous for publishers and songwriters
to verify the accuracy of accounting data that streaming services remit to them. See, e.g.,
Ed Christman, NMPA Questions Whether Spotify & Amazon Have Miscalculated,
Underpaid Publisher Royalties, BILLBOARD (Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.billboard.com/
articles/business/publishing/8528526/nmpa-spotify-amazon-royalties-miscalculatedunderpaid?utm_campaign=Platform%20%26%20Stream&utm_medium=email&utm_sou
rce=Revue%20newsletter [https://perma.cc/FG3S-XB5S].
339
See supra Section II.B.2.
337

2021]

SOMETHING OLD/SOMETHING NEW

645

Ultimately, the “simplicity” argument may be more useful to the
Board as extra padding for other, meatier arguments. Still, because
the Phonorecords III Board did not invoke this point in the context
of any of the 801(b) factors—and because there is nothing in Web
IV suggesting that “simplicity” is incompatible with willing
buyer/willing seller—Copyright Owners once again shooting for a
per-play rate in Phonorecords IV are likely to parrot the Board’s
words back to itself, assuming those words (which the D.C. Circuit
did not take issue with)340 are not negated in the Board’s revised
determination.341
4. The Extent of the Board’s Obligation to Protect
Stakeholders
Streaming Services’ Business Models. The Phonorecords III and
Web IV Boards each stated, unequivocally, that the Board has no
obligation to protect streaming services’ businesses. In
Phonorecords III, the Board’s declaration that it “cannot and will
not set rates to protect any particular … business model” 342 echoed
its insistence in Web IV that it was “not obliged to set the statutory
rate at a level that permits a … service to realize any particular profit
in the market.”343 Crucially, the Phonorecords III Board made this
statement even while constrained by 801(b) Factor D—the “avoidance of disruption” prong.344
Creators’ Livelihoods and the “Inherent Value” of their Creations. In Phonorecords III, the Board was, at times, sympathetic to
certain evidence of economic hardship among the songwriter labor
force. While it ultimately preferred the Services’ consumer-centric
interpretation of 801(b) Factor A—maximizing availability of
works to the public—to the Copyright Owners’ supply-incentivizing
view, it did devote a portion of its Factor A discussion to songwriter

340

See generally Johnson, 969 F.3d.
See supra note 339 and accompanying text.
342
See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1945.
343
See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26348.
344
See supra Section II.A.5. The Board was not entirely dismissive of the relationship
between overall industry “disruption” and individual stakeholders’ positions, which is why
it elected to roll its rate increase out over five years, rather than immediately. See id.
341
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livelihoods.345 Even in adopting the Services’ interpretation of Factor A, the Board brushed aside the Services’ suggestion that, under
a decade of this basic rate structure, “there is no evidence that songwriters as a group have diminished their supply of musical works to
the public” under the existing rate structure.346 Instead, while it
acknowledged that no party had submitted empirical evidence on
this precise question, it countered that the record reflected “uncontroverted testimony” that songwriters’ mechanical royalty rates had
undergone a “marked decline” over the prior two decades. 347 Further, it acknowledged the “critical role” mechanical royalties play in
allowing professional songwriters to earn a living as professional
songwriters, particularly through all-important publisher advances,348 which it noted had recently become significantly less
available to songwriters, leading to a decrease in songwriters entering the profession to begin with.349 It cited testimony estimating that
the number of songwriters in Nashville—dubbed the “Songwriting
Capital of the World”350—had decreased by over 75% in the prior

345

See id.
See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1957.
347
See id.
348
Advances are lump sums paid out by publishers to their songwriter clients, which are
then recoupable against future royalties: in other words, rather than remitting to songwriters
their share of earnings as they trickle in over time, the publisher pays the writer up front
(or in a period of installments) and then retains the writer’s share of earnings until the value
of the advance has been recouped. See Benom Plumb, The Songwriter & Music Publisher
Relationship: Part II, ROYALTY EXCHANGE (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.royalty
exchange.com/blog/the-songwriter-and-music-publisher-relationship-pt-2#sthash.X4Top
eh7.dpbs. [https://perma.cc/37MD-5BVP]. Traditionally, advances have represented one
of the relatively few ways in which songwriters have access to large amounts of capital at
once, allowing them to sustain themselves as they create new works. See Frances Katz, The
Truth about Advances in the Music Business, SONGTRUST (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://blog.songtrust.com/the-truth-about-advances#
[https://perma.cc/FT55-ZMR6]
(explaining that advances, while certainly not “free money” for songwriters, help writers
with “cash flow problems” and represent “additional financing to keep the lights on”).
349
See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1957.
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See Margaret Littman, Nashville Songwriting Community Spotlighted in New Web
Series, ROLLING STONE (July 23, 2014), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/musiccountry/nashville-songwriting-community-spotlighted-in-new-web-series-176343
[https://perma.cc/47JM-ABZQ]; The Story of Music City, VISIT MUSIC CITY,
https://www.visitmusiccity.com/explore-nashville/music-and-entertainment/story-musiccity [https://perma.cc/K3D9-S976].
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decade.351 From this evidence, the Board soberly concluded that the
existing rate structure for interactive streaming had contributed to
“the decline in songwriter income,” which, in turn, had “led to fewer
songwriters.”352 Thus, even though the plight of songwriters was
not directly relevant to the Board’s consumer-centric construction
of the 801(b) “availability” factor, the Board insisted that it should
“not go unheeded,” and indeed that it warranted a significant rate
increase.353
Furthermore, although it did not do so in the context of 801(b)
Factor A, the Phonorecords III Board cited many of these same concerns in the context of its adoption of a mechanical floor. 354 It held
that the mechanical floor operates as a “failsafe to ensure that mechanical royalties will not vanish.”355 It credited testimony again
demonstrating the “critical role that mechanical royalties play in
making songwriting a viable profession,” including through the
funding and recouping of advances (an “important source of liquidity to songwriters”).356
By contrast, the Phonorecords III Board gave little credence
whatsoever to one of the centerpieces of the Copyright Owners’ proposals: the “inherent value” of a musical work. 357 The Copyright
Owners emphasized that the incumbent percentage-of-revenue approach counterintuitively permitted a “decreasing effective per play
351

See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1957.
See id.
353
See id.
354
See supra notes 100–104 and accompanying text.
355
See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1935.
356
See id. at 1934–35. Performance income cannot fund songwriter advances from
publishers in the same way, because—unlike mechanical income—songwriters typically
receive performance income directly from performing rights organizations. See Education,
SONA, https://www.wearesona.com/education [https://perma.cc/LS6T-NPH6]; see also
Assignment of Royalties, BMI, https://www.bmi.com/creators/royalty/miscellaneous_
royalty_rules [https://perma.cc/484Q-78V4] (articulating the hoops BMI requires its
songwriter members to jump through in order to assign the writer share of their
performance royalties to third parties such as music publishers). Thus, without a
mechanical floor, if the performance portion “substantially reduces or fully eliminates the
mechanical portion of [the all-in rate], the pool of funds available for advances and
recoupments would be reduced.” Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1997 (Strickler, J.,
dissenting) (“Liquidity funding for songwriters is a necessity, just as heat is a necessity—
and the complementary nature of the rights to the Services is of no relevance”). Id. at 1935.
357
See supra note 95.
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rate” even as increases in consumption outpaced increases in service
revenue (and, consequently, royalties).358 Thus, they argued, a perplay rate would better reflect the “inherent value” of a musical
work.359 The Board disagreed. In opting for a revenue-based structure as, again, “the most efficient means of facilitating beneficial
price discrimination in the downstream market,” 360 it declined to
formalize any underlying “inherent value” to copyrighted works. 361
Conspicuously, the Web IV Board did not engage in any discussion centered around creators’ well-being whatsoever. 362 To be sure,
it may be the case that SoundExchange and record companies
simply do not invoke such arguments as frequently as songwriter
organizations do.363 But it may also be the case that the Board does
not consider these points relevant to an impassive, market-driven
analysis under the willing buyer/willing seller standard.
The Web IV Board also made no mention of any “inherent value”
of copyright argument; if anything, the Board was more sympathetic
to value inherently attributable to the Services. In its refusal to adopt
a “greater-of” structure with a percentage-of-revenue prong, the
Web IV Board effectively suggested that because a proper per-play
rate (under the willing buyer/willing seller standard) already purports to fully compensate rightsholders for the full value of their
works, “[a]bsent proof that the per-play prong had been set too low,
there is no justification for assuming that the record companies

358

Id. (emphasis removed).
Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1982 (Strickler, J., dissenting).
360
Id. at 1934.
361
See id. at 1931 n. 64.
362
See generally Web IV, supra note 73.
363
See, e.g., Billboard: At Annual Mtg, Music Publishers Lament ‘Criminal’ Returns
From Digital Services, NMPA, https://nmpa.org/billboard-at-annual-meeting-musicpublishers-lament-criminal-returns-from-digital-services-call-for-industry-to-expand-thepie/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2021) [https://perma.cc/2Q73-Q2KW]; NMPA Statement on
Senate Introduction of the Songwriter Equity Act, NMPA (May 12, 2014),
http://nmpa.org/press_release/nmpa-statement-on-senate-introduction-of-the-songwriterequity-act/ [https://perma.cc/F5ZC-9593]; Tim Ingham, Martin Bandier: ‘Songwriters’
Livelihoods are under Threat Like Never Before’, MUSIC BUS. WORLDWIDE (Feb. 8, 2015),
https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/martin-bandier-songwriters-livelihoodsthreat-like-never/ [https://perma.cc/9DT6-VPPG].
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should share” in any additional value the services generate. 364 In
other words: if per-play rates are properly calibrated, then any additional Service upside is attributable to the Service’s own inherent
ingenuity, not to its musical repertoire, and therefore there is no call
for record companies to share in that upside.365
Protecting Stakeholders in Phonorecords IV. The Boards’ stances
on protecting stakeholders tend to cut both ways when projected
onto Phonorecords IV. On the one hand, the Phonorecords IV Board
certainly seems likely to continue the view that it is in no way beholden to the Services’ bottom lines and indeed to wield that perspective even more freely without 801(b) Factor D (“disruption”) to
navigate. This is a huge win for the Copyright Owners, who can rest
easier knowing that they will not have to fend off rhetoric surrounding overall service profitability (or lack thereof). 366 However, it is
also unchanged from before: the Copyright Owners already enjoyed
this benefit prior to the MMA, so it is unclear whether the sentiment’s survival will help them cover any additional ground under
willing buyer/willing seller.
On the other hand, the Web IV Board’s avoidance of the kinds
of creator-wellbeing themes that expressly informed the 44% rate
increase in Phonorecords III could have significant pro-Service implications for Phonorecords IV.367 It suggests that Copyright Owners will have a harder time convincing the Phonorecords IV Board
to consider these pro-songwriter policy considerations. While songwriter advocates may, on the whole, rejoice in the fact that the
801(b) factors are gone, this may be one drawback. Copyright Owners can no longer look to Factor A—the context in which the
Phonorecords III Board considered the songwriter livelihood arguments368—nor Factor B’s “fair income” language—the other natural
364

See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26326. It also noted that “none of the percentage-ofrevenue prongs in the greater-of agreements in the record has been triggered.” Id. at 26325.
365
See id. at 26326.
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See supra notes 191–192 and accompanying text; see also Tim Ingham, Loss-Making
Spotify Will Continue to Put Growth Ahead of Profit for ‘Next Few Years’, MUSIC BUS.
WORLDWIDE (May 6, 2020), https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/loss-makingspotify-will-continue-to-focus-on-growth-over-profit-for-next-few-years/
[https://perma.cc/D69B-72U6].
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context for advocacy grounded in well-being and equity369—to
make this case. The lone holdover is Factor C, the “relative roles”
of copyright owner and user prong, which played a fairly minor role
in Phonorecords III.370 And in any event, the Web IV Board’s presumption that any excess service upside is attributable solely to
streaming services’ inherent value suggests that this factor is just as
likely to weigh in the Services’ favor as it is to weigh in the Copyright Owners’ favor.371 Certainly, there is little reason to believe the
Phonorecords IV Board will be any more sympathetic to arguments
centered around the “inherent value” of a musical work than was its
forebearer.372
These points highlight perhaps the greatest liability to songwriters posed by the MMA’s new willing buyer/willing seller rate standard for mechanical royalties. The songwriter-wellbeing arguments
were expressly tied to the dramatic rate increases secured for songwriters in Phonorecords III.373 They also directly informed an important safeguard for songwriters: the mechanical floor. 374 If the
Phonorecords IV Board no longer feels they are germane—or at
least as germane—to its task, then both future equity-drive rate increases and the mechanical floor could be more difficult for the Copyright Owners to secure in Phonorecords IV.375
5. Dissecting Streaming Services’ Business Models: Deferral,
Displacement, “Loss Leader”
One key dynamic to Phonorecords III that was effectively absent from Web IV was a fierce debate surrounding the interaction
between the streaming services’ business models and creator compensation. The Phonorecords III Board considered, in multiple
369

See supra Section II.A.5.
See supra notes 44, 48 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 364–365 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 358–361 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 345–353 and accompanying text.
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See supra Section II.A.5.
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This is of particular importance in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has
had a disastrous impact on many areas of the music industry, including for songwriters.
See Global Creators' Royalties Expected to Decline by up to €3.5 Billion in 2020, CISAC,
https://www.cisac.org/Newsroom/news-releases/global-creators-royalties-expecteddecline-eu35-billion-2020 [https://perma.cc/9WAT-W35D].
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contexts, the Copyright Owners’ argument that linking service revenue to royalty rates tended to depress songwriter compensation
through (1) revenue deferral, (2) “loss leading”, and (3) revenue displacement.
First, the Copyright Owners argued that, while streaming services warring for turf sacrifice present revenues in an effort to grow
market share (for example, through extended free trials, discounted
student and family plans, promotional bundles, etc.)376 may hope to
reap the benefits of future profits, songwriters currently subsisting
on royalties calculated as a percentage basis of those deflated revenues suffer immediate consequences without the hope of a future
windfall.377 Second, they suggested that some streaming services
may intentionally operate as “loss-leaders,” sacrificing streaming
revenue (and therefore mechanical royalties) to capture consumers
for their other products (which do not generate mechanical royalties).378 Finally, services offering interactive streaming as a part of
a larger product bundle have every incentive to attribute as little of
the bundled revenue pie to the royalty-generating interactive streaming slice.379
The Phonorecords III Board was generally receptive to the underlying premises of these arguments, but not necessarily to the conclusions the Copyrights Owners drew from them. Indeed, while
even the Services conceded that these dynamics could occur, and the
Phonorecords III Board found further support in the record that at
least some do occur, the Board concluded that this configuration was
a sensible allocation of risk to facilitate the development of the interactive streaming market.380 Because of “the reliance on scaling
for success,” and the resulting “competition [among streaming services] for the market rather than simply competition in the market,”
the Board emphasized that for the Services to sacrifice current revenue for market share was no mere exercise in vanity: it was
376

See supra note 310.
See supra note 101.
378
Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1927.
379
See id.
380
See id. at 1927–28 (concluding that the record does support revenue deferral among
streaming services, but that “there is no support for any sweeping inference that crossselling [i.e. intentional revenue displacement] has diminished the revenue base”).
377

652

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:387

“rational.”381 For the Services, maximizing immediate revenue
could be “inconsistent [with] competing for the market longterm.”382 Thus, the Board reasoned, by absorbing some of the effects
of the immediate revenue deferral, songwriters are simply assuming
some of the risk inherent to streaming services continuing to compete, exist, and grow—and are thus helping to safeguard “the ultimate existence of that future revenue.”383
In effect, per the Phonorecords III Board, this configuration
helps songwriters help themselves: it is in songwriters’ interest for
streaming services to thrive so that streaming revenue can continue
to be available to songwriters in the future, and therefore it is appropriate for them to bear some of the risk that allows the services to
compete for viability.384 After all, there can be no future royaltygenerating streaming revenue without future streaming services. 385
The Board also stressed that it had found no evidence of services
intentionally displacing bundled revenue from streaming to other
products.386 However, the Board did tip its hat to these same concerns when it justified a mechanical floor as a failsafe against mechanical royalties (and the liquidity they provide songwriters) “vanish[ing]” due to these same deferral and displacement concerns. 387
Because the Web IV Board did not confront these issues—perhaps because these arguments are more relevant in a percentage-ofrevenue context, which is a structure the Web IV board quickly dismissed for other reasons388—recent CRB proceedings provide scant
evidence for how these arguments will play in a willing buyer/willing seller world. Still, the Phonorecords III Board avoided using
801(b)-driven language in this context, instead favoring logic driven
by the respective parties’ self-interests. There is little reason to think
that this approach will be dramatically different under a marketdriven standard in Phonorecords IV. As a result, an ongoing matter

381
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of frustration for rightsholders will likely continue to be a matter of
frustration under the new rate standard.
6. Industry Disruption
The role of potential industry disruption varied significantly between Phonorecords III and Web IV. In fact, it was not discussed in
Web IV at all—the word “disrupt” literally does not appear even
once in the Web IV decision.389 This is intuitive enough. The
Phonorecords III Board was still governed by the 801(b) standard,
which expressly contemplated “minimiz[ing] any disruptive impact;” by contrast, Web IV applied willing buyer/willing seller,
which incorporates no such provision.390
Despite its statutory mandate, however, the Phonorecords III
Board took a fairly hands-off view of what would constitute undue
disruption. Per Phonorecords III, even a 44% increase in headline
royalty rates need not run afoul of 801(b) Factor D. 391 Factor D
merely prompted the Board to adjust the timing of the rate increase—spaced out over a half-decade, rather than overnight. 392
This was, to be sure, not an unimpactful adjustment. Still, it demonstrated that the Board was less inclined to allow Factor D to trump
its other analysis than to smooth over the effects of that analysis.
However, there was one significant exception: the Board invoked Factor D as expressly supporting its decision not to adopt a
per-play rate.393 While it also offered other rationales that—at least
on their face—did not relate to Factor D, its linking of Factor D to
its denial of the central feature of the Copyright Owners’ proposed
structure is conspicuous in a post-MMA world in which Factor D no
longer exists.
This link suggests one of the two major implications for the new
role (or lack thereof) of “disruption” analysis in Phonorecords IV.
The first implication: every individual piece of armor that is removed from the current service-revenue-driven rate structure

389
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See generally Web IV, supra note 73.
See id.
See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 195–197 and accompanying text.
See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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increases the chances that future Copyright Owners will manage to
land meaningful per-play jabs in future Phonorecords proceedings.
The per-play goal was central to their approach in Phonorecords III,
and—as frustrations surrounding having rates tied to loss-leading
and non-revenue-maximizing services linger394—it figures to play a
starring role again in Phonorecords IV.
The second implication is more neutral, and yet still impactful
in spite of its neutrality. Other than the per-play issue (which, of
course, is a massive caveat) it is unclear that the absence of Factor
D will cut in either side’s favor in Phonorecords IV. The Board was
already primed to make significant rate changes while still constrained by a disruption-avoidance governor. Thus, Phonorecords
III offers no reason to think the absence of Factor D will unlock any
further willingness to make impactful change, in either direction, in
Phonorecords IV (nor does the Web IV Board’s silence on the matter). The Services can hardly have emerged from Phonorecords III
imagining that either their disruption arguments, their reliance arguments, or their profitability arguments would have constituted a silver bullet, even under the policy-driven 801(b) standard. Accordingly, there is no reason to think that willing buyer/willing seller will
have cost them any leverage on these points. However, the absence
of Factor D does ensure one thing: whatever changes the
Phonorecords IV does yield, there will no longer be any statutory
force to dissuade the Board from imposing them immediately. This
should raise already-heightened stakes even higher, since any rate
changes imposed are less likely to be staggered across a full fiveyear CRB term, a la Phonorecords III. Among other effects, this
may all but guarantee another appeal next time around.
C. Structure
The Phonorecords III and Web IV Boards structured their approaches differently. The overall frameworks were similar: consider
one-off rate structure elements, then look to benchmarks and economic analysis to establish a zone of reasonableness, and then pick
rates from that zone.395 But navigation within that framework
394
395

See supra Section I.B.5.
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diverged significantly. In Web IV, the initial rate structure discussion
served as a prologue to an opinion devoted primarily to marketplace
benchmarks under a per-play structure that seemed almost inevitable.396 By contrast, in Phonorecords III, the various rate structure
proposals were the primary battleground, while the marketplace
benchmarks became an afterthought to rates arrived at via Shapley
models.397
1. The Significance of Benchmarks
In Web IV, the benchmarks were the ballgame. The Board devoted the majority of its energy to sifting through the various marketplace-derived benchmark proposals, accepting, adjusting, or rejecting them.398 It then positioned those accepted and adjusted
benchmarks—and only those accepted and adjusted benchmarks—
to form a zone of reasonableness, before ultimately selecting its final
rate from that zone.399
The Phonorecords III Board took a very different approach. Before even considering the individual benchmarks, it adjudicated various rate structures distilled from the party proposals; while those
proposals were themselves informed by, and justified using, benchmarks, the Board’s scope of inquiry was far broader than the benchmark-specific analysis employed in Web IV.400 Even where it relied
upon principles embedded in the 2012 Settlement benchmark, or
where it adopted structures from Google’s benchmark, the
Phonorecords III Board did so by distilling and discussing the virtues (or vices) of the benchmark’s structure, not simply by evaluating the benchmark on its own terms.401 Only after considering these
discrete structural issues did the Phonorecords III Board proceed to
evaluate specific benchmark rate proposals. Then, while it found
some of the benchmarks to be helpful, it ultimately declined to rely
upon any of them.402
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2. Shapley Analysis and 801(b) Verification
Instead, just a few years after publishing a Web IV decision that
did not include any mention of Shapley analysis, the Phonorecords
III Board (which consisted of the same three judges) relied exclusively upon Shapley analyses to establish the zone of reasonableness
from which it selected its final rates.403 It construed them both as
valid reflections of the 801(b) guidance, as well as instructive models of free market forces.404 It permitted models to adjust for market
power or to proceed under real-world competitive conditions. 405 It
then used these models to triangulate a range of appropriate sound
recording/musical work ratios, which it converted into ranges of reasonableness for both prongs of the structure it had already decided
to adopt—percentage of revenue and TCC—and selected provisional rates from the middle of those ranges. 406 After vetting those
provisional rates against the 801(b) factors—its first concerted application of those factors, aside from a few passing references—it
adopted them as final.407
3. Projected Structure of Phonorecords IV
It is difficult to predict precisely how much the new rate standard
will compel the Board to rejigger its Section 115 (i.e. Phonorecords)
approach to more closely resemble its Section 114 (i.e. Web) approach. Much will depend on the Board’s interpretation of its new
statutory marching orders in Section 115—particularly the conspicuous absence of language permitting it to consider voluntary agreements—and how this informs its approach to using benchmarks. 408
Much will also depend on how instructive the Board finds
Phonorecords III as a benchmark.409 If the Board concludes that its
hands are tied on benchmarks, it may have to afford them even less
emphasis than it did in Phonorecords III, moving even further away
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from its approach in Web IV. This would be an odd result, in light
of the supposedly unified rate standards.410
Regardless of how the benchmark issues pan out, there is little
reason to believe that the new rate standard will preclude the
Phonorecords IV Board from continuing to entertain Shapley analyses. Although it did not do so in its most recent willing buyer/willing seller proceeding, nothing in the Web IV decision suggests that
it was foreclosed from doing so. While the Services’ Shapley models and analyses were informed by the 801(b) standard, the Copyright Owners’ primary Shapley expert was transparent in his efforts
to model a free market result.411 The Board was unequivocal in stating that satisfying the 801(b) standard was not, by definition, antithetical to market-based rates.412 Thus, the transition from 801(b) to
willing buyer/willing seller is more likely to constrain how Shapley
models are used than whether they are used.413 As a blanket sentiment, this favors neither the Copyright Owners, nor the Services.
However, Copyright Owners are likely to embrace it. First, they
will be happy to see the Board focusing on any inputs other than
voluntary agreement benchmarks—at least any that come within
shouting distance of a compulsory license—which they almost always criticize as distorted by the statutory “shadow.” 414 Second,
while the Services’ experts will no doubt find other means of producing models favorable to their clients, the removal of the 801(b)
factors as available Shapley inputs will preclude tools that, in the
past, allowed their Shapley models to produce lower rate proposals.415
Furthermore, while the remaining structural makeup of
Phonorecords IV will likely resemble the commonalities between
410
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Phonorecords III and Web IV, there is of course one additional
change that the Copyright Owners are sure to welcome. As in
Phonorecords III and Web IV, there will likely be a discussion of
one-off rate structure issues, followed by a review of the parties’ rate
proposals, by way of benchmarks and/or Shapley analysis. From
there, as in Phonorecords III and Web IV, the Board will likely derive a zone of reasonableness and then cull final rates from that zone.
And as in Phonorecords III, the Board may choose to combine aspects of different proposals into its ultimate structural and numeric
decisions.416 The upshot of all this structural continuity is almost
certainly neutral. However, crucially, after doing all that work, the
Phonorecords IV Board—unlike its Phonorecords III predecessor—will no longer be compelled (or allowed) to check those final
rates against the 801(b) factors. For songwriters and publishers who
have long believed 801(b) to be a royalty albatross, this is cause for
celebration.
D. Benchmarks
1. Marketplace Benchmarks?
The Web IV and Phonorecords III Boards’ differing approaches
to benchmarks occurred in spite of points of statutory overlap between the pre-MMA Section 114 and Section 115 that no longer exist post-MMA. Prior to the MMA, Section 115 provided that—in
addition to the 801(b) factors—the Board could “consider rates and
terms under voluntary license agreements.”417 That language is echoed in both pre- and post-MMA Section 114. 418 However, it is notably absent from the post-MMA Section 115 willing buyer/willing
416

The D.C. Circuit agreed that the Board possesses the flexibility to adopt one party’s
proposal as presented, adjust party proposals, or select features a la carte from multiple
proposals. Johnson v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 969 F.3d 363, 381–82 (D.C. Cir. 2020). The
only constraint: “[T]he ultimate proposal adopted by the Board has to be within a
reasonable range of contemplated outcomes.” Id. at 382. Per the D.C. Circuit, the
Phonorecords III Board ran afoul of this requirement when it adopted an uncapped TCC
prong without giving parties sufficient notice to litigate the issue. Id. at 381–82. Thus,
assuming future Boards offer litigants proper notice and adequate explanations, nothing in
the D.C. Circuit’s opinion precludes them from once again stitching together elements from
separate proposals.
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seller standard, which is otherwise identical to the Section 114 willing buyer/willing seller standard.419
The Phonorecords IV Board will have the opportunity to use
these discrepancies to conduct a masterclass in textualism and statutory construction. It will be difficult for any judicial or quasi-judicial body to ignore the absence of this term from the post-MMA
Section 115, particularly given its presence in both the pre-MMA
Section 115 (meaning Congress had to actively strike the language)
as well as in the otherwise identical Section 114 (meaning Congress
had to actively choose not to precisely duplicate a rate standard that
it was otherwise seeking to unify).
The clause’s absence poses something of a mystery. While the
House, Senate, and Conference Reports are all silent as to the precise intent behind removing this language, each emphasizes that the
MMA’s goal was to align the rate standards governing Sections 114
and 115.420 This congressional push for uniform rate standards and
equal treatment jibed with the Copyright Office’s recommendation
that “all music users should operate under a common standard, and
that standard should aim to achieve market rates to the greatest extent possible.”421
However, this push for uniformity makes the absence of actual
uniformity all the more striking. The textualist argument writes itself: Congress knew how to write the clause, because it appears elsewhere in the statute—and in fact, Congress already included the
clause in this same section, and then erased it. Therefore, its absence
must be significant. It will be difficult for any court, or administrative adjudicator such as the CRB, to ignore that argument.
There is some possibility that the Board could formally refer the
question to the Copyright Office, as the Web IV board did when considering whether it could differentiate rates between major and indie
labels.422 Here, unlike in that instance, it is improbable that the
Phonorecords IV parties’ presumably divergent benchmark
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approaches would give the Copyright Office an opening to deem the
issue moot.
If the Copyright Office were to rule on the issue, there is precedent suggesting it would seek to allow the use of marketplace benchmarks. In the past, it has issued guidance in favor of the practice. In
a study cited throughout the legislative process that birthed the
MMA—and was therefore, of course, published prior to the enactment of the new Section 115 language—it recommended the use of
marketplace benchmarks, even as it recognized that using marketplace benchmarks can be “an elusive enterprise, since there are no
freely negotiated licenses to inform the tribunal.”423 In spite of the
awkwardness, “[e]ven where rates remain subject to government
oversight,” it opined that “copyright policy—and specifically the
desire to fairly compensate creators—will be better served by a
greater opportunity to establish rates with reference to real market
transactions.”424 Of course, if the Copyright Office were to issue a
ruling consistent with this opinion, and the Board were to act on it,
the textualist counter would still be available to the D.C. Circuit on
appeal.
If the Board does allow marketplace agreements to serve as
benchmarks, it is likely to review similar agreements to those offered by the parties in Phonorecords III, as well as other voluntary
streaming agreements, both for interactive streaming, noninteractive
streaming, and new service types arising after Phonorecords III.425
Finally, even if it does not allow them to directly establish benchmarks, it could greenlight their influence in other, less direct ways—
perhaps as an input for expert economist analysis,426 or by limiting
their application to structure, but not numerical rates.
423

See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 55, at 172.
See id.
425
See, e.g., Colin Stutz, Time’s Up, TikTok: Labels, Publishers Eye Better Licensing
Deals with the Buzz-Making App, BILLBOARD (May 9, 2019), https://www.billboard.com/
articles/business/8510825/tiktok-music-licensing-deals-major-labels-publishers
[https://perma.cc/SP5A-JCLD]; Todd Spanger, Peloton Settles Legal Fight with Music
Publishers, VARIETY (Feb. 27, 2020, 6:46 AM), https://variety.com/2020/digital/news/
peloton-settles-music-publishers-lawsuit-1203517495/ [https://perma.cc/SN4N-H68B].
426
Though obviously an administrative tribunal, not an Article III court, the Board could
model its approach after Federal Rule of Evidence 703—allowing experts to rely upon
424
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Fundamentally, the Copyright Owners are likely to view any deemphasis of voluntary marketplace benchmarks hailing from highly
regulated, compulsory-license-beholden markets as a victory. Their
position that it is effectively impossible for voluntary agreements to
escape the statutory “shadow” is unlikely to have changed in the few
years since Phonorecords III—indeed, it may have been reinforced
by the reality that the Phonorecords III Board itself opted to place
greater weight on Shapley analyses than voluntary benchmarks, and
after doing so, promptly handed songwriters a 44% rate increase.
2. Other Benchmarks?
If the Phonorecords IV Board were to disallow, or limit its consideration of, marketplace benchmarks, it would—in addition to
placing greater weight on Shapley analyses—thrust other benchmarks into greater prominence. For that matter, even if voluntary
agreements are permitted to serve as benchmarks, other benchmarks
are likely to play a role.
Phonorecords IV will test the limits of CRB precedent as benchmark. On the one hand, the Board is typically open to benchmark
proposals built around past CRB settlements and decisions. In
Phonorecords III, the Board ruled that the 2012 Rates Settlement
(Phonorecords II) was instructive, even as it elected not to rely on
it.427 On the other hand, the Web IV Board’s decision not to allow an
earlier CRB determination—SDARS II, which covered satellite
rates, not the noninteractive digital streaming rates it was being offered as a benchmark for—to serve as a benchmark because it was
governed by 801(b), not willing buyer/willing seller, has obvious
implications for Phonorecords IV.428 Were either party to propose
using Phonorecords III as a benchmark, the Phonorecords IV
Board, bound by Section 803’s stare decisis-esque guidance, would
have to navigate around this Web IV/SDARS II decision in order to
permit it.429
otherwise inadmissible evidence where “experts in the particular field would reasonably
rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject.” See FED. R. EVID.
703.
427
See supra notes 105–114 and accompanying text.
428
See supra note 213.
429
See supra notes 293–295 and accompanying text.
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If it were motivated to do so, the Phonorecords IV Board could
offer a few points in favor of permitting a Phonorecords III benchmark. First, it could argue that Phonorecords III is distinguishable
because, unlike SDARS II it applied to the exact same rights and
parties: it was a member of the Phonorecords family. Second, it
could attempt to limit its applicability—perhaps by only relying on
portions of the determination that did not touch on 801(b) whatsoever. At the very least, at some point the Phonorecords IV Board is
presumably going to have to actually quantify the difference between 801(b) and willing buyer/willing seller. How better to do so
than by utilizing Phonorecords III—a benchmark involving the
same rights, the same parties, the same market, and thereby allowing
the Board to control for almost every variable other than rate standard?
In addition to past CRB authority, parties may also attempt to
use voluntary opt-in settlements as benchmarks. The National Music
Publishers Association (“NMPA”) routinely negotiates opt-in settlements on behalf of its members—which include the vast majority of
the U.S. music publishing community, including all of the major
publishers and many indies.430 The Web IV Board laid the foundation for them to be deemed relevant and representative. Over
SoundExchange’s objections, it found that the Pandora/Merlin optin agreements were representative of the larger indie label
430

See, e.g., Ed Christman, Vast Majority Join Royalties Settlement Between Spotify and
Publishing Group, BILLBOARD (July 11, 2016), https://www.billboard.com/articles/
business/7431272/nmpa-spotify-settlement-most-members-join [https://perma.cc/C2B7JQF6]; NMPA and YouTube Reach Agreement to Distribute Unclaimed Royalties, NMPA
(Dec. 8, 2016), http://nmpa.org/press_release/nmpa-and-youtube-reach-agreement-todistribute-unclaimed-royalties/ [https://perma.cc/C554-ZJSZ]; see also Robert Levin, How
the NMPA Fights For Music Publisher—With Help From Sting, Steven Tyler, Bon Jovi and
More, BILLBOARD (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/7662334/
national-music-publishers-association-100th-anniversary [https://perma.cc/5X5U4QDK].
Of course, in the event that the Board chooses not to consider voluntary agreements,
opponents of these benchmarks would presumably argue that opt-in settlements are
voluntary agreements. However, proponents might then counter by echoing the Board’s
own language back to itself: the Phonorecords III Board distinguished Google’s
benchmark agreements, reached in the marketplace, from the 2012 Rate Settlement
benchmark because the parties to the latter were potentially motivated by the “context of
litigation.” Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1935. A motivated litigant could construe
the Board as having suggested that the settlement was, effectively, a less “voluntary”
voluntary agreement.
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community, in spite of the fact that not all indie publishers are Merlin members, not all Merlin members opted in, and the agreement
was negotiated by the agent (Merlin) rather than the principals (its
members).431 Additionally, while the Web IV Board was not convinced that the Pandora/Merlin agreements were representative of
major labels, this will be of little comfort to opponents of the NMPA
opt-in benchmarks: the NMPA represents majors and indies alike.432
Although the full extent to which the Phonorecords IV Board’s
reliance on other benchmarks aside from voluntary marketplace
agreements would skew songwriter- or service-friendly is unclear,
it is likely a practice the Services would view more favorably. Fundamentally, tethering rates to any pre-existing data point—particularly those that are, at least in the Copyright Owners’ view, depressed by the statutory “shadow”—would tend to make dramatic
rate increases less likely.
3. Evaluating Individual Benchmarks
In addition to providing guidance on which benchmarks will be
allowed to shape the Phonorecords IV proceedings, the Web IV and
Phonorecords III determinations also provide guidance on how the
Board will evaluate each of those individual benchmarks.
a) Four-Part Test
Benchmarks tossed into the Phonorecords IV gauntlet will presumably be routed through the Board’s traditional Four-Part test for
willing buyer/willing seller benchmarks. 433 While the Web IV Board
did entertain, and rely upon, proffered benchmarks that did not fully

431

See supra notes 253–255 and accompanying text. The Board did rely in part on the
fact that a “compelling” (but redacted) number of Merlin members had in fact opted in. See
id.
432
Notably, however, the major publishers often license independently from other
NMPA members, and therefore are presumably less likely to actually avail themselves of
general NMPA-negotiated opt-ins. See, e.g., Frank D’Angelo & Mariah Volk, Downtown
Music Publishing LLC v. Peloton Interactive, Inc., LOEB & LOEB, LLP (Jan. 29, 2020),
https://www.loeb.com/en/insights/publications/2020/01/downtown-music-publishing-llcv-peloton-interactive-inc. [https://perma.cc/Q8KA-58H3].
433
See supra Section II.B.3.

664

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:387

satisfy this test,434 it tended to look more favorably upon those that
came the closest.435 The four prongs are:
(1) The Willing Buyer and Seller Test—were the parties sophisticated and “under no compulsion” to enter the agreement? 436
(2) The Same Parties Test—did the agreement govern the same,
or similar, parties?437
(3) The Statutory License Test: to what extent is the benchmark
probative of the Platonic “hypothetical marketplace…in which there
is no statutory license?”438
(4) The Same Rights Test: does the proffered benchmark apply
to the same rights that the Board is currently assigning rates for? 439
“Shadow” of the Statutory Rate? One issue that is sure to figure
every bit as prominently in Phonorecords IV as it did in Web IV and
Phonorecords III is the alleged statutory “shadow”—the notion that
even voluntary rates set in a marketplace governed by the compulsory license yield depressed rates because licensees have no incentive to agree to any rate that exceeds the statutory fallback. 440 Because almost every possible benchmark agreement—including marketplace agreements, settlements, past CRB rate determinations, and
beyond—will have occurred in a regulated market, almost every
proffered benchmark will be subject to this attack.441 The discussion
will likely occur, as in Web IV, in the context of the Four-Part-Test’s
third prong: the Statutory License Test.442
Unfortunately for Copyright Owners hoping to invoke the
“shadow” against benchmarks that they feel reflect depressed royalty rates, neither the Web IV nor Phonorecords III boards were particularly sympathetic to this argument. In Phonorecords III, the
Copyright Owners argued that the pre-existing rates—along with

434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442

See id.
See id.
See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26383.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 55, at 5.
Id. at 172.
See supra Section II.B.3.
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other Service benchmarks—were “inherently suspect” because they
were formed under the “shadow” of the statutory license. 443 Because
any licensee understands that it can simply walk away from the bargaining table and accept a compulsory license, they argued, licensors have no leverage to deviate from statutory rates. 444 Thus, it
would be perversely circular to use “voluntary” negotiations influenced by the statutory license to then influence the next statutory
license.445
The Phonorecords III Board did acknowledge that the statutory
“shadow” is not a myth, but it maintained that a “shadow”-ed benchmark is neither disqualified, nor even “per se inferior,” but rather a
dynamic for the Board to consider when weighing any particular
benchmark.446 Even more ominously for Copyright Owners, it
mused that the “shadow” might actually have pro-competitive effects: a “countervailing” power to offset the oligopolistic licensors’
ability to threaten to walk away from any negotiation. 447
The Phonorecords IV Copyright Owners may find some solace
in the fact that the Phonorecords III Board’s analysis of the statutory
“shadow” relied on two pieces of pre-MMA authority. First, it justified its decision to accept the arguably “shadow”-ed 2012 rates as
a viable benchmark by citing the D.C. Circuit’s holding in a 2014
appeal of a SDARS determination promulgated under the 801(b)
standard that “the Judges may ‘use[ ] the prevailing rate as the starting point of their Section 801(b) analysis.’”448 Second, it invoked
the provision in (the old) Section 115 providing that “in addition to
the objectives set forth in section 801(b)(1), in establishing such

443

Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1932.
See id. The Copyright Owners argued that this “shadow” can be cast in two directions:
(1) prior statutory rates shaping parties’ expectations for subsequent rates, and (2)
upcoming proceedings affecting parties’ motivations to enter into voluntary agreements.
Id.
445
See id. at 1932–33.
446
See id. at 1933, 1941. The Board contended that there may very well be some
marketplace benchmark agreements that are “unaffected by the shadow” but perhaps
“subject to their own imperfections.” Id. at 1933.
447
See id. at 1933.
448
See id. at 1933 (quoting Music Choice v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 774 F.3d 1000, 1012
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that it is permissible for the Board to conclude that the prevailing
market rate was “reasonable given the Section 801(b) factors”)).
444
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rates and terms, the Copyright Royalty Judges may consider rates
and terms under voluntary license agreements.” 449 Thus, the two
pieces of authority the Phonorecords III Board relied on in downplaying the “shadow” argument were (1) language from an appeal
of an 801(b) determination—a rate standard which no longer applies
to Section 115450—and (2) statutory language directing the Board to
consider voluntary agreements—language which no longer exists in
Section 115.451
For its part, the Web IV Board acknowledged a consensus view
among experts for both parties that the statutory rate operated as a
“ceiling.” 452 Even so, it signaled that, in a willing buyer/willing
seller context, it was perfectly content to hold one marketplace licensor’s voluntary decision to grant rights below the statutory rate
against statutory licensors. Over SoundExchange’s objections, the
Web IV Board relied upon the fact that the iHeart/Warner benchmark—which provided for sub-statutory rates—was a direct agreement executed at a time when iHeart was already obligated to pay
statutory rates, but that Warner had nevertheless accepted rates that
“[were] not statutory rates.”453 It reasoned, simply enough, that because the effective rate under the iHeart/Warner agreement was less
than the statutory rate, and because Warner was under no obligation
to opt for a rate decrease instead of “default[ing] to the higher” statutory rate, the agreement satisfied the Statutory License Test.454
For the Web IV Board, this theory of meaningful voluntary divergence from the statutory rates was apparently a one-way street.
Despite holding that Warner’s voluntary decision to accept sub-statutory rates did not disqualify that benchmark, the Board held that
Apple’s decision to acquire rights above the statutory rate suggested
449

17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(3)(D) (prior to 2018 amendment); Phonorecords III, supra note
28, at 1932–33 (emphasizing, under the pre-MMA statutory scheme that “it is beyond
dispute that Congress has authorized the Judges, in their discretion, to consider such
agreements as evidence, notwithstanding the argument that the compulsory license may
cast a shadow over those agreements”).
450
See supra Section III.A.1.
451
See supra Section III.A.2.
452
See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26352.
453
Id. at 26383.
454
Id. (declining to credit SoundExchange’s contention that its rates were “too heavily
influenced by the ‘shadow’ of the statutory rates” to satisfy this test).
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something was too “amiss” to allow that agreement to serve as a
reliable benchmark.455
This bodes ill for Copyright Owners in Phonorecords IV. If the
Board allows voluntary agreements to serve as benchmarks, Apple
agreements may play a similar role as they did in Web IV. Apple has
positioned itself as the one streaming service that is a “friend of artists.”456 As part of this effort, it has made a point of sitting out the
Phonorecords III appeal being brought by its competitors Spotify,
Amazon, Google, and Pandora (although it certainly still stands to
benefit if the rate increases are curtailed).457 Furthermore, its willingness—even eagerness—to pay above the statutory rate is not
confined only to the sound recording agreement the Web IV board
disregarded, but has also occurred on the publishing side, perhaps as
a larger part of its “friend of artists” strategy.458 And of course in
Phonorecords III, it was the lone Service to join the Copyright Owners’ push for a (much lower, naturally) per-play rate. 459 These efforts
have earned Apple the public praise of the NMPA for “tak[ing] a
different approach and treat[ing] songwriters more like business
partners.”460 To the extent that these efforts have filtered into
455

See id. at 26352 (because “economists for both licensors and licensees agreed that the
statutory rate effectively sets a ceiling on rates for statutory services,” the fact that “that
the effective rates under the Apple agreements are substantially higher than the statutory
rates strongly suggests that something is amiss”).
456
Dani Deahl, Here’s Why Apple is Saying Spotify is Suing Songwriters, VERGE (Mar.
15, 2019, 2:51 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/15/18267288/apple-music-spotifysuing-songwriters-eu-antitrust [https://perma.cc/2SKX-RJTT].
457
Jem Aswad & Shirley Halperin, Apple Is the Real Winner in Spotify’s Battle Against
Songwriters’ Rate Hike, VARIETY (Apr. 9, 2019, 7:07 AM), https://variety.com/2019/
music/news/spotify-rate-hike-apple-real-winner-1203183647/ [https://perma.cc/SEP3-4A
Y3].
458
Tim Ingham, Apple Wanted to Improve Songwriter Pay to $0.00091 Per Stream.
Spotify and Google Weren’t Keen, MUSIC BUS. WORLDWIDE (Sept. 9, 2019),
https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/apple-wanted-to-improve-songwriter-pay-to0-00091-per-stream-spotify-and-google-werent-keen/
[https://perma.cc/8BDE-LFTQ];
But see What is Apple Music Up to with the MLC?, TRICHORDIST (Dec. 10, 2020),
https://thetrichordist.com/2020/12/10/what-is-apple-music-up-to-with-the-mlc/
[https://perma.cc/PVK2-GC3C] (reporting that Apple may be positioning itself to abandon
its above-statutory agreements and revert to statutory rates administered by the MLC).
459
See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
460
Compare Seismic Implications, supra note 37, with Spotify Defends Its CRB-Rates
Appeal—but NMPA Boss Isn’t Impressed, MUSIC ALLY (Mar. 12, 2019),
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voluntary agreements proffered as benchmarks in Phonorecords IV,
it
will do Copyright Owners little good if the Board once again discards these above-stat data points as “amiss” and unreliable—particularly if, as it did in Web IV, the Board then takes no issue with
any marketplace licensors’ decision to voluntarily license at substatutory rates.
Taken together, Web IV and Phonorecords III provide little reason for Copyright Owners to feel hopeful that their “shadow” arguments will enjoy a warmer welcome in Phonorecords IV. Of course,
if the role of marketplace benchmarks themselves is diminished,
then it is also possible that there will be less occasion to make this
argument in the first place.461
Licenses for Related Rights? Another issue that featured heavily in
Phonorecords III that will now, newly, be subject to the Board’s
Four-Part test for willing buyer/willing seller benchmark agreements is the probative value of licenses for related rights. These will
likely be argued in the context of the fourth prong of the Four-Part
test: the Same Rights test.462 In Phonorecords III, while the Copyright Owners did not convince the Board to consider as many related
rights as they had hoped, they did manage to score a few points in
this arena. The Board accepted as at least somewhat helpful several
benchmarks derived from rights other than interactive streaming
mechanical rights. These included digital performance rights for
noninteractive streaming (offered by the Copyright Owners), sound
recording rights for interactive streaming (at least insofar as it embraced the Copyright Owners’ sound recording/musical work ratio
approach relative to those rights), and mechanical rates for physical
and digital sales (offered by the Services). 463 However, the Board
rejected the Copyright Owners’ most ambitious benchmark—the
1:1 sound recording/musical work ratio in synchronization licenses—due to divergent upstream competitive dynamics.464 It also
https://musically.com/2019/03/12/spotify-defends-its-crb-rates-appeal-but-nmpa-bossisnt-impressed/ [https://perma.cc/5UN5-7R6G].
461
See supra Section III.D.1.
462
See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
463
See supra Section II.A.4.a.
464
See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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dismissed another songwriter-friendly sound recording/musical
work ratio benchmark derived from YouTube agreements, this time
due to the depressing effect of Section 512 “safe harbor” on sound
recording YouTube rates.465
Ultimately, the Phonorecords III Board expressly linked mechanical rates to rates for other rights, both directly and inversely.
In adopting a TCC prong, it directly tied mechanical rates to sound
recording interactive streaming rates: as sound recording rates increase, so too do mechanical royalty rates (beginning when the TCC
prong exceeds the percentage-of-revenue prong). 466 And by adopting an all-in rate, the Board expressly created an inverse relationship
between mechanical rates and the rates payable for the complementary performance right.467
Rates for related rights also played a (less prominent) role in
Web IV. There, the Board rejected the NAB’s bid for a bifurcated
rate structure for terrestrial/web simulcasters that the NAB justified
in part using the royalty rate for sound recordings performed on terrestrial radio (which just so happens to be zero).468 The Board
roundly refused to consider as probative a right for which “there is
no market” because “there is no general public performance right”
for sound recordings on terrestrial radio. 469 However, the Web IV
Board quickly clarified that this decision was more a product of the
NAB’s somewhat extreme approach than of a wholesale aversion to
considering related rights: it accepted (with a steering adjustment)
SoundExchange’s benchmark derived from unregulated interactive
streaming sound recording rates. 470
Together, the Phonorecords III and Web IV decisions augur that,
with some limitations along the outer flank, the Phonorecords IV
Board is likely to be receptive to benchmarks derived from licenses

465

See supra note 147; 17 U.S.C. 512.
See supra notes 122–129 and accompanying text.
467
See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text. Importantly, while neither of these
rate structures were new, prior to Phonorecords III they had been the product of settlement,
so the Phonorecords III Board was the first to impose them in the context of a fully-litigated
rate-setting proceeding. See supra Section II.A.1–2.
468
See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26390.
469
See id. at 26391.
470
See supra notes 238–241 and accompanying text.
466
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for rights other than mechanical streaming. The limitations are as
follows: first, NAB’s Web IV whiff stands for the unremarkable
proposition that the Phonorecords IV Services will probably not be
allowed to rely upon rates for rights for which there is no right at
all.471 Second, the Copyright Owners will likely continue to have a
tough time convincing the Board that synchronization sound recording/musical work ratios are probative of “reasonable” mechanical
royalty rates.472 Even as Copyright Owners continue to harp on the
reality that synchronization is the one significant songwriter income
source that is negotiated in the free market, 473 and even as
Phonorecords IV will be the first mechanical rate-setting proceeding
that is mandated by statute to approximate the free market, the
Phonorecords III and Web IV Boards gave little reason to think that
a new rate standard will trump the upstream competitive concerns
the Board has relied upon in the past—concerns that so often shape
the Board’s analysis under any rate standard. 474 As long as songs
continue to be substitutes in competition with one another in the
synchronization setting and “must have” complements for one another in the interactive streaming setting, the Phonorecords III
Board’s disregard for the synchronization market—which did not
rely at all upon 801(b) factors—will likely survive the change in
rate standards.475
Setting these limitations aside, the Phonorecords IV Board
should continue to be receptive to the related rights it considered in
Phonorecords III. Additionally, the Phonorecords III Copyright
Owners were put on notice that, absent factual support, their “conclusory” allegations regarding the effect of “safe harbor” provisions

471

See supra notes 468–469 and accompanying text.
See supra note 146.
473
See, e.g., Ingham, supra note 38 (“The music publishers’ [Phonorecords IV] plan,
quite deliberately, is to go in impossibly high. As [NMPA president David] Israelite tells
it, in the world of synchronization, licensing fees in the US are broadly split 50/50 between
publishers (and songwriters) and record labels (and artists)”); Ed Christman, NMPA: David
Israelite, RIAA’s Cary Sherman Work to Mend Fences Between Publishers, Labels,
BILLBOARD (June 13, 2013), https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/1566903/nmpadavid-israelite-riaas-cary-sherman-work-to-mend-fences-between
[https://perma.cc/PH2F-NWKA].
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See infra Section III.D.3.b.
475
See supra note 146.
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on YouTube composition rates were insufficient to compel the
Board to consider that benchmark.476 Assuming they heed this warning, they will arrive at Phonorecords IV armed with evidence to support their contention that “safe harbor” depresses YouTube composition rates every bit as much as it depresses YouTube sound recording rates. And assuming their evidence is convincing, this will unlock an additional related right benchmark for the Phonorecords IV
Board to consider—likely a win for songwriters. 477
b) “Effective Competition” and the Influence of Market
Power
There is perhaps no greater unifier between the 801(b)-governed
Phonorecords III determination and the willing buyer/willing sellergoverned Web IV determination than the two Boards’ respective deference to competitive concerns. Both Boards concluded that inherent to each respective rate standard was an “effective competition”
requirement.478 Both Boards agreed that benchmarks skewed by
anti-competitive, oligopolistic market power—notably, in the view
of both Boards, among the major record companies—could not, as
a rule, satisfy this requirement.479 However, both Boards also agreed
that marketplace rates reached in such an environment could still be
useful if handled prudently.480 More generally, both Boards consistently grounded their analysis of any issue (including benchmarks,
rate structure, Shapley analysis, etc.) in competitive concerns. There

476

See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
Again, this is assuming the Board considers marketplace benchmarks at all. See supra
Section III.D.1. However, this discussion introduces another avenue through which the
Board could formally honor the textually-significant absence of language permitting it to
consider voluntary agreements, while also shrinking the scope of this limitation. See id.
The Board could construe this limitation as applying only to voluntary licenses for the same
rights (mechanical reproduction rights for interactive streaming) or only to rights subject
to compulsory licensing (which would add noninteractive digital sound recording rights to
the mix). See id. This interpretation would still permit the Board to consider benchmarks
for many of the related rights it deemed helpful in Web IV and Phonorecords III. See supra
Sections II.A.4.a, II.B.3.
478
See supra notes 143, 226–230 and accompanying text.
479
See supra notes 143, 238–241 and accompanying text. The mere presence of
negotiation is not enough to qualify a benchmark as “effectively competitive.” See Web IV,
supra note 73, at 26344.
480
See supra notes 143, 238–241 and accompanying text.
477

672

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:387

is no reason to think that Phonorecords IV will be any different, particularly as tensions between record labels and major streaming services continue to foment.481
While the effects of this renewed priority are too sprawling to
cleanly isolate, the Phonorecords IV Services will certainly use it as
a shield against one recurring Copyright Owner argument: that mechanical rates for interactive streaming should more closely resemble sound recording rates for interactive streaming. Both the
Phonorecords III and Web IV Boards fully adopted the view that the
market for interactive streaming rights of sound recordings is heavily slanted by the oligopoly power of the record company. That view
makes it difficult for the Copyright Owners to use those sound recording rates to convince the Board to do much of anything. This is
unlikely to escape the Services’ attention.

481

The competition concerns could also ratchet up at any time if there is a renewal in
record company consolidation, or if the trend towards streaming services acquiring
interests in record labels continues. See, e.g., Shan Li & Mauro Orrù, Tencent Buys 10%
Stake in Record Label of Billie Eilish, Drake, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 31, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/tencent-buys-10-stake-in-record-label-of-billie-eilishdrake-11577793085 [https://perma.cc/ETQ4-RLMQ]; Mergers: Commission Clears
Universal’s Acquisition of EMI’s Recorded Music Business, Subject to Conditions, EUR.
COMM’N (Sept. 21, 2012), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_
12_999 [https://perma.cc/7JRM-PG27]. As it is, there are a myriad of tension points. See,
e.g., Ben Sisario, A New Spotify Initiative Makes the Big Record Labels Nervous, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/06/business/media/spotifymusic-industry-record-labels.html; [https://perma.cc/8459-JS3G]; Lucas Shaw, The
Tension is Building Between Spotify and the Music Industry, STAR (Sept. 6, 2018, 7:00
AM),
https://www.thestar.com.my/tech/tech-news/2018/09/06/the-tension-is-buildingbetween-spotify-and-the-music-industry [https://perma.cc/RRG8-AK58]; Lucas Shaw,
Spotify’s Newest Pitch to Labels and Musicians: Now You Pay Us, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 2,
2010, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-02/spotify-s-newestpitch-to-labels-and-musicians-now-you-pay-us [https://perma.cc/QUV9-HVT5]; Stuart
Dredge, Are Spotify, Apple Music and YouTube the New Record Labels?, MUSIC ALLY
(June 4, 2019), https://musically.com/2019/06/04/are-spotify-apple-music-and-youtubethe-new-record-labels/ [https://perma.cc/25DE-93DU]; Tim Ingham, Who Are the Two
‘Major Labels’ that Have Signed New Deals with Spotify? Clue: Not Universal or Warner.,
MUSIC
BUS.
WORLDWIDE
(July
31,
2019),
https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/who-are-the-two-major-labels-that-havesigned-new-deals-with-spotify-clue-not-universal-or-warner/
[https://perma.cc/53UUU8A6].
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c) Analysis of Individual Benchmarks
Substitution and Promotional Value. The statutory definition of the
willing buyer/willing seller rate standard includes a requirement that
the Board consider substitution and promotional effects. “Substitution” effects refer to the extent to which revenue from one type of
copyright use replaces revenue from other types of copyright uses,
while promotion effects refer to the extent to which one type of copyright use encourages revenue from other types of copyright uses.482
The exact statutory text compels the Board to consider “whether use
of the compulsory licensee’s service may substitute for or may promote the sales of phonorecords or otherwise may interfere with or
may enhance the musical work copyright owner’s other streams of
revenue from its musical works.” 483 This guidance is included in
both Section 114, and the post-MMA Section 115, but was not a part
of the pre-MMA Section 115 801(b) standard. 484
Given that reality, it is perhaps unsurprising that substitution and
promotion effects figured more prominently in Web IV than in
Phonorecords III. While the Phonorecords III Board barely discussed either,485 the Web IV Board engaged deeply with both phenomena. First, it made the impactful choice not to consider the substitution effects and promotion effects separately from any of the
benchmark agreements it reviewed, but rather to deem them “baked
into” those agreements.486 However, this approach only extended to
same-market benchmarks; the Board held that for benchmarks imported from other markets (e.g. interactive streaming), the Board
would have to “identify and consider any difference in the promotional/substitutional effects” between the two markets in order to
properly quantify the imported benchmark. 487 Furthermore, the
Board signaled that it could be sympathetic to arguments that
482

See supra notes 218–219 and accompanying text.
17 U.S.C. § 115.
484
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 114–15; 17 U.S.C. §§ 115, 801 (prior to 2018 amendment).
485
Outside of a passing reference to one Shapley model’s accounting for substitution
(Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1948), and the Services’ argument that the 2012
Settlement suggested an “implicit consensus on such issues as substitutional effects” (id.
at 1926), the Phonorecords III Board’s only reference to either force was actually through
an inconsequential citation to Web IV. See id. at 1933 n. 68.
486
See Web IV, supra note 28, at 26326.
487
See id. at 26327.
483
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licensors are willing to accept lower rates when a licensed use does
not cannibalize other revenue, or when a licensed use generates
enough promotional value.488
Now equipped with the same statutory directive that spurred its
Web IV analysis, the Phonorecords IV Board is certain to entertain
substantial substitution and promotion discussion from both sides—
both inside and outside of the benchmark context. Under Section
803’s stare decisis-esque guidance, the Board will likely consider
both effects to be “baked into” any intra-market voluntary benchmarks, as it did in Web IV. However, for benchmarks summoned
from beyond the interactive streaming mechanical space, and for
arguments outside of the benchmark context entirely, it will be open
season.
The tacks taken by each party will greatly depend on how prominent a role benchmarks play in the proceedings. Indeed, the parties’
strategies inside of the benchmark context will be diametrically
opposed to their strategies outside of the benchmark context.
For Copyright Owners, the value of any marketplace agreement
is equal to the royalty rate, plus the promotional benefit, and minus
the revenue earned under the benchmark agreement that substitutes
for revenue that would otherwise have been earned elsewhere. For
example, if interactive streaming decreases consumers’ demand for
CDs, then interactive streaming revenue has, to some extent, substituted for CD sales revenue—presumably prompting the licensor to
demand a higher royalty rate than it would otherwise agree to in order to make up for the lost CD revenue. Conversely, if interactive
streaming activity encourages a movie producer to place a song in
an upcoming film, then the interactive streaming license has promoted synchronization revenue—presumably encouraging the licensor to be open to a lower royalty rate than it would otherwise
agree to, because it is motivated by its ability to generate extra value
488

See supra note 212. The Web IV Board declined to adopt these arguments due to
underlying evidentiary deficiencies, even as it accepted that the phenomena were plausible.
See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26322–23 (“Assuming for the sake of argument that a
promotional impact could justify a discounted royalty rate for simulcasters, the NAB would
be required to demonstrate that such promotional effect is greater for simulcasting than for
other forms of commercial webcasting to an extent that would justify a lower rate for
simulcasters. The NAB has not done so.”).
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elsewhere. Thus, when discussing the rate included in that interactive streaming license as a potential benchmark, the licensor has an
incentive to claim that the promotional effect was more
significant than the substitution effect, to show that the benchmark
agreement rate is actually lower than it would otherwise have been,
absent the extra benefit granted under that marketplace license that
is not transferring over to this statutory license. The licensee, of
course, has the exact opposite incentive.
Outside of the benchmark context, the calculus flips. In a Shapley analysis, for example, the licensor has an incentive to argue that
the promotional effect under this statutory license for interactive
streaming is minuscule, and the substitution effect gargantuan. For
the purposes of rate-setting, the licensor does not want to concede
that under this interactive streaming license it will be generating any
value other than the royalty—willing sellers, of course, are willing
to sell for less if they are getting something extra on the side. And
for the purposes of rate-setting, the licensor will want to claim that
interactive streaming is gutting physical and digital sales such that a
willing seller of interactive streaming would demand extra royalties
to make up for the decimation of the rest of its business.
In Web IV, iHeart’s expert attempted to straddle these two divergent goals in a manner that may be instructive. Tasked with devaluing a prospective Spotify interactive benchmark being applied in a
noninteractive rate-setting proceeding, he presented expert testimony purporting to show that “noninteractive services are 15 times
more promotional than interactive services.” 489 If the Board had
credited this testimony (it did not),490 it would have supported the
proposition that the statutory rates currently being set should be
lower than the marketplace benchmark would otherwise indicate,
because all else equal, licensors would be willing to accept a lower
noninteractive rate (along with its huge promotional benefits) than
the interactive benchmark (with its lack of promotional benefits)
would otherwise suggest.

489
490

See id. at 26328.
See id.
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Given the questionable statutory standing of marketplace benchmarks in Phonorecords IV,491 the Web IV Board’s limitations on
independent consideration of substitution and promotion values,492
and the Phonorecords III Board’s favoring of Shapley analysis,493
it seems most likely that these arguments will have a greater impact
outside of the marketplace benchmark context. Thus, Copyright
Owners will likely come prepared to quantify the many ways
in which interactive streaming appears to have harmed other sources
of music revenue.494 Their adversaries, the Services, will be prepared to discuss the many promotional benefits of interactive
streaming.495 The projected outcome of those efforts remains
491

See supra Section III.D.1.
See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26321–22.
493
See supra Section II.A.4.b.
494
See, e.g., Ben Sisario & Karl Russell, In Shift to Streaming, Music Business Has Lost
Billions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/25/business/
media/music-sales-remain-steady-but-lucrative-cd-sales-decline.html [https://perma.cc/
Z55N-T74K]; Ashley King, Spotify Will Overtake Pandora’s Total U.S. Listener Count by
2021, Report Predicts, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.digital
musicnews.com/2019/03/25/spotify-pandoras-listeners/ [https://perma.cc/5492-GMBM];
Amy X. Wang, Album Sales Are Dying as Fast as Streaming Services Are Rising, ROLLING
STONE (Jan. 3, 2019, 5:11 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/albumsales-dying-as-fast-as-streaming-services-rising-774563/ [https://perma.cc/VZG7-7R3V].
But see Tim Ingham, Global Recorded Music Industry Revenues Topped $20BN Last
Year—But Streaming Growth Slowed, MUSIC BUS. WORLDWIDE (May 4, 2020),
https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/the-global-recorded-music-industrygenerated-over-20bn-last-year-but-streaming-growth-slowed/
[https://perma.cc/ATT8S9W6]. The Copyright Owners may even arrive equipped with visual aids. See, e.g.,
SONA, Gently Down the Stream, YOUTUBE (Apr. 27, 2016), https://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=OllDCF_llHc&feature=emb_title. [https://perma.cc/6BUW-THG5].
495
See, e.g., Peter Robinson, Streams Ahead: The Artists Who Made It Huge Without
Radio Support, GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2016, 11:32 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
music/2016/dec/01/artists-made-it-huge-streaming-spotify-apple-music [https://perma.cc/
A9C2-A3BG]; Patrick McGuire, How Streaming Platforms Are Changing Music
Promotion and Discovery, TUNECORE (Feb 13, 2018), https://www.tune
core.com/blog/2018/02/streaming-platforms-changing-music-promotion-discovery.html
[https://perma.cc/WZS7-FNLD]; Lisa Robinson, Why Chance the Rapper Makes Music for
Free (and How He Actually Makes Money), VANITY FAIR (Feb. 9, 2017),
https://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2017/02/why-chance-the-rapper-music-is-freeand-how-he-makes-money [https://perma.cc/D46W-WMFZ]. But see What Is the Value of
Exposure When Exposure is All There Is?, MIDIA: MUSIC INDUS. BLOG (May 6, 2020),
https://musicindustryblog.wordpress.com/2020/05/06/what-is-the-value-of-exposurewhen-exposure-is-all-there-is/ [https://perma.cc/RHH2-2TSQ]. The Services have their
492
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uncertain: it will likely depend on which experts the Board finds
most compelling.
Extra-Statutory Terms and Functionality. A very similar dynamic
occurs when discussing extra-statutory terms and functionality. In
the benchmark setting, Copyright Owners have every incentive to
exaggerate the extra benefits received by licensors in a marketplace
setting that would not be received by the licensors in this statutory
setting, to show that the benchmark licensors agreed to artificially
low monetary rates because they were also receiving additional benefits. Thus, they would argue, those benchmark monetary rates need
to be increased if they are being applied in a setting devoid of those
extra benefits that are not available under the statutory license—
such as access to proprietary data, or promotional services, as were
discussed in the Web IV Pandora/Merlin and iHeart/Warner benchmark agreements.496 As before, the Services have the opposite incentive, or indeed an incentive to highlight the extra-statutory benefits the licensees received in those benchmark transactions (such as
additional rights or favorable indemnification terms) that would not
be available to statutory licensees. 497
In Web IV, the Board considered several extra-statutory terms in
benchmark agreements but rarely found them dispositive. While it
did dismiss some of SoundExchange’s noninteractive benchmarks
for failing to account for extra-statutory functionality,498 it did not
do the same for either the Pandora or iHeart benchmarks. In both of
those instances, the Board acknowledged the presence of statutory
terms, but declined to adjust for them because it was not convinced
that the parties had actually ascribed to these terms any value that
would have affected the monetary royalty rates. 499
Importantly, the Board made two important rulings that could
factor into Phonorecords IV. First, extra-statutory terms do not
own visuals. See, e.g., Promoting Your Work, SPOTIFY, https://artists.spotify.com/videos/
the-game-plan/promoting-your-work [https://perma.cc/CR7D-KKGW].
496
See supra notes 264–265 and accompanying text; supra note 255.
497
See, e.g., Steele, supra note 119 (outlining a marketplace agreement in which Spotify
received, among other things, the right to charge Universal’s artists for promotional tools
and opportunities).
498
See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26353.
499
See supra notes 264–265 and accompanying text; supra note 255.
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disqualify a prospective benchmark.500 Second, recognizing that a
party claiming extra-statutory terms has an incentive to quantify
those terms, it held that the burden to establish an extra-statutory
term’s quantifiable value lies with the party claiming that the term
has value.501
Because the Phonorecords III Board did not engage with this
issue, the Web IV Board’s guidance remains intact heading into
Phonorecords IV. As with promotional and substitution effects, the
parties’ arguments will depend upon whether they are characterizing
a benchmark marketplace license, or the statutory license itself. Of
course, by definition, the statutory agreement itself cannot contain
non-statutory terms. However, where streaming services are providing publicly available benefits to rightsholders, they may attempt to
argue that lower rates are warranted, just as if these benefits were
available under the statutory license. For example, Spotify—perhaps to strengthen its testy relationship with songwriters 502—has
been rolling out a series of songwriter- and publisher-facing tools.
These have included proprietary analytic insights for publishers, visible songwriter credits, songwriter playlists, and songwriter promotional landing pages.503
Presumably, in a hypothetical marketplace, some licensors
might ascribe enough value to some of these features to be willing
500

See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26369.
See id. at 26387.
502
See, e.g., Elias Leight, Threats, Bullying and Misinformation: Inside Spotify’s Battle
With Songwriters, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 19, 2019, 12:15 PM), https://www.rolling
stone.com/music/music-features/threats-bullying-misinformation-spotify-battlesongwriters-820969/ [https://perma.cc/FG9T-6LKW]; Spotify’s Relationship with
Publishers
Hits
the
Rocks—Again,
MUSIC ALLY
(June
24,
2019),
https://musically.com/2019/06/24/spotifys-relationship-with-publishers-hits-the-rocksagain/ [https://perma.cc/A34F-BQET].
503
See Introducing Spotify Publishing Analytics in Beta, SPOTIFY (Nov. 8, 2018),
https://newsroom.spotify.com/2018-11-08/introducing-spotify-publishing-analytics-inbeta/ [https://perma.cc/9V3D-LLEJ]; Dani Deahl, Spotify Now Lets You Search by
Songwriter With Clickable Credits, VERGE (Feb. 12, 2020, 11:45 AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/2/12/21134557/spotify-search-songwriter-pagesclickable-credits [https://perma.cc/MMA8-Y72U]; Murray Stassen, A Year After Trying
To Cut Songwriters’ Pay, Spotify Boosts Writer Visibility With Launch of Pages Features,
MUSIC BUS. WORLDWIDE (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/ayear-after-trying-to-cut-songwriters-pay-spotify-boosts-writer-visibility-with-launch-ofpages-feature/ [https://perma.cc/ZFS6-S8FM].
501
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to lower their royalty rates in order to access them. Crucially, then,
if Spotify were to include these benefits as a part of individual licensing agreements, they could pose a rate-setting liability: were
those agreements to be offered as a benchmark, the Copyright Owners would argue that the presence of these valuable extra-statutory
benefits led to artificially low royalty rates because licensors were
willing to sell for less in order to secure the extra benefits that would
not be available under the statutory license. However, by making
these features publicly available, Spotify has not only foreclosed that
benchmark argument, but it has also opened the door for the Services to argue that the statutory rates should be lower because companies like Spotify are providing extra value to the entire publisher
and songwriter communities at large. Should the Services attempt
such an argument, per Web IV, they will bear the hefty burden to
prove the quantifiable presence of a market-wide benefit. 504
As with substitution and promotional value, the net effect of this
variable is difficult to project and will likely also boil down to a
battle of the experts.
Prevalence of a Feature in the Marketplace. The Board’s review
of individual benchmark terms is not confined only to extra-statutory features. Both the Phonorecords III and Web IV Boards signaled the relevance of a structural term’s ubiquity in the marketplace—irrespective of any purported self-fulfilling statutory
“shadow.” The Phonorecords III Board noted the prevalence of its
core rate structural elements on its way to adopting each of them:
all-in,505 “greater-of” percentage-of-revenue and TCC structures506
all apparently predominate in the voluntary marketplace. 507 Similarly, the Web IV Board relied upon the lack of effective marketplace
prevalence in its primary structural choice: declining to adopt a
“greater-of” rate structure.508
To the extent it considers marketplace benchmarks, the
Phonorecords IV Board is likely to adopt a similar approach. This
504

See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26387.
See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1929.
506
Id. at 1935.
507
The Phonorecords III Board did not rely upon marketplace prevalence in adopting the
mechanical floor. See supra notes 100–104 and accompanying text.
508
See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
505
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may make it even more difficult for Copyright Owners looking to
establish a per-play rate, who will at that point be swimming upstream against over a decades-worth of market organization around
the percentage-of-revenue rate structure. On the other side, it provides an opportunity for Services to mount, in effect, a populist revolt against the uncapped TCC prong: presumably, if enough
streaming services manage to convince publishers to enter into voluntary agreements without an uncapped TCC prong, the Board will
look less favorably on reinstating this feature.
The net effect of this dynamic is difficult to predict before seeing
and dissecting the structural elements of the marketplace agreements
that will inform the Phonorecords IV Board’s analysis on this point.
Agreement Context and Participants. Both the Phonorecords III
and Web IV Boards agreed that the context in which a benchmark
agreement occurs can be relevant to the Board’s conclusion as to
whether the benchmark is probative of “reasonable” rates. The
Phonorecords III Board used the “context of litigation”—and its potential to distort bargaining positions with transaction cost avoidance—as a justification to ding a settlement benchmark in favor of
a marketplace benchmark.509 The Web IV Board went a step further:
it cited SoundExchange’s failure to consider the context and business relationships that birthed a proffered voluntary benchmark
agreement as grounds to wholly disregard it.510 The Phonorecords
IV Board will likely feel empowered to take similar steps.
Similarly, there is one recurring contextual argument that both
the Phonorecords III and Web IV have uniformly rejected: the “experimental” agreement argument. The licensor parties have attempted to make this case to invalidate both marketplace agreements511 and CRB settlements.512 In each context, the Board has essentially said the same thing: all agreements are experiments. 513
509

See Phonorecords III, supra note 28, at 1935.
See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26353.
511
See supra note 255.
512
See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
513
See Web IV, supra note 73, at 26371–72. While the Phonorecords III majority did not
expressly respond to this argument, it declined to endorse it, leaving Judge Strickler to be
more explicit in his dissent: “At a high level, all markets are not ‘mature,’ in the sense that
510
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There is no reason to think that this argument will become any more
compelling to the Phonorecords IV Board as streaming continues its
climb from industry niche to industry overlord. 514
Finally, while the matter did not arise in Phonorecords III, the
Web IV Board established that, in a willing buyer/willing seller context, the participants themselves are relevant to a benchmark’s reliability.515 In addition to its split baby regarding the Pandora/Merlin
benchmark’s representativeness of the licensor market at large,516
the Board also examined whether Pandora was representative of the
licensee market at large. Did Pandora’s market share afford it too
much market power for its negotiated rates to be representative of
the market at large? In answering this question, the Board set forth
a guiding legal principle: market power in a bilateral marketplace
agreement is not a product of the licensee’s percentage share of its
own market, but rather the percentage of the licensor’s revenue that
is derived from the licensee’s business.517 Thus, Pandora’s irrefutably expansive share of the noninteractive music market was trumped
by the relatively insignificant 5% of Merlin member revenue it

they are dynamic and thus subject to change, making all rate structures ‘temporary,’ if not
‘experimental.’” Phonorecords III, supra note 27, at 2000 (Strickler, J., dissenting).
514
See Sarah Perez, TechCrunch: Streaming Services Accounted for Nearly 80% of All
Music Revenue in 2019, RIAA (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.riaa.com/techcrunchstreaming-services-accounted-for-nearly-80-of-all-music-revenue-in-2019/
[https://perma.cc/9BPY-3NU8]. The ever-refreshing supply of new streaming entrants
should ensure that Copyright Owners are never entirely bereft of arrows in their
“experimental” quiver. See, e.g., Anne Freer, TikTok Secures Licensing Deal with Major
Music Publishers, BUS. OF APPS (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.businessofapps.com/
news/tiktok-secures-licensing-deal-with-major-music-publishers/
[https://perma.cc/4T
PW-BJAQ]; Dami Lee, Snap Is Looking into Licensing Music for Users to Embed in Posts,
VERGE (May 24, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/24/18638984/snap-snapchatmusic-licensing-copyright; [https://perma.cc/F8TR-G57S]; Cherie Hu, Unbundling The
Song: Inside The Next Wave Of Recorded Music’s Disruption, FORBES (May 13, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/cheriehu/2018/05/13/unbundling-the-song-inside-the-nextwave-of-recorded-musics-disruption/#645ca6109cae [https://perma.cc/3QT3-4FB4]; Jon
Blistein, Twitch Licenses Music Now. But the Music Industry Says It’s Skirting the Rules,
ROLLING
STONE
(Oct.
1,
2020),
https://www.rollingstone.com/pro/
features/twitch-soundtrack-licensing-sync-1069411/ [https://perma.cc/2WUK-S2DQ].
515
See Web IV, supra note 73.
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See supra notes 253–255 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 255.
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accounted for: Pandora was not too powerful to be representative of
other licensees.518
This issue’s Phonorecords III absence is noteworthy. Like noninteractive streaming, interactive streaming has a few dominant
players: for interactive audio-only streaming, Spotify has a large
plurality market share,519 and for interactive video music streaming,
YouTube is dominant.520 While the percentage of each licensor’s
revenue that each streaming service accounts for is, of course, proprietary, streaming revenue as a whole accounted for nearly 80% of
all recorded music revenue in 2019.521 It stands to reason, then, that
for at least some of the licensors—either publishers, or especially
record labels—who were party to the Spotify and YouTube voluntary agreements that the Copyright Owners offered as benchmarks
in Phonorecords III,522 Spotify or YouTube would have
accounted for significantly more than the 5% of revenue that the
Web IV Board ruled was insufficient to constitute market power. 523
The Phonorecords IV Board may very well see a benchmark
challenged on these grounds, likely to the benefit of the Copyright
Owners. The fact that the Phonorecords III Board did not have to
rule on whether Spotify or YouTube was representative of other,
less powerful services was probably due to the fact that these benchmarks were proffered by the Copyright Owners—the same party

518

See id.
See Stuart Dredge, Report: Spotify Has 36% Market Share of Music-Streaming Subs,
MUSIC ALLY (Dec. 9, 2019), https://musically.com/2019/12/09/report-spotify-has-36market-share-of-music-streaming-subs/ [https://perma.cc/C2PZ-NQQ5].
520
YouTube reportedly accounts for 47% of all (not just video) on-demand music
streaming. See Matt Binder, YouTube Accounts for 47 Percent of Music Streaming, Study
Claims, MASHABLE (Oct. 10, 2018), https://mashable.com/article/youtube-47-percent-ofon-demand-music-streaming/ [https://perma.cc/UQ33-G83S]. For the avoidance of
confusion: interactive video streaming is not subject to the Section 115 compulsory license.
See FAQs for YouTube Content Uploaders, ASCAP, https://www.ascap.com/help/musicbusiness-101/youtube-faq-uploaders [https://perma.cc/2LUP-NQGY]. See also Bruce
Houghton, “YouTube is Becoming More Important to Music than Music is to YouTube,”
says MIDiA’s Mark Mulligan, HYPEBOT (Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.hypebot.com/
hypebot/2020/11/youtube-is-becoming-more-important-to-music-than-music-is-toyoutube-says-midias-mark-mulligan.html [https://perma.cc/V6M2-5JNU].
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who would have had the incentive to argue that Spotify/YouTube’s
market power had depressed the benchmark rates—and not the Services.524 That could easily change in Phonorecords IV. It is also possible that the Phonorecords III Board considered this entire issue to
be more relevant in a willing buyer/willing seller context than an
801(b) context—a matter more appropriate for Web IV (which engaged with it) than for the pre-MMA Phonorecords III (which did
not). If so, that will change in Phonorecords IV. The bottom line:
any extent to which the Board finds marketplace benchmark rates to
be anticompetitively depressed by streaming services’ market power
can only help the Copyright Owners.
IV. WHAT COMES NEXT? PROJECTING THE IMPACT OF THESE CHANGES

Interested onlookers attempting to use the Phonorecords III and
Web IV determinations to predict the MMA’s effect on mechanical
royalty rates are apt to see what they want to see. There is enough
pro-licensee material in the Phonorecords III decision that appears
to have been influenced by the now-vanquished 801(b) factors to
give licensors hope that Phonorecords IV will raise rates beyond the
incumbent 44% increase—assuming it survives remand. Conversely, there is also enough pro-licensor material in Phonorecords
III that appears to conflict with Web IV to give licensees hope that
the willing buyer/willing seller may be less copyright-friendly than
its advocates hope.
In reality, the two decisions are more similar than they are different. Each undertook similar approaches, albeit with somewhat divergent emphases: (1) each began with structural determinations,
followed by (2) evaluating specific benchmarks and economic analyses; (3) each then synthesized these data points into zones of reasonableness before (4) selecting final rates. 525 Both Boards placed
special emphasis on competitive concerns. 526 Finally, both Boards
engaged in substantial market analysis, even where (in the case of

524
525
526

See supra Section II.A.4.a.
See supra Sections I.A–I.B.
See id.
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Phonorecords III) they were not expressly charged with setting
market rates.527
Of course, even subtle changes can have dramatic impact on
songwriters struggling to scrape out a living in the new streaming economy, and on streaming services continuing their slow trek
towards consistent profitability. And, to be sure, the two opinions
contain a number of subtle—and less-than-subtle—differences.
Together, the Phonorecords III and Web IV determinations stand
for the proposition that songwriters should remain cautiously optimistic that the willing buyer/willing seller rate standard will boost
their rates.
Part IV of this Comment explains why. First, Section A discusses the reasons for songwriter optimism—recapping and elaborating upon the positive implications suggested by this Comment’s
analysis of Phonorecords III and Web IV. Sections B and C then
explain why that optimism should be tempered with caution—by,
respectively, recapping and discussing the pro-service implications
for the change to willing buyer/willing seller, and finally by cataloging the many points of uncertainty.
A. Pro-Songwriter Implications
A side-by-side comparison of Phonorecords III and Web IV illuminates several points of optimism for songwriters. This is not, in
and of itself, particularly surprising: the switch to willing buyer/willing seller was pushed for by rightsholders, not licensees, after all.
But even beyond the consensus, conclusory feeling that a mandate
to set market-based rates will result in higher songwriter compensation than past rate standards, there are specific granular matters from
within the two Board’s reasonings that suggest further rate increases
may be on deck.
Most notably, the Copyright Owners have never been better
equipped to pursue their coveted per-play rate. First, the absence of
801(b) factor A—the “availability” factor that the Board construed
as regulating pro-service demand considerations, rather than prosongwriter supply considerations—removes the most explicit per-
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play obstacle cited in Phonorecords III.528 While Web IV demonstrates that the absence of Factor A will not preclude the Board from
considering the downstream competitive effects that ultimately dissuaded it from adopting a per-play rate, it also shows that, in the
willing buyer/willing seller context, the Board is perhaps more amenable to other factors trumping downstream competitive effects.529
Second, per-play advocates may also rejoice in the post-MMA absence of 801(b) factor D (industry disruption), which the Board similarly linked to its decision not to adopt a per-play rate.530 Third, in
a world in which the Board has declared itself bound by something
close to stare decisis, and just recently imposed a per-play rate on
its most contemporary willing buyer/willing seller rate determination (Web IV), it may feel some pressure to allow its newly unified
inputs (i.e. rate standards) to yield unified outputs (i.e. rate structures).531 Finally, these per-play hopes are only further bolstered by
the Phonorecords III Board’s express statement of preference for
simplicity: there is, of course, no simpler structure than a straightforward per-play rate.532
Even in the absence of a per-play rate, the Copyright Owners
should also feel relatively confident that the structural protections
they currently do approve of are not (for the most part) in any particular danger. Nothing in Web IV forecloses any of the reasoning
the Phonorecords III Board used to arrive at a mechanical floor or a
TCC prong—both of which activate when diminished service revenue would otherwise lead to reduced royalties. 533 Here, songwriters
may take extra solace in both the Web IV and Phonorecords III
Board’s insistence that they are in no way obligated to protect any
specific service’s business models, nor ensure anyone’s profitability.534 This should continue to foreclose the Services from effectively weaponizing low-revenue services—for whom these alternate, non-revenue-based prongs might pose a hardship—in order to

528
529
530
531
532
533
534

See supra Section III.B.2
See id.
See supra Section III.B.6.
See supra Section I.A.4.
See supra Section I.B.3.
See generally supra Part II.
See supra Section III.B.4.

686

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:387

convince the Board to abandon these protections in the name of protecting these fledgling services.
Beyond structure, songwriters may also reasonably feel optimism regarding the future numerical rates themselves. Fundamentally, the absence of the 801(b) factors relieves the Board of its former “legislative discretion,” which allowed it to maintain—at least
in songwriters’ estimation—below-market rates wedged into songwriter-hostile structures.535 Whether or not those assessments are
accurate, it is undeniably true that the post-MMA Board no longer
has the discretion to stray from market-based rates. 536 Where the
Phonorecords III Board was permitted—indeed required—to entertain economic analyses across the fair market/free market spectrum,
the Phonorecords IV Board will only be permitted to consider analysis that at least purports to model a free market. 537 While the parties
will no doubt submit widely divergent analyses that each purport to
imitate a free market, it is significant that no party—particularly the
Services—will be able to factor in non-market values and principles.
In the end, the removal of the 801(b) factors as available Shapley
inputs may be the most consequential change of all.
The resulting upward pressure on rates should work in tandem
with the Phonorecords IV Board’s likely renewed emphasis on
Shapley analyses. First, there is a real possibility that the statutory
text itself may forestall the use of marketplace benchmarks altogether.538 Even if they are permitted, they will likely be deemphasized relative to the Shapley analyses that the Phonorecords III
Board already revealed itself to be partial to.539 For rightsholders
convinced that benchmark rates derived from within the Section 115
marketplace are inherently shaded downwards by the statutory
“shadow,” this would be a welcome development. 540
To the extent that the Board does rely upon marketplace benchmarks—which did of course figure prominently into the Web IV
Board’s construction of the willing buyer/willing seller rate
535
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538
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standard541—Web IV does provide at least one beacon of hope for
songwriters. After ignoring the issue in Phonorecords III, the Web
IV Board showed itself willing to evaluate whether certain Service
benchmarks reflected market power on behalf of the contracting
service.542 For a streaming industry that is certainly not getting any
less concentrated, this may give Copyright Owners some cause
to believe that their benchmark arguments in Phonorecords IV
may fare better than in the past.543 It may also afford them a plausible counter to the Phonorecords III and Web IV Boards’ insistence
that interactive streaming sound recording rates are inflated by
major label market power.544 Fundamentally, anything the Copyright Owners can do to link their rates to those much higher sound
recording rates is a win for songwriters. Finally, next time around,
the Copyright Owners should be able to at least attempt to substantiate their claims that “safe harbor” depresses both sound recording
and composition rates from YouTube, giving their YouTube benchmark (a favorable benchmark for songwriters in Phonorecords III)
a fighting chance.545
B. Pro-Service Implications
While many of the implications of the new rate standard tend to
cut against the Services’ interests, the Services certainly benefit
from the inertia suggested by the similarities between Phonorecords
III and Web IV. For one—perhaps most importantly to the Services—the Web IV Board’s competition-driven approach is entirely
consistent with the Phonorecords III Board’s emphasis on the perfectly complementary nature of mechanical and performance
streaming rights, and its resulting decision to renew the all-in rate
structure.546 The all-in rate structure allows the CRB to effectively
cap the Services’ obligations to songwriters (in the U.S.): sure, they
must still negotiate with the PROs, and go to rate court where
necessary, but anything that comes out of their left pocket will
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ultimately be credited to their right pocket anyway.547 Second, Web
IV also offered Copyright Owners no additional ammunition in their
fight to show that the services effectively suppress royalty rates
through revenue deferral, “loss-leading,” revenue displacement, and
other business practices and models.548 The Phonorecords III Board
proved itself fairly resistant to these arguments, and the Services
will be happy that the Web IV Board avoided discussing them altogether.549 They will also, no doubt, be grateful that the Board views
the record companies as an oligopoly—and therefore any inflated
benchmark rates involving record company negotiations as inherently suspect—regardless of which rate standard it is applying.550
Further, while Web IV does supply new market-based ammunition for the Copyright Owners’ per-play crusade, it also appears to
hinder their ability to leverage several non-market arguments. First,
to the (limited) extent that Phonorecords III may have left the door
open for the Copyright Owners to re-run their “inherent value”
argument, the Web IV Board’s conspicuous silence on all equity
matters seems to confirm that such arguments have no place in a
willing buyer/willing seller landscape.551
Of even greater consequence: while the Board did not expressly
allow these songwriter-wellbeing arguments to inform its interpretation of the 801(b) factors, it did invoke these concerns in its 801(b)
discussion, and ultimately expressly tied them to its conclusion that
mechanical royalty rates should be significantly increased from their
2012 levels.552 Thus, even if the Services believe that the switch to
willing buyer/willing seller may increase the chances of a modest
rate increase in Phonorecords IV, they will no doubt be heartened
that much of the evidence that the Phonorecords III Board most directly mobilized in its decision to enact a significant rate hike is no
longer relevant to the new rate standard.
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C. Uncertain Implications
In some respects, the differences between Phonorecords and
Web IV yield more questions than answers. For one, there is the entirely unsettled issue surrounding the role (or possible lack thereof)
of marketplace benchmarks under the new Section 115. 553 The Web
IV Board devoted by far more time to evaluating benchmarks than
it did to any other portion of its analysis. If it is unable to do the
same in Phonorecords IV, then it may be impossible for willing
buyer/willing seller to truly embody the “unified” rate standard
trumpeted by both Congress and the Copyright Office. 554 Nor is it
possible to confidently predict what the effect of such an outcome
would be on royalty rates. While licensors may hope that the uncertainty around benchmark admissibility will help them escape the
statutory “shadow”—and it certainly may—its most likely outcome
is an increase in outcome variance, which could ultimately swing
either way (or back-and-forth over time, depending on the makeup
of any particular triumvirate of judges).
Second, the heightened statutory emphasis on substitution and
promotion effects adds an extra layer of volatility.555 All that is certain is that substitution and promotion effects will factor prominently into the Board’s analysis.556 What remains entirely unclear is
which side this will benefit. For one, as discussed supra, both substitution and promotion effects operate opposite to themselves depending on whether they are discussed in the benchmark context, or
outside of it.557 Thus, their import is directly linked to the uncertainty surrounding the role of benchmarks. And even if, as seems
likely, the Board ends up entertaining promotion and substitution
arguments primarily outside of the benchmark context, both the
Copyright Owners (stressing, in this context, substitution) and the
Services (countering, in this context, with promotion) will have
plausible arguments in support of their respective positions. In the
end, the Board will simply have to choose a narrative it prefers. The
only thing that is certain about this choice is that the statute now
553
554
555
556
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expressly provides that the Board should afford this tug-of-war
significant attention.558
A similar —albeit, unanointed by the statute—uncertainty exists
surrounding the import of extra-statutory functionality contemplated by prospective benchmarks 559 and of the prevalence of certain
features in the marketplace: it is impossible to know which way
these factors will cut until the parties have actually furnished these
putative benchmarks.560 It is entirely plausible that both services and
publishers alike will have sought to score CRB points by ensuring
that any voluntary agreements entered into tend to conform to structural features they hope to see reflected in future CRB determinations. Finally, it is difficult to predict the role that the context surrounding future proffered benchmarks will play without knowing
what those benchmark agreements are, and when and how they were
entered into. For example: were the parties on the verge of infringement litigation, or in the purgatory period between the MMA’s passage and the date its effective sunsetting of service liability became
active, etc.?561 And finally, once again, how probative of a benchmark will Phonorecords III itself—a hugely litigious, controversial,
statutorily-mandated ruling, applying a defunct rate standard—
prove to be?562
Meanwhile, lurking beneath all of this will be the absence of
801(b) Factor D (industry disruption).563 To be sure, as discussed
supra, the upshot of this change does skew songwriter-friendly. 564
But apart from that general leaning, Factor D’s disappearance unlocks something else: instability. While the Phonorecords III Board
did not view Factor D as sufficiently imposing to preclude a 44%
increase, that does not necessarily mean Factor D did not act as a
governor on the Board’s ultimate wishes. For one, it may be the case
that the majority actually wished to impose a greater rate increase,
but felt barred from doing so under Factor D. In any event, it
558
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certainly is the case that the Board felt that it had to delay the full
effect of its rate increase over a half-decade purely out of deference
to Factor D.565
There are a few other potential wild cards. For example, structures and proposals not considered in either Web IV or Phonorecords
III may arise for the first time in Phonorecords IV. One proposal
that has gained some widespread support is the notion of “user-centric” royalty accounting, whereby streaming services would pay
rightsholders—particularly labels, but also potentially publishers,
subject to CRB adoption—rates prorated by user, rather than by
overall stream count.566 In other words, a user paying $10/month
who only streams one song that month would see all $10 of their
user fee (less Spotify’s share) paid through to rightsholders for that
one song, rather than have their one stream lumped into a general
fund paid out pro rata, treating all streams as equal.
Finally, regardless of whether the uncapped TCC that was struck
down on appeal re-emerges on remand in Phonorecords III-2, the
concept of an uncapped TCC prong is likely to reprise its role as a
hot button item in Phonorecords IV. Importantly, the D.C. Circuit
made its ruling on procedural, not substantive, grounds, leaving the
door open for future Boards to explore this structure again—provided they give the parties sufficient notice and opportunity to litigate the point.567 If and when TCC comes up in Phonorecords IV,
the ticking time bomb that is the major label oligopoly could very
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well compel the Board to reconsider tying publishing rates directly
to what the Board itself believes to be undue label market power.
CONCLUSION

While the differences between the Phonorecords III and Web IV
determinations certainly tend—generally, if not at all uniformly—
to shade in favor of songwriters, the two proceedings’ similarities
suggest that the distance between the old 801(b) standard and the
new willing buyer/seller standard for Section 115 licenses may not
be quite as pronounced as either the MMA’s rightsholder champions
hope, or its detractors fear. Indeed, the Phonorecords III Board
itself, in effect, made this point when it noted that 801(b) rates
and market rates were not mutually exclusive.568 Under both rate
standards, the Board is guided by competition considerations, exercising broad discretion and flexibility in choosing both rate structures and numerical rates. Licensors hoping that the new rate standard will reinvigorate their favorite arguments—service revenue
deferral, the statutory “shadow,” synchronization as free market
bastion, and “experimental” benchmark invalidity—are likely to be
disappointed.
Furthermore, to the extent that Phonorecords III and Web IV
do highlight some real, operative differences between the two rate
standards, these differences also unlock a significant degree of
volatility. In other words, while songwriter’s may on average expect
to benefit from the new rate standard, they should also steel themselves for an even broader spectrum of possible outcomes—in both
directions.
Still, the median value within that broadened spectrum does appear to be more songwriter-friendly under willing buyer/willing
seller than it was under 801(b). Songwriters have perhaps never had
a better shot at a per-play rate, nor more structural avenues to deemphasize statutorily “shadow”-ed benchmarks—even if the substantive “shadow” critique itself is unlikely to fall on friendlier ears
post-MMA than was the case pre-MMA. More fundamentally, their
fate is now in the hands of a tribunal with neither the “legislative
568
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discretion” nor the “public interest” mandate to do anything other
than attempt to approximate market rates. And so there is certainly
cause for songwriters and publishers to bask in the promise of the
new rate standard they fought for. Nonetheless, they would do well
to temper their optimism with a significant dose of caution, even as
they prepare to aim “impossibly high” in the “all-out war” that is
soon to come.569
Only one thing is certain: the distance between the final buzzer
for Phonorecords III and the opening tip-off for Phonorecords IV
will be, at most, a few months.
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